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Chapter 1.
Introduction
The concept of stakeholder participation has become a critical approach in devel-
opment policy and is still at the center of contemporary development discourse.
In the mid 1960s, policy makers in the US started to question that economic
growth would yield social justice in the Third World and development special-
ists moved from capital-investment growth models to more people-centered ap-
proaches. In 1966, Title IX of the Foreign Aid Assistance Act oﬃcially recognized
the contribution of popular participation amending the existing legislation to sup-
port more participatory approaches (Cohen and Uphoﬀ, 1980).
Over the last ﬁfty years, participation has increased in popularity, acquired a wide
range of meanings, and promoted a variety of practices.
Under the assumption that an active participation of stakeholders in the policy
process leads the way to more democratic and eﬀective governance, participation
has become one of the most widely used concepts in development politics (Reed,
2008; Young, 1980; Pretty, 1995).
The merits of participation are manifold and include normative claims like the
realization of democratic values or empowering marginalized groups which bene-
ﬁts the democratic society, citizenship, and equity. Stakeholder participation in
the decision-making process may increase public trust in decisions and civil soci-
ety if participatory processes are perceived transparent and consider conﬂicting
claims and views (Richards et al., 2004). Furthermore, it reduces the likelihood
of marginalized groups if stakeholders are included in decisions that aﬀect them
and an active citizenship can be promoted (Martin and Sherington, 1997). Active
participation may foster transparency in the policy process and enables the people
to hold the government accountable for its actions.
More pragmatic claims focus on a higher quality of political decisions and in-
creased eﬃciency implied by participatory processes. The inclusion of relevant
stakeholders provides access to grassroots knowledge and may enhance the capac-
ity to meet local needs and priorities (Martin and Sherington, 1997; Reed, 2007).
Furthermore, the integration of local and scientiﬁc knowledge allows a compre-
hensive understanding of complex development processes. Including local interests
and concerns into the decision-making process increases the likelihood that local
needs and priorities are successfully met (Dougill et al., 2006) and may lead to
ownership over the process and outcomes (Richards et al., 2004). Ownership of
stakeholders over the policies that aﬀect them is one of the key elements in the
concept of participation. An active involvement of stakeholders in the decision-
making process may foster commitment to the policies and promote ownership of
the outcome which increases eﬃcient implementation (Stiglitz, 2002).
Even though stakeholder participation in development policy is not a new con-
cept and remains high on the political agenda, a quantitative evaluation of parti-
1
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cipatory policy processes and a comprehensive policy process framework based on
micro-political theories is still missing. Approaches to assess participation remain
vague and on a narrative level. Neither a clear concept nor a framework to quan-
titatively measure participation have been developed yet. While diﬀerent degrees
of participation are described and evaluated based on typologies developed in the
literature, it is not clear what beneﬁcial participatory structures actually are, nor
how they evolve or how they translate into government performance. Even if we
knew which participatory structures are favorable and in which way they impact
government performance, we would not know how to achieve the desired level of
participation.
In this context, we propose a framework based on social network analysis (SNA)
that includes modules of interest group theory to measure stakeholder participa-
tion. Incorporating lobbying activities and informational inﬂuence into a leg-
islative decision-making model enables us to derive network-based indicators to
quantitatively assess the extent of stakeholder participation in policy processes.
In particular, the developed indicators enable the assessment of governmental
accountability, government capture, and political ownership as a result of stake-
holder participation in the policy process. Furthermore, we apply the developed
framework empirically. First, we perform a descriptive analysis of participatory
policy processes in African countries based on the derived participation indicators
and standard measures of quantitative network analysis. Secondly, we review the
revealed participation structure in a cross-country comparison in order to detect
a possible relationship between the structure indicated by the applied participa-
tion indicators and performance. Finally, we test our theoretical framework and
construct central theoretical hypothesis on the process of knowledge interaction.
Part I includes a review of the relevant literature and provides the theoretical
framework for our analysis. Chapter 2 outlines the concept of participation as
well as approaches to evaluate participatory processes in the literature. Chapter 3
describes the theoretical framework in order to provide the environment to derive
the network-based indicators of participation. Part II comprises the empirical
application of our framework. The design of the elite network survey and the
collection of quantitative network data are described in chapter 5 followed by
the three country case-studies in chapters 6 to 8. Subsequently, we provide an
overview of the central results in a comparative perspective and evaluate the
identiﬁed participation structures based on the political performance in a cross-
country comparison. Furthermore, we discuss the limits of networks by applying
the derived participation-indicators to estimated network data which enables us to
comment on the robustness of the empirical results in chapter 9. Finally, we apply
quantitative network analysis in the context of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
to explicitly investigate the donor-recipient relation in the process of knowledge
interaction in chapter 10, before we conclude with a summary and critically assess
our approach which provides the environment for further research on participatory
policy processes.
2
Part I.
Theoretical Framework
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Chapter 2.
Literature Overview on Participatory Processes
A policy shall reﬂect the concerns of those that are aﬀected by the policy outcome.
The concept of participation boils down to the perception that the inclusion of
the society in the policy process leads to better policy outcomes if the voice of
the people is taken into account. Thus, participation is given if a policy decision
reﬂects the needs and wants of the society or any subgroup thereof. The degree
of participation can be high or low and may have direct or indirect eﬀects on
the policy outcome. If the society does not engage in the policy process, ineﬃ-
cient policy outcomes are the result. Only if policy instruments are aligned to
the needs and concerns of those that are directly aﬀected by the outcome par-
ticipatory policy-making may foster economic and social development. On the
other hand, a very high degree of participation may be ineﬃcient as well if the
decision-making process is determined by the society alone and the policy issues to
be decided on are complex and of particular importance. Complete participation
of the society implies that every citizen has a vote that directly aﬀects a policy
decision, regardless of the knowledge about the context and possible outcomes,
and may thus lead to imperfect allocations due to uncertainty.
However, policies are not determined by the society. As representatives of the
society, only politicians have legislative decision-making power by constitution.
Though voter behavior is not the issue of interest in this study, it is worth noting
that one form of political participation is the citizen's democratic right to vote.
Voting shapes the course of politics and enables the people to hold the government
accountable for its actions. We are interested in participation by the society that
aﬀects the political decision-making process beyond voting.
If we want to consider the society in the policy process we ﬁrst have to determine
who the society is comprised of and how it can be involved in political decision-
making.
Participation can either include the citizen (popular participation) or actors who
hold a stake in what they participate in (stakeholder participation). Furthermore,
participation can take place either at the micro-level (i.e. policy implementation,
e.g. community-programs) or at the macro-level (i.e. sector wide participation,
e.g. policy formulation), and comprise diﬀerent issues in environmental, health,
or economic development contexts. Popular participation, i.e. the participation
of the citizenry, is primarily called for in contexts in which the involvement of the
broad society is essential like environmental sustainability, health care, or edu-
cation. For example, the implementation of sustainable environmental policies is
impossible without the participation of the citizens if they do not identify with
the decided policy and hence don't commit to its implementation. While popular
participation was primarily the approach of choice in implementing policies de-
ﬁned by donor organizations in the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) processes
5
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in the 1990s, more recently the focus shifted towards participation and ownership
of the political decision-making process. The call for participation in policy pro-
cesses considers stakeholders rather than the general public as not every citizen
is aﬀected by or inﬂuences the decision-making process in particular policy ﬁelds.
In general, stakeholders are non-state actors who are aﬀected by or can aﬀect
a policy decision (Freeman, 1984). Depending on the policy ﬁeld, stakeholders
comprise organizations, constituencies, and collective bodies with a stake in the
policy process and may participate in planning, implementation, or monitoring
and evaluation.
While this study lays the focus on stakeholder participation rather than popular
participation, there is a ﬂuid transition between both concepts. In the next two
sections we will provide an overview of the relevant literature on participation.
Section 2.1 presents key concepts and typologies of participation before we de-
scribe the attempts to assess participatory processes in the literature in section
2.2.
2.1. Key Concepts
Over the time of its development, the concept of participation has continued to
embrace a widespread range of meanings and interpretations in the contexts where
it has been applied (Lawrence, 2006). As a consequence, typologies of participa-
tion have evolved to comprehend the diﬀerences between these interpretations and
their associated approaches and methods, and to understand the diﬀerent contexts
in which they are applied ideally. Typologies provide a useful starting point to
distinguish degrees and classes of participation and can be used a-priori to choose
participatory methods based on the desirable outcome or can be applied post-hoc
to evaluate and categorize observed participation (Reed, 2008). Most typologies
bear implicit normative assumptions indicating that some approaches to partici-
pation should be preferred over others.
The ﬁrst typologies take account of the degree to which stakeholders are engaged.
One of the best known is Arnstein's `ladder of participation' (Arnstein, 1969), who
describes a continuum of increasing stakeholder involvement symbolized by eight
rungs on a ladder of citizen participation ranging from passive dissemination of
information (which she calls `manipulation' and `therapy') to active engagement.
While `non-participation' constitutes the two lowest rungs on Arnstein's ladder,
she distinguishes the increase in participation into three degrees of `tokenism'
comprised of informing, consultation, and placation, and three degrees of `citizen
power' which includes partnership, delegate power, and ﬁnally citizen control at
the topmost rung. Various alternative terms have been suggested for the diﬀerent
rungs of the ladder. Pretty (1995) characterizes the diﬀerent levels of partici-
pation equally normative from `manipulative participation' which includes token
representatives without real power to `self-mobilization'. The two highest levels of
participation, i.e. `interactive participation' and `self-mobilizations', are charac-
terized by diﬀerent systems of ownership. `Interactive participation' is described
as a learning process, in which people participate in joint analysis, development of
action plans or strengthening institutions. `Self-mobilization' particularly empha-
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sizes the control over how resources are used, which enables people to participate
by taking initiatives independently of external institutions to change systems.
Furthermore, self-mobilization may spread if governments and NGOs provide an
enabling framework of support.
The metaphor of the ladder has been criticized by some practitioners to imply
an ultimate goal of all participation exercises, which proposes a simplistic view
of power, suggesting that manipulation can occur at each rung of the ladder (e.g.
Abbott, 2013). Yet, diﬀerent types of engagement are likely to be appropriate in
diﬀerent occasions and circumstances, depending on the objectives and the ca-
pacity of stakeholders to inﬂuence outcomes (Richards et al., 2004; Tippett et al.,
2007). This is taken account of by the `wheel of participation' which has been
supplemented as an alternative metaphor (Davidson, 1998).
Also, diﬀerent degrees of participation may result from the nature of engage-
ment. Value-based decisions may require higher levels of public involvement than
knowledge-based decisions which in return involve speciﬁc stakeholders rather
than the general public. Diﬀerent types of public engagement may thus arise as
a consequence of communication ﬂows between stakeholders. Rowe and Frewer
(2000) characterize the extent of public participation in the decision-making pro-
cess based on the direction of communication. The lowest level is deﬁned by a
one-way ﬂow of information between scientists and the public in a top-down com-
munication process, whereas the highest level of participation is represented by
a two-way exchange of information and dialogue on a mutual basis. However, a
top-down communication process (the so-called `deﬁcit model') between experts
and the general public is viewed by some scholars as the most suitable approach
leading to public acceptance of policies and decisions following as a result of an
alignment process (see Rowe and Frewer, 2000). While participation through in-
formation sharing might restrict more active participation it fosters transparency
and enables the people to hold the government accountable for its actions.
Further typologies concentrate on the theoretical basis (Habermas, 1987), dis-
tinguish between normative and pragmatic participation (Beierle, 2002; Thomas,
1993) or account for the objective of participation (Michener, 1998; Okali et al.,
1994). White (1996) includes the interest-dimension into the framework of par-
ticipation and distinguishes and provides examples of four major types of par-
ticipation, i.e. nominal, instrumental, representative, and transformative. By
contrasting the interests in participation from the perspectives of the architects of
participation (`top-down') with the participants (`bottom-up'), she points out that
stakeholders do not share the same expectations of participation in development
projects. The ambiguity of participation, as both concept and practice, leaves
scope to entrench existing power relations. The importance of the relative power
of outsiders and beneﬁciaries as a key characteristic in deﬁning participation is
underlined by Deshler and Sock (1985), who developed a typology based on a scale
which measures the extent of control or power ranging from pseudo-participation
to genuine participation. In general, the evaluation of participation is conditioned
by the context and those within. Diﬀerent participants and diﬀerent purposes
require diﬀerent forms of participation. Who participates is crucial and has been
taken into account by Cohen and Uphoﬀ (1980) who not only included diﬀer-
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ent types of participation, but who participates and how. They distinguish the
type of participation in regard to decision-making, implementation, beneﬁts, and
evaluation. The who dimension comprises local residents, local leaders, and gov-
ernment as well as foreign employees. The how dimension diﬀerentiates between
the basis of participation (initiative, inducement), the form of participation (struc-
ture, channels), extent of participation (duration), and the eﬀect of participation
(empowerment).
However, while these wide range of concepts and typologies of participation
provide a guideline to understand diﬀerent levels of participation it remains vague
and leaves little room for assessment beyond anecdotal and narrative evidence.
Important issues that impact the level of participation are raised. While it is clear
that the capacity of stakeholders to inﬂuence outcomes (Richards et al., 2004; Tip-
pett et al., 2007) is crucial, it is not clear how stakeholders achieve the capacity
required in a particular context nor what degree of inﬂuence is beneﬁcial and by
whom? Deshler and Sock (1985) point out that the relative power of outsiders
and beneﬁciaries is a key characteristic in deﬁning participation. But they pro-
vide no theoretical framework on how power structures emerge nor on how relative
power of stakeholders can be measured. On a theoretical level, the importance of
communication and knowledge in stakeholder participation has been pointed out,
but take on the simplistic view on the direction of communication ﬂows (Rowe
and Frewer, 2000) or relate vaguely to abstract theories, e.g. the theory of com-
municative action by Habermas (1987). The vagueness of the various concepts
and typologies is reﬂected in the attempts to assess participatory processes in
the literature. The next section provides a brief overview of approaches to assess
participation. Primarily based on qualitative methods that mirror the vagueness
of the concepts of participation they a lack a clear concept of measurement. Nev-
ertheless, they provide insights into the realities encountered in political practice.
2.2. Approaches to assess Participation
When we think about assessing participation we generally have to distinguish be-
tween evaluation and quantiﬁcation of participation. In addition to that, we have
to diﬀerentiate between development programs and projects on the one hand and
development policy on the other. Development projects usually aim at popular
participation in communities whereas participatory policy making targets stake-
holder participation.
The narratives of the various concepts of participation have sparked primarily
qualitative approaches to evaluate participation in line with the developed typolo-
gies. Quantitative evidence as well as a theoretical based framework to quantita-
tively assess participation in policy processes is still absent. This section provides
a brief overview of the approaches to assess participation in the literature.
When participatory approaches in development hit mainstream in the 1990s, the
rhetoric of international organizations changed. Two participatory methodologies
descending from this period are the participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) and par-
ticipatory poverty assessment (PPA). Much like the concepts of participation or
participatory approaches themselves, numerous interpretations and applications of
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PRA evolved and make a thorough speciﬁcation of its content diﬃcult. According
to Lucas and Cornwall (2003), PRA `is a matter of individual and organizational
preference'. It may include checklists, interdisciplinary teams, visualization tech-
niques, or data triangulation as means of generating information. Others who
aim at transforming attitudes and behavior may instead listen to the needs of the
target group and build capacity for responsiveness and empathy (p. 17 Lucas and
Cornwall, 2003).
PPAs come in two versions. Designed as a method to include the realities of
the poor into poverty analysis and thereby informing policy choices, PPAs have
three key elements: ﬁeld research, policy inﬂuence, and country capacity. While
`ﬁrst generation PPAs' mainly focused on information gathering for research pur-
poses which is considered bad practice, `second generation PPAs' are designed to
account for policy inﬂuence and country capacity (Robb, 2002). Based on parti-
cipatory research methods to include the perspective of the poor, PPAs combine
both visual and verbal techniques. During the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)
process which explicitly called for the participation of the civil society in adoption
and monitoring PPAs have been increasingly applied (see McGee and Norton,
2000).
In the context of rural development projects the assessment of participatory pro-
cesses has been approached in case-studies.
Based on data collected through qualitative techniques taken from PRA, Mich-
ener (1998) analyzes participatory development in Burkina Faso. By examining a
case study of a community development project, she relates the pattern of partic-
ipation observed on diﬀerent stakeholder levels (i.e. policy, ﬁeld, community) to
common typologies and assesses the degree of participation. Moreover, she is able
to reveal complications in the implementation that might challenge participatory
development. Obstacles at the ﬁeld level such as unequal power relations may
foster manipulation and dependency. Vested interests on both sides of implemen-
tation hinder `genuine people-centered participation'. The working environment
of development assistance is appealing to its employees who have no incentive to
threaten their current situation by promoting empowerment and losing control
over the project. Communities may in return bargain with the agencies for bene-
ﬁts or refuse to participate for other reasons. Development professionals have to
adjust participatory frameworks to take account of the implementation realities
(Michener, 1998).
Ahuja et al. (2008) further illustrate the problems arising in the reality of imple-
mentation. Based on a case study on participatory policy development in Andhra
Pradesh, India, they highlight the challenges arising in a context of multiple ac-
tors with conﬂicting goals and interests which can lead to missed opportunities
to learn from stakeholders. Power structures constitute an obstacle to eﬀective
communication within the process and may lead to `agenda-hijack'. Thus, it is
important to reﬂect on the views and interactions of stakeholders and to identify
the diﬃculties in preceding projects that have to be overcome in order to better
design implementation-strategies for future processes.
Resnick and Birner (2009) review the role of participation in the formulation
of rural and agricultural development strategies. The paper presents case stud-
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ies of two national and two regional agricultural and rural development strategies.
Semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders constitute the main research
method. The chosen stakeholders span ﬁve major categories: government min-
istries, research institutes, producer organizations, NGOs, and the private sector.
Resnick and Birner (2009) ﬁnd that while the cases studied do not lack enough
participation, the primary issue is transforming the outcomes of participatory pro-
cesses into policies that could be feasibly implemented. The disconnect between
participation and implementation was inﬂuenced by political considerations, ﬁ-
nancial constraints, fundamental diﬀerences in opinion among key interest groups,
and a lack of communication by governments on policy decisions taken subsequent
to stakeholder involvement.
Karl et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive overview of the key principles, beneﬁts,
and constraints of participatory processes. She presents ten case-studies of FAO
and non-FAO experiences in supporting the rural poor in policy making processes,
who otherwise have only limited inﬂuence on the policies that aﬀect them when
policies are developed at a central level. The study is based on desk research and
interviews with project oﬃcials. She illustrates important cornerstones of partici-
patory policy making and outlines the most important results of each case-study
based on an analytical framework. This includes without limitation the initiator
and source of funding, goals and objectives, participants, the process itself as well
as the enabling environment, and constraints to success or failure of participatory
policy making. One of the key obstacles to participatory policy making relates to
power relations. Though successfully implemented, the cases of policy processes
in Mali, Kenya, and Mozambique highlight the need of greater accountability and
transparency to increase ownership and conﬁrm the importance of capacity build-
ing of stakeholders to avoid the emergence of power elites (Mali) and to prevent
pressure from powerful socio-economic groups (Mozambique). The experiences in
participatory approaches outlined by Karl et al. (2002) were intended to provide
assistance for the `Livelihood Support Programme' (LSP) initiated by the FAO in
2001. The subprogram of `Participation, Policy and Local Governance' accounts
for marginalized groups under the assumption that a more active participation in
policy making improves access of the rural poor to assets and services and thereby
beneﬁts livelihood and food security.
Similar to the LSP which focuses on participatory policy making, the Compre-
hensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) targets the inclusion
of relevant stakeholders in the policy process. In contrast to the LSP which is
initiated by the FAO, the CAADP is a continent-wide program which empha-
sizes country ownership in policy formulation and implementation and excludes
an external initiator. In an attempt to understand the potential of the CAADP
initiative1 to inﬂuence national agricultural policies, Zimmermann et al. (2009)
provide a comprehensive analysis of the key objectives of CAADP. In particular,
they evaluate the potential of CAADP for improving agricultural policies in the
case countries, i.e. Ghana and Kenya, by evaluating the quality of agricultural
1Zimmermann et al. (2009) analyze the CAADP policy processes as well as the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM) policy process. While the APRM process is interesting in itself,
we will focus on CAADP
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policy processes and the allocation of government expenditure to agriculture.
The study mostly relies on qualitative information and consequently most meth-
ods used in data collection and analysis are of qualitative nature. Quantitative
information is also used, albeit to a much lesser extent, mainly when reviewing
past macro-economic or budget trends. Methods used for gathering information
include review of documents, key informant interviews, participants' observation,
and network mapping. According to Zimmermann et al. (2009), implementation
of the CAADP framework in the case study countries has not led to the desired
improvement in participation, ownership, use of evidence and alignment compared
to the policy making processes previously in place. Nevertheless, the authors see
potential of CAADP to positively inﬂuence national agricultural policy making as
it is becoming part of the agricultural development discourse at the international
level and the ten percent budget-share for the agricultural sector has set a bench-
mark for countries to demonstrate their commitment.
While the study by Zimmermann et al. (2009) has the drawback that the two
case-countries had not yet started to implement the CAADP process and there-
fore the outcome is delicate to generalize, a CAADP working group on non state
actor participation comes to similar results. Randall (2011) critically assess the
ability of stakeholders to use the newly created opportunities of participation. Us-
ing information gathered by a qualitative stakeholder survey and desk research,
they point out that CAADP has not consistently achieved high quality inclusion
of non-state actors at national, regional and local levels.
Although these studies provide interesting insights into the diﬃculties in imple-
menting participatory policy processes, they demonstrate the weakness inherent
in current approaches to evaluate participatory processes. Findings based on sub-
jective level are connected with the vague typologies developed in the literature to
assess the level of participation. Clear conceptualized methodologies for a quan-
titative assessment of stakeholder participation are missing. The approaches to
evaluate participation are based on qualitative methods or PRA which itself has
been criticized for the lack of a commonly deﬁned framework (see Lucas and Corn-
wall, 2003). While qualitative methods provide valuable insights into diﬃculties
in the implementation process, they are not able to provide a causal relationship.
They oﬀer no comprehensive framework to integrate the role of stakeholders in
the policy process that goes beyond anecdotal evidence. It remains unclear how
particular participation structures determine the policy process or which eﬀect
conﬂicting interests and diﬀerent levels of power have on the policy outcome. If
we want to quantitatively assess participation in the policy-making processes, we
have to take the inﬂuence of stakeholders exerted in the decision-making process
into account.
At a methodological level, numerous theories and frameworks for the analysis
of policy-making processes exist. A common denominator of these frameworks are
power relations around three inter-locking domains (Sumner and Harpham, 2008,
p. 715):
• The policy narrative and discourse
• The policy actors and networks
• The policy making context and institutions.
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One policy analysis framework - the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) has gained wider attention by political sci-
entists. This framework explicitly identiﬁes beliefs as drivers of policy-making
and especially of advocacy coalitions and provides a systematic approach for a
stakeholder analysis. A belief system includes implicit theories about how to
achieve certain objectives, perceptions about the eﬃcacy of policy instruments,
value priorities, and perceptions of important causal relationships. The ACF con-
cept identiﬁes policy actors in a policy subsystem who share a particular set of
policy beliefs and act together on the basis of their shared beliefs. A policy subsys-
tem is deﬁned as a ﬁeld of policy analysis consisting of government, private sector,
academia, civil society organizations, and others, who are actively concerned with
a policy problem. Actors in the policy subsystem who share a set of normative
and causal beliefs can be grouped into an advocacy coalition. A coalition identiﬁes
a problem and forms beliefs about the policy instruments that could be used to
address the problem.
But the framework provides neither a theoretical model how actors of a policy
subsystem agree on a mutually accepted policy decision, nor a theoretical model
of belief formation among actors involved in policy-making.
One approach that has been neglected so far in the attempt to assess participa-
tory processes in development policy is social network analysis (SNA). It is widely
acknowledged that networks constitute an important channel through which stake-
holder organizations are able to inﬂuence the policy process and has been studied
by several scholars (e.g. Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi
et al., 1995; Pappi and Henning, 1999; Henning, 2009). However, even though
the importance of networks in international development has been acknowledged
(see Kuruvilla, 2005; Perkin and Court, 2008), comparable studies of agricultural
policy-making in developing countries that explicitly consider the interaction be-
tween policy makers and interest groups remain limited (Birner and Resnick,
2010).
Stakeholders involved in the policy process diﬀer in their level of power, interests,
and resources. The World Bank argues that `achieving consensus and reconciling
key stakeholder diﬀerences (...) may entail risks, such as generating or aggra-
vating conﬂicts among groups with competing interests and priorities. Dealing
with conﬂict often requires an understanding of the underlying societal interests
inhibiting consensus and putting into place mechanisms for dispute resolution and
negotiation' (The World Bank, 1996, p. 7). The importance of the interaction be-
tween stakeholder organizations which shapes the level and type of participation
in development policies is evident and has been tried to capture on a qualitative
level through network mapping (e.g. Zimmermann et al., 2009). On a quantita-
tive level, Prell et al. (2009) apply SNA subsequent to a stakeholder analysis in
order to shed light on the inﬂuence structure based on communication in a parti-
cipatory process. However, while this study recognizes the advantages of network
analysis for the assessment of participation it provides no theoretical framework
and merely applies standard measures of quantitative network analysis like degree
centrality.
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The next chapter provides the theoretical background for the derivation of the
network-based participation indicators, i.e. Accountability, Government Capture,
and Political Ownership developed in chapter 4.
13
Chapter 3.
Theoretical Model
If we want to measure in how far stakeholder organizations are involved in the
policy process, we need to establish a framework that allows us to capture partici-
pation of non-governmental organizations in the political decision-making process.
Participation in the policy process implies that relevant stakeholder organizations
have political power, i.e. they are able to exert inﬂuence on the ﬁnal policy de-
cision. By constitution only governmental organizations have legislative decision-
making power. Hence we have to establish a theoretical framework that explicitly
incorporates the inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations in political decision
making.
Following interest group theory, non-governmental organizations obtain inﬂu-
ence in the policy process via two channels: classical lobbying and expert informa-
tion. The most prominent theoretical approach to incorporate lobbying activities
is the model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) who model political exchange
between reelection seeking politicians and welfare-seeking interest groups as a
menu-auction. Politicians are interested in reelection and grant political favors in
exchange for political support by interest groups.
Political support is not the only way via which interest groups are able to get hold
of policy decisions. Policy decisions have an impact on the welfare of voters. If
a politician chooses a policy that negatively aﬀects a speciﬁc segment of society
her chance of reelection is diminished. Politicians generally have limited knowl-
edge how certain policy choices turn into outcome and hence form beliefs about
the relationship between a policy decision and policy outcome. Based on these
policy beliefs they choose a policy that has a direct eﬀect on the welfare of voters
which may increase or diminish the chance of reelection. Interest groups on the
other hand may hold valuable information how policies impact the welfare of the
members they represent (Ball, 1995). When politicians receive these information
they update their beliefs and align their policy choices accordingly. Thus, inter-
est groups acquire political inﬂuence by providing information that changes the
beliefs of powerful actors in line with their own interest.
The fundamental condition of the inﬂuence of interest groups by sending po-
litical support and expert information is that both mechanisms require access to
political decision-makers. This condition is taken into account by applied policy
network studies (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi et al.,
1995). We incorporate a lobbying module and a belief formation module in our
framework that reﬂect the inﬂuence of policy networks on policy decisions. On a
theoretical level, we follow Pappi and Henning (1998) who suggest the organiza-
tion of political exchange in social networks, and Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) who
propose a model of belief updating and information exchange in social networks.
This enables us to illustrate the inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations on
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the ﬁnal policy decisions and the derivation of network-based indicators to mea-
sure participation in policy processes.
To illustrate how both inﬂuence mechanisms, lobbying and informational inﬂu-
ence, operate and how networks determine political inﬂuence we denote a set of
stakeholder E.
The term `stakeholder' is not uniquely deﬁned in the literature. We follow Reed et
al. (2009) and Freeman (1984) and consider stakeholders as a group of individuals
or organizations who are aﬀected by or can aﬀect a decision. Organizations can
be involved formally in the policy process by constitution or informally through
lobbying and the provision of expert information. Thus, we further distinguish
between the subset of political agents and the subset of interest groups.
Political agents comprise the government, i.e. the ministries and the prime min-
ister as members of the cabinet as well as the president as the head of the state
and legislative groups. Interest groups comprise many diﬀerent actors and orga-
nizations. Donor organizations, research institutes, and public agencies, as well
as private socio-economic interest groups like agribusiness organizations or farmer
associations and public interest groups like civil society organizations form the
subset of interest groups. These organizations are only informally involved in the
political decision-making process.
Furthermore, we distinguish between governmental and non-governmental orga-
nizations. The latter comprises interest groups and political parties.
Let i ∈ E denote a generic element in the set of stakeholders, whereas G ⊂ E
denotes the subset of political agents g ∈ G.
Before we formalize the inﬂuence of stakeholders in the policy process in our the-
oretical framework, we illustrate the legislative decision-making process without
considering lobbying and informational inﬂuence of non-governmental organiza-
tion. We rather introduce both inﬂuence instruments stepwise to better capture
the mechanisms at work. In general, we understand a policy as the result of a
decision-making process among politicians who vote over diﬀerent policy options
to reach a speciﬁc state of the world. Assuming that interest groups are able to
inﬂuence this decision-making process informally enables us to illustrate stake-
holder participation in the policy process.
The next section describes the decision-making process based on the mean-voter
rule by Henning (2000) that reproduces a ﬁnal policy decision as the result of
a voting power distribution among political agents. Following standard theory
on interest group inﬂuence we provide the rationale of the lobbying and belief
formation module subsequently in section 3.2.
3.1. Legislative decision-making
Formally, political agents decide on policies on the basis of constitutional rules.
The module of legislative decision-making in our framework is based on the mean
voter rule by Henning (2000). This theoretical module corresponds to a Baron-
Ferejohn (1989) game extended by the rational cooperative behavior of political
agents.
According to the mean voter rule, a ﬁnal policy decision α is the result of package
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deals among political agents that is determined by individual ideal policy posi-
tions Yg and individual political power Cg.
Agent-speciﬁc ideal positions correspond to the policy the agents like to imple-
ment. Political power results from the probability to succeed in building a winning
coalition. Political agents need the support of such a winning coalition in order to
vote their ideal position through. The probability to be a member of a coalition
depends on constitutional rules and the embeddedness of an actor in the institu-
tional system. Political bargaining corresponds to the competition among agents
to form a winning coalition.
Non-cooperative political bargaining would result in uncertain policy choices as
it corresponds to a lottery over the heterogeneous ideal policy positions. Agents
have an incentive to agree on a cooperative policy formulation ex ante which yields
higher pay-oﬀs for each political agent. The mean voter rule is self-enforcing as
long as legislators do not discount future gains too much.
The ﬁnal policy decision is equivalent to the weighted mean of the agents' ideal
policy position
α =
∑
g
CgYg with
∑
g
Cg = 1 (3.1)
The weight Cg of the ideal position of agent g corresponds to her political
power and is determined by political institutions. Technically, Cg corresponds to
the ratio of winning coalitions that agent g is a member and the sum of winning
coalitions that all other agents are member of. The weight Cg correspond to the
classical Coleman-Banzhaf voting power index (Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971).
In general, voting power indices reﬂecting diﬀerent power distributions in policy-
making can be calculated by deﬁning a threshold of votes to be met for a collective
decision and identifying whose vote is compulsory. Basically, both formal as well
as informal voting power games can be deﬁned.
Formal voting power games correspond to the ordinary legislative process in a
democratic system. This process begins with a bill submitted to the parliament
by the government. The responsible committee works on the bill and presents it
to the parliament including amendments. Finally, there is a vote on the entire bill
on the ﬂoor and additional amendments may be submitted. Generally, the agenda
setting power within the government lies with the ministry that is responsible for
the particular sector policy.
Informal political power distribution relates to internally enforced standards of
legislative power. According to Shepsle and Weingast (1987) formal institutional
rules are not capable to explain observed power distributions. Furthermore, Brat-
ton (2007) arguments that the rule of law in developing countries is only weakly
developed if at all. One major informal institution that inﬂuences political life in
Africa heavily is "Big Man" presidentialism, i.e. political power is intensely con-
centrated around the president. This leads to an increase in power of his cabinet
(see van de Walle, 2003). These internally enforced standards grant all political
power to the cabinet and the president and exclude the ﬁnal vote on the ﬂoor.
In summary, the mean voter rule captures the essential eﬀects of political bargain-
ing as an aggregate of diverse policy positions according to the voting procedure
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in parliament. However, it does not explain how political agents build their indi-
vidual policy positions. This is subject to the next section where we incorporate
stepwise the inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations in the policy process
that shape the ﬁnal policy decision of a political agent.
3.2. Stakeholder Inﬂuence in the Policy Process
To explain the inﬂuence of interest groups in the political decision-making process,
we consider a political agent who has to decide on a speciﬁc policy program. In
general, the political agent wants to maximize her political support when she
decides on a particular policy to increase the chance of reelection.
A policy decision α has direct consequence on a particular state of the world z
that has an impact on the utility and on the welfare of the voters. Technically, the
political support of an agent g is determined by a support function, which relates
the welfare of a voter with the political support this voter sends to the agent. The
relation of a policy α and the current state of the world z is deﬁned through a
political technology. This means there is a true relationship between a ﬁnal policy
decision and the resulting policy outcome. Assuming the stakeholder is fully
aware of this speciﬁc technology, the favored policy decision of this stakeholder
results from maximizing her political support function subject to the true political
technology.
Political Support and Political Inﬂuence
To integrate lobbying activities into a probabilistic voter environment we follow
Grossman and Helpman (1996) and deﬁne electoral competition as a political
game among political agents who seek reelection and interest groups who strive
to increase the welfare of the members they represent.
Lobbying is mutual beneﬁcial. Interest groups support the political agent who
chooses a policy position that increases the welfare of the members of the interest
group. The support by interest groups might be ﬁnancial as a contribution to the
campaign run by the agent or include other activities that increase the reelection
probability of the agent like election rallies.
Let Cg be the political power of agent g and let Cri be the interest group i's re-
source available to support agent g. Following the basic idea of political exchange
inherent in all lobbying models, lobbying can be considered the exchange of po-
litical power Cg for the support-resource Cri .
Further, let Cgi be the political power of stakeholder i after the exchange with
agent g. This implies that the ﬁnal policy decision of agent g is just the weighted
mean of her own ideal position and the ideal policy position of the actor she en-
gaged in the political exchange with. The individual weight of an ideal position
is determined by the relative political power of an organization:
Y Eg =
∑
g
Cgi
Cg
Yi. (3.2)
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The weight of the policy position of agent g corresponds to the control the agent
does not trade for political support, i.e. CPgg = C
a
g −
∑
i 6=g C
P
ig . The ﬁnal policy
position is determined by the mean voter rule (3.1) with the adapted position
(Y Eg ) of agent g as the substitute for her initial policy position (Yg).
Pappi and Henning (1999) conceptualize political exchange in networks and deﬁne
a Walras equilibrium which explicitly includes actor-speciﬁc transaction costs of
political exchange. In particular they demonstrate that political control held by
diﬀerent organizations in the exchange equilibrium can be derived from a network
of actor-speciﬁc transfers, T = [tij], observed in equilibrium. Following Pappi and
Henning (1999), we denote the relative interest of agent g in a political resource
by Ωg and her relative interest in political control by (1− Ωg). The result of this
exchange process can be computed as an income of power or control of actors i
(Pappi and Henning, 1999). Furthermore, following Henning (2009) we include
brokerage. Access to powerful legislators is restricted and not all interest groups
can approach the legislator directly. Accordingly, interest groups without direct
access to the legislator approach other interest groups who may provide access
indirectly. In return, lobbying groups take a part of the support resources provided
by other lobby groups as a brokerage commission (Henning, 2009).
Let µi be the individual broker shares of a stakeholder i and the diagonal matrix
with the diagonal elements (µi) be µdiag the generalized Pappi-Henning model
follows in matrix notation as (Henning, 2009):
cp = [I − µdiag[I − (I − µdiag)T ]−1TΩdiag]−1ca (3.3)
where cp denotes total power ﬂows, ca represents the constitutionally deter-
mined legislative decision-making power, and Ωdiag is the diagonal matrix with
diagonal elements Ωi. In the political equilibrium, the total political control of
governmental and non-governmental organizations is then given by cp(I − Ωdiag)
accordingly.
The political agent chooses a policy that corresponds to the weighted mean of
ideal positions of all actors in the support network where the weight of an actor's
ideal position equals the support network multiplier, msjg, deﬁned as the jg's ele-
ment of the matrix [I − µdiag[I − (I − µdiag)T ]−1TΩdiag]−1.
While almost any model that approaches lobbying as political exchange implies
that the weights of individual stakeholder organizations reﬂect their political inﬂu-
ence, the inﬂuence can actually be derived empirically from an observed political
support network in the Pappi-Henning model.
Belief Formation and Political Inﬂuence
Until now we assumed the political agents to have perfect knowledge over the po-
litical technology that determines the relationship between a policy decision and
the resulting outcome for the state of the world z. In reality, political decision-
making is characterized by fundamental uncertainty. Politicians have only limited
information how policies translate into outcome which aﬀects the welfare of vot-
ers and therewith the probability of reelection. This led to the development of
theoretical approaches of informational inﬂuence on policies (Austen-Smith, 1993;
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Ball, 1995).
To illustrate how the provision of expert information inﬂuences policy-decisions,
and to highlight the role of policy networks in this context, we assume that stake-
holders are not aware of the true political technology. For this reason they form
beliefs how policies turn into outcome to make rational policy-decisions. To un-
derstand how this belief formation process takes place is crucial to understand
how information inﬂuences policy-decisions.
In essence, belief formation has three key components. The ﬁrst component is the
communication network that provides the environment of informational exchange.
Again we denote the deﬁned set of actors that provides information about policy
impacts and that constitutes thereby the relevant network, as the country's polit-
ical elite (E) where i denotes a generic element of E. The political elite comprises
political agents g, who collectively decide on the national policy by constitution,
and a subset of non-governmental organizations. The non-governmental organi-
zations have no legislative decision-making power, but they are linked with the
political agents in the communication network. Whether non-governmental actors
are members of such a network relies upon overcoming the collective action prob-
lem determined by socio-economic framework conditions (Olson, 1965). It follows,
that rarely each actor is able to form ties with inﬂuential actors, but that the set
of actors whose policy positions inﬂuence the ﬁnal policy decision is restricted.
Let T be a binary communication network, where Tij = 1 indicates an established
communication tie between actor i and actor j. Furthermore, let the subset
Ei = j ∈ E, Tij = 1 be the neighborhood of actor i where it holds:∑
j∈Ei
tij = 1 with tij =
Tij∑
j∈Ei Tij
. (3.4)
Accordingly, T = [tij] denotes the communication network where tij > 0 indi-
cates that actor i pays attention to actor j. T is a stochastic matrix, i.e. for each
actor the sum of total weights equals 1.
The second component is the initial policy position Y 0i of actor i that reﬂects
all exogenous inﬂuences except for the inﬂuence resulting from communication.
Political agents form their policy position by maximizing their individual policy
support function. Non-governmental actors, i.e. interest groups, build here a
special case. They also maximize a political support function given a speciﬁc
political technology to develop their initial policy position. However, they do not
want to gain votes but want to attract members with their policy position. If
they are also not perfectly informed about policy impacts, better information on
policy impacts would enable them to lobby more eﬃciently. In consequence, their
number of members and thereby their budget available for providing information
in line with an organization's own interests to political agents increases. Hence,
information gathering via communication with elite members is rational for them.
The last component determines how individuals form their ﬁnal policy position.
To reﬂect how actors combine their own position with the position communicated
by the elite, our model proposes belief-updating: individuals adapt their policy
position Y 0i by taking the weighted mean of the neighboring policy positions Y
0
j
where tij is the weight or trust that actor i puts in actor j's current policy position.
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Accordingly, tii equals the weight that actor i puts on his own initial position or
own control (see Jackson, 2005). Friedkin and Johnsen (1997) assume that each
actor puts the same weight on her initial policy position. Our generalized model
allows actors to have diﬀerent belief-updating strategies. The relative weight an
actor puts on her own and on the initial belief of another stakeholder may vary
substantially across actors. For instance, stakeholders who are conﬁdent regarding
their information on policy impacts may put more weight on their own initial
policy position whereas rather uncertain stakeholders may pay more attention to
the initial position of others. We do not assume a particular own control ex-
ante. Instead we determine the weight an actor puts on the beliefs of other actors
empirically.
Y ∗i = tiiY
0
i +
∑
j 6=i
tijY
0
j (3.5)
⇒ Y ∗i = tiiY 0i + (1− tii)
∑
j
tˆijY
0
j with tˆij =
tij
(1− tii)
Y ∗i denotes the position of agent i after communication. Own control describes
to what extent an actor relies upon own information on policy impacts while
forming his ﬁnal position. As T is row normalized to one, (1−tii) is the aggregated
weight for all neighbors' positions on actor i's position. Let γ denote the diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements tii than writing (3.5) in matrix notation results
after further rearrangements in:
y∗ =
[
I − (1− γ)Tˆ
]−1
γy0 (3.6)
with MC = [I − (1 − γ)T ]−1γ being the network multiplier matrix which is
similar to the Hubbell index (Hubbell, 1965). An element of the multiplier matrix
mcij deﬁnes the ﬁeld strength of actor j's initial position operating on actor i's
ﬁnal position. If i = j, the element mcii of the multiplier matrix M
C equals the
weight that an actor i puts on his own initial position. That is the ﬁnal network
multiplier matrix denoted by MC =
[
mcij
]
i,j∈E. Note that a network multiplier
includes all communication loops among actors, i.e. all direct and all indirect
eﬀects of j's initial position on i's position resulting from communication.
For any row stochastic matrix the belief formation process described in (3.6)
delivers an unambiguous ﬁnal policy position y∗ as a weighted average of the
initial position of all agents before communication y0, where the weight of actor
j's initial position for actor i's ﬁnal position just equals the element mcij of the
multiplier matrix MC . The belief-updating in equation (3.6) is similar, but still
diﬀers from the DeGroot model analyzed by Jackson (2005). In particular, our
model includes the DeGroot and the Friedkin model as a special case.
In essence, our theoretical framework is represented by Figure 3.1. The mean
voter rule reproduces ﬁnal policy decisions as the result of a voting power distribu-
tion among agents with individual ideal positions Y and is given by the equation
in the rectangle in Figure 3.1. Furthermore we integrate a lobbying module and
a belief formation module into our framework to enable non-governmental orga-
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Figure 3.1.: Overview of the Framework
nizations to inﬂuence the ﬁnal policy position (lower triangle in Figure 3.1). In
summary, our model considers the policy process as an aggregation mechanism
for diﬀerent policy positions according to voting procedures in parliament and to
belief formation and lobbying activities in networks. These voting procedures, ei-
ther determined by formal or informal institutions, constitute the political power
C of an legislator g (upper triangle in Figure 3.1) and determine to what extent
ﬁnal legislation represents an agent's individual preferences.
Now that we established a theoretical framework that explicitly takes the inﬂu-
ence of non-governmental organizations on the ﬁnal policy decision into account
we can derive network-based indicators to measure stakeholder participation in
the policy process. In particular, we present four indicators in chapter 4 in refer-
ence to the literature on participation that enable the assessment of governmental
accountability, government capture, political ownership, and political knowledge
as a result of stakeholder participation in the policy process.
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Network-based Indicators of Participatory Policy
Processes
In the last chapter we established the theoretical framework that includes non-
governmental organizations in the policy process. We described how political
agents make decisions in the political arena and that they form beliefs about the
relationship between policy decisions and policy outcomes. Stakeholder organiza-
tions are able to exert inﬂuence on the policy decision through political support
and informational inﬂuence. We described how political agents form policy be-
liefs about the relationship between policy decisions and policy outcomes, and
that stakeholder organizations are able to exert inﬂuence on these beliefs via po-
litical support and the provision of expert information. The interaction between
political agents and stakeholders takes place in policy networks. As a result of
this interaction, stakeholder organizations obtain a share of political control over
the policy decisions that aﬀect them. This enables us to derive network-based
indicators that capture the essence of participatory policy processes.
The literature on participation emphasizes the ability of stakeholders to hold the
government accountable for its actions as a direct consequence of increased trans-
parency in the participatory policy process. Hence, the ﬁrst indicator to assess
participation will be `Government Accountability'. Our second indicator, `Gov-
ernment Capture', corresponds to the concept that policy decisions may be biased
towards the interests of organized social groups. A central theme in the litera-
ture is political ownership. The inclusion of local interests and concerns into the
decision-making process reduces implementation costs of policies and increases
commitment and political eﬃciency. Therefore `Political Ownership' constitutes
the third indicator in our assessment of stakeholder participation. A crucial as-
pect of participation and therewith our fourth indicator of participatory policy
processes is `Knowledge'. Including `grassroots' knowledge may enhance the ca-
pacity to meet local needs and priorities. The integration of local and scientiﬁc
knowledge increases eﬃciency and fosters evidence-based policy making.
In general, we apply the theoretical framework described in section 3.2. We
focus speciﬁcally on the combination of a modiﬁed legislative bargaining model
with the two inﬂuence modules, i.e. political support and informational inﬂuence,
in a policy elite network. In essence, this aggregation mechanism corresponds to
a generalized mean voter decision rule:
y∗ =
∑
j
CTj yˆ
0
j , (4.1)
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where y∗ denotes the ﬁnal policy decision, CTj denotes the total political power
and yˆ0j denotes the initial preferred policy position of actor j. The total political
power results from political inﬂuence on powerful political actors:
CTj =
∑
j
mcijC
L
i , (4.2)
wheremcij denotes the political inﬂuence of actor j on agent i. As demonstrated
in section 3.2, mcij is the network multiplier derived from the communication
network among governmental and non-governmental actors. Accordingly, mgg
denotes the weight that a legislator g puts on her own initial position, while CLi is
the political power of agent i that is derived from the lobbying game, as described
in section 3.2. Thus, it holds:
CLi =
∑
g
mSgiCg. (4.3)
.
As described in section 3.2, mSgi is the support network multiplier that corre-
sponds to the outﬂow of legislative power from legislator g to actor i, resulting in
the equilibrium of the lobbying game. Hence, the better access an interest group
i has to powerful legislators, the more successful are the lobbying activities of
this organization. Further, Cg denotes the legislative power of legislator g that is
derived from the modiﬁed legislative bargaining game, as described in section 3.2.
Equations (4.1) to (4.3) constitute the theoretical backbone of our policy process
framework, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Based on our theory, the policy process corresponds to an aggregation mechanism
of the policy positions of the involved governmental and nongovernmental orga-
nizations, where the individual weight of an organization is jointly determined
by political communication network structures that determine political inﬂuence
mij, informal access structures mSgi that determine lobbying power and constitu-
tional rules that determine legislative decision making power C lg. Based on our
theoretical framework, the underlying communication and access structures en-
capsulated in the communication network and the political support network are
central components that determine ﬁnal policy choices. To describe these networks
we apply social network analysis tools, including methods for identifying overall
network structures (e.g. blockmodel analysis, see Wasserman and Faust (1994)).
However, our framework oﬀers network tools that go beyond a pure descriptive
analysis. They allow us to draw direct conclusions concerning the impacts of the
identiﬁed network structures on diﬀerent aspects that determine governmental
performance (i.e., the network multipliers derived in section 3.2). Speciﬁcally,
we develop the network-based indicators described below to empirically measure
diﬀerent aspects of governmental performance.
4.1. Government Accountability
The successful functioning of any government depends on the ability of citizens
to hold politicians and public administrators accountable for their actions. The
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existing literature on political accountability describes the machinery of govern-
ment as a game between a principal (i.e., the public) and an agent (i.e., the
politicians or public administrators) in which the former delegates to the latter
a given set of instruments to execute certain goals (Adsera et al., 2003). In this
game, the principal and the agent may have opposing interests (i.e., even while
partially acting based on the interests of their potential electorate, political agents
are likely to pursue their own political agenda. For example, political agents may
be interested in enriching themselves while in oﬃce or political agents' strategies
for enhancing the welfare of the public may diﬀer from the desires of the public.
Hence, with self-interested political agents, the delegation of decision making and
policy implementation responsibilities automatically provides the opportunity for
signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies and corruption among politicians. One could argue that
electoral competition induces governmental incentives for acting in line with so-
ciety's interests; thus, the high concentration of political power in governmental
organizations does not contradict political accountability. Though this argument
could be true in general, this reasoning is limited because elections fail to guaran-
tee strong governmental accountability. The citizens' (i.e., `voters') information
concerning governmental policies and their consequences for society's welfare is
a factor that impacts the functioning of free and regular democratic elections as
an eﬀective mechanism for guaranteeing political accountability. If citizens lack
this information, they base their votes on non-policy indicators. In the literature
voting behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa has often been described as non policy
oriented, with voters that are unaware of politics and rather rely on ethnicity
or regional identity when voting. This statement is especially true for Uganda,
where non-policy voting motives are the principal determinants of vote choices,
particularly within the rural population, whereas policy oriented and retrospec-
tive voting is more important in Senegal and Ghana (see Seide (2014)).
Thus, voters are swayed by the relative campaign spending of diﬀerent parties,
which reﬂects the inﬂuence of election advertisements more than high governmen-
tal performance (i.e., serving voters' true desires and needs). Hence, in addition
to elections, the participation of stakeholder organizations in the political process
is a second mechanism for holding public oﬃcials accountable. The more domes-
tic stakeholder organizations control governmental actions and policy choices via
lobbying and political communications, the more these actions and choices corre-
spond to the desires of society.
We use the sum of the total political power of important non-governmental orga-
nizations as a general indicator of government accountability:
GA− Total =
∑
i 6=g
CTi (4.4)
Moreover, to understand how policy network structures interact with constitu-
tional rules, we use the belief power (GA-Belief) and the lobbying power (GA-
Lobby) as additional sub-indicators to comparatively evaluate the extent of polit-
ical power due to communication and access structures. The higher the values of
the accountability indices GA-Total, GA-Belief and GA-Lobby, the higher is thus
the participation and the involvement of the respective stakeholder in the policy
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process. This indicator can either include an individual non-governmental actor
or a group of actors that we are interested in. The application of the indicator
for a single actor might yield very small values depending on her standing in the
policy networks and the size of the network. Therefore we rather propose the
application to a group of actors in general. Moreover, it is recommended to ap-
ply these indicators to several groups of stakeholders simultaneously to compare
diﬀerent levels of accountability and hence adequately assess the performance of
a particular stakeholder group.
4.2. Government Capture
According to the relevant political economy literature (Bardhan and Mookher-
jee, 2000), governmental capture corresponds to the concept that governmental
political actions and policy choices are biased towards the particular interests of
organized social groups at the expense of the general public. Thus, even if the
government is fully accountable to its electorate, it might respond asymmetri-
cally to the speciﬁc interests of particular social groups. In this context, electoral
competition induces governmental capture because some social groups are less
informed than others. However, beyond democratic elections, stakeholder partic-
ipation is a second mechanism for relaying society's interests to public oﬃcials.
Hence, the determination of the extent to which this mechanism is biased in favor
of the particular interests of vested groups is of interest. In order to measure
government capture (GC) we follow the set-up proposed by Henning et al. (2016)
who imply that a stakeholder system deﬁned by the participation structures of
the expert network and the support network is composed of a belief bias, BB, and
an interest bias IB. Accordingly, we deﬁne government capture as the interest bias
of a particular stakeholder organization towards the interest of the general public.
Thus, we calculate the weighted distance between the interest in policy issue k
stated by stakeholder organization i, θik, and the general public approximated by
the mean interest of all stakeholder organizations, θk, weighted with the relative
total power of stakeholder i, CTi . The sum of these distances over all relevant
stakeholder organizations yields the issue-related capture indicator
GCk =
∑
i
CTi (θik − θk) (4.5)
which displays the bias towards or against a particular policy issue k. A non-
biased policy issue is therefore indicated by CGk = 0 as both very powerful and
very weak actors share the same policy interest with the general public. On the
other hand, a powerful actor with comparatively low interest in issue k will push
the indicator towards a negative value whereas a powerful actor in favor of k will
push in the opposite direction. Thus a negative value in GCk reﬂects a bias against
issue k whereas GCk > 0 indicates an over-representation of the respective policy
issue.
In a second step we incorporate a directional parameter to take account of the
interests of vested groups in regard of global policy dimension g (i.e. pro-rural,
pro-urban, pro-poor, pro-rich). Therefore we construct the dimension speciﬁc
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index ∆gk which assigns each policy issue k a speciﬁc direction depending on its
nature of favoring either the rural or urban, the poor or the rich population.
GC − Total =
∑
k
∑
i
CTi (θik − θk)∆gk (4.6)
As with the issue-related capture indicator, a positive value of GC-Total implies
a bias in favor of policy dimension g whereas a negative value of GC-Total indicates
a bias against dimension g. Furthermore, we are able to investigate the impact of
particular stakeholder groups on the total capture indicator.
4.3. Ownership
Political ownership corresponds to the concept that a society identiﬁes with a spe-
ciﬁc policy and is committed to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals. Hence,
a lack of ownership corresponds to an incentive problem on the side of the society.
Technically, ownership is related to the involvement of national non-governmental
organizations in political communication. Political ownership increases citizen
compliance with policies, decreasing implementation costs and increasing the eﬀec-
tiveness of the implemented policies. In contrast to governmental accountability,
the ability of non-governmental organizations to exert inﬂuence on governmental
organizations is less important for achieving political ownership. In contrast, even
a top-down communication system (i.e., the policy beliefs of the civil society are
primarily inﬂuenced by governmental organizations) implies political ownership,
because the citizens feel involved in policy formulation. Accordingly, all other
things being equal, the higher the level of consensus achieved through stakeholder
participation, the higher the political ownership of citizens in the decided policies
will be. To measure the political ownership implied by stakeholder participation,
we deﬁne the following political conﬂict index from the viewpoint of an organiza-
tion i:
CONi(γ
∗) =
√∑
k
θik(γˆik − γ∗k)2 (4.7)
where θik denotes the interest of actor i in the policy dimension k, γˆik denotes
the ideal position of actor i with respect to dimension k, and γ∗k is the ﬁnal policy
decision for the dimension k. Drawing on the political exchange model as proposed
by Henning and Wald (2000), the ﬁnal policy decision γ∗k is determined by agent i
′s
ideal-position regarding dimension k, γˆik, weighted with the agent-speciﬁc control
identiﬁed in the exchange game, C∗ik, over all actors i:
γ∗k =
∑
i
C∗ikγˆik (4.8)
with
C∗ik =
θik
v∗k
CTi (4.9)
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and
v∗k =
∑
i
θikC
T
i . (4.10)
Accordingly, the average political conﬂict for representatives of the civil society
and the agricultural sector results as:
CONsociety(γ
∗) =
∑
i∈(Civil,AG)
CONi(γ
∗) (4.11)
Further, we can calculate the ﬁnal policy outcome that would result from leg-
islative bargaining, assuming no lobbying and no belief updating occur. Let γ#
denote this policy outcome. We can then analogously deﬁne the average political
conﬂict CONsociety(γ#). The lower the political conﬂict when including political
communication and lobbying in comparison to the political conﬂict without com-
munication, the higher the involvement of the non-governmental organizations;
thus, we deﬁne the following indicator of political ownership (PO-Consens):
PO − Consens = 1− CONsociety(γ
∗)
CONsociety(γ#)
(4.12)
For political ownership generally decreases with the dominance of donor orga-
nizations in the political process (Jones et al., 2013a), we take the total political
power of a donor organization as an additional sub-indicator of ownership (PO-
Donor). Moreover, we use the density of the communication network between
the national nongovernmental and governmental organizations as a measure of
political involvement that corresponds to ownership (PO-involve).
4.4. Knowledge
The relationship between a policy decision and the induced policy outcome is
complex and characterized by fundamental uncertainty. Politicians have only lim-
ited knowledge how policies turn into outcome and therefore form beliefs to make
rational policy-decisions. Based on these policy beliefs they choose a policy that
has a direct eﬀect on the state of the world z, which may increase or diminish the
welfare of the society. However, not only politicians have diﬃculties to fully un-
derstand the complex relation between chosen policy instruments and the desired
policy outcome. Other stakeholders engaged in the policy process are unaware of
the true political technology as well. This causes an ineﬃcient implementation
compared to a situation in which actors know the true technology and decide on
the policies accordingly. The role of biased policy beliefs as a main determinant
of ineﬃcient policy choices is emphasized in an increasing number of publications
(Beilhartz and Gersbach, 2004; Caplan, 2007; Bischoﬀ and Siemers, 2011). The
lack of political knowledge is thus an additional source of policy failure that de-
creases the eﬃciency of policy making.
In this context Henning et al. (2016) prove that an organization's optimal relative
inﬂuence reﬂects its relative informational value, i.e. knowledge. This implies
that the total inﬂuence exerted on other actors reﬂects her political knowledge
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in the optimum. Under the assumption that the knowledge distribution is exoge-
nous, the given relative informational inﬂuence enables us not only to evaluate
the identiﬁed participation structure, but in addition allows us to comment on
the optimal participation structure.
According to Henning et al. we can derive the optimal power distribution from
the relation of any given power structure and knowledge. The optimal power
distribution will then correspond exactly with the observed knowledge structure.
Now that we introduced the theoretical foundation and the derived indicators to
assess participatory policy processes we apply our framework empirically. Part II
provides the empirical application of the developed network approach. We outline
the study design and the data collection in chapter 5 before we continue with the
country case studies of Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda.
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Empirical Application
29

Chapter 5.
Study Design and Data Description
Data for our analysis has been collected based on an elite network survey within
a study on the CAADP-reform in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal in 2012-2013.
One of the key principles of the CAADP-reform process is to promote greater
participatory and evidence-based policy processes during the design and imple-
mentation of CAADP at the country level. The process is characterized by inten-
sive stakeholder consultations involving all development partners to ensure that
political needs and desires of all societal groups are represented. Furthermore, the
inclusion of local stakeholder organizations targets the integration of local evidence
and knowledge into the policy process in ways that guarantee the formulation of
eﬀective and eﬃcient development strategies. It is therefore a process character-
ized by extensive stakeholder dialog on the evidence at hand, policy beliefs, and
ultimately, about political compromises.
In order to better understand these political economy issues within the con-
text of CAADP, especially with regard to how they may either strengthen or
weaken the fundamental principle of promoting an evidence-based and partici-
patory policy process, a consortium of research partner institutions undertook a
comparative analysis of CAADP policy processes in Ghana, Senegal and Uganda.
The project `Promoting Participatory and Evidence-Based Agricultural Policy
Processes in Africa' (PEBAP) was jointly implemented by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Universities of Kiel and Hohenheim, in
collaboration with local research institutions: The Institute of Statistical Social
and Economic Research (ISSER), the Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles
(ISRA), and the African Institute for Strategic Resource Services and Develop-
ment (AFRISA), respectively.
One essential part of the study was a policy network survey conducted in all
three countries on political interactions, policy goals and preferred policy positions
of key policy makers and stakeholders regarding the most appropriate allocations
to diﬀerent policy programs under the CAADP agenda. This constitutes the data
basis for our analysis.
Data has been collected in the framework of an elite network study which involves
questions about networks, policy positions, and policy interests. Interviews were
conducted among key stakeholder groups and policy makers in the agricultural
policy domain in the respective country using carefully constructed survey ques-
tionnaires. The unit of observation in an elite network study is an organization,
which is interpreted as a corporate actor (Coleman, 1990) and interviewees are
considered experts of the organizations they represent. To identify organizations
relevant for our study we follow a two-step procedure that is well established in
policy network studies (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Laumann et al., 1989; Pappi
et al., 1995; Pappi and Henning, 1999).
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In the ﬁrst step, we used the nominalist approach to set boundaries of the theoret-
ical policy network. Using the position method we compiled a list of potentially
relevant organizations with formal political power and organizations that have
access to these due to their institutional position. We further included organiza-
tions with expert knowledge such as policy analysts and interest groups in order
to guarantee a consistent speciﬁcation of the network boundaries in accordance
with the highlighted role of stakeholder participation in CAADP and to align to
our theoretical framework of expert communication. The ﬁnal set of actors ac-
cording to the nominalist approach consists of 112 actors for Ghana and Uganda
and 103 actors for Senegal. Based on this list, personal interviews were conducted
with representatives of the preselected organizations allowing for a snowball eﬀect.
The interviews began with targeting governmental organizations, especially the
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Finance as well as subordinate agencies,
and later, the most important interest groups (e.g. farm organizations).
In the second step, we follow the realist approach that speciﬁes the boundaries of
the empirical network from the actors point of view. Personal interviews were con-
ducted based on the list of stakeholder organizations, beginning with governmental
organizations and the most important interest groups. Interviewees were asked to
check all actors on the identiﬁed list that are perceived as extremely inﬂuential
in policy decision-making. Based on this reputation question, new organizations
were interviewed that had received three or more nominations. Overall, 46 stake-
holders were interviewed in Ghana and Senegal whereas the snowball sampling
led to 43 interviews in Uganda.
Table 5.1 displays the ﬁnal set of stakeholders and their distribution in our sam-
ple for all three countries. The policy networks establishing the CAADP policy
domain in these countries are almost equally sized. Stakeholder organizations are
structured into four main categories. Political actors are comprised of the exec-
utive (i.e. ministries and head of the state), the legislative (i.e. parliamentary
groups), and public sector agencies. Donor organizations and iNGOs constitute
the group of international organizations in Ghana and Uganda whereas two supra-
national organizations are additionally included in the case of Senegal. Research
organizations are comprised of both national and international research institutes.
Interest groups span organizations of diﬀerent ﬁelds and encompass agricultural
industry and trade organizations, farmer organizations and cooperatives, as well
as non-agricultural business and civil society organizations. Governmental institu-
tions represent the largest share in all three countries. International organizations
including donor and iNGOs (and supranational organizations) account for the
second largest stakeholder group in Ghana (26%) and Senegal (24%), agricul-
tural interest groups are especially strong represented in Uganda (26%). The elite
questionnaires included four parts: a) policy networks, b) policy preferences (i.e.,
information concerning interest and position with respect to relevant CAADP pol-
icy issues), c) budget distribution to speciﬁc policy programs formulated in the
speciﬁc CAADP investment plans, and d) organizational characteristics. Data
collected for part c) and d) is not relevant for our analysis in this study and is
thus disregarded in the description.
To collect reliable networks, we designed our network questions using a format
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Category Group Ghana Uganda Senegal
Political Actors Executive (EXEC) 6 7 7
Public Sector Agencies (PUB) 5 6 5
Legislative (LEG) 2 2 1
Int. Organizations Donor (DONOR) 7 6 7
International NGOs (iNGO) 5 3 2
Supranational Organizations (SUPRA) 2
Research Organizations National Research Organizations (RESEARCH) 4 4 8
International Research Organisations (RESEARCH) 3 1 2
Interest Groups Agric. Industry and Trade (IG:AGIND) 4 8 6
Agric. Producer Organizations and Cooperatives (IG:PROD) 4 3 2
Non-agriculuratl Business (IG:NA) 3 2
Civil Society Organizations (CSO) 3 1 4
N=46 N=43 N=46
Table 5.1.: Classiﬁcation of Stakeholders
that was extremely helpful in previous network studies (Pappi and Henning, 1999;
Pappi et al., 1995). Interviewees were asked to check those organizations on the
list with which they maintain a speciﬁc relation. To facilitate orientation, the
list of organizations was organized according to the type of organization or the
branch of interest represented by the respective organizations (see Table A1 in
the appendix). As we did not know in advance whether we had identiﬁed all rel-
evant organizations, we provided a hybrid type of list. That is, interviewees were
presented with a roster of organizations and given the option to add additional
organizations that they believed to be important. This approach addresses two
problems: under-reporting in a free recall interview and failures in setting the the-
oretical network boundaries. In the following sections, we describe in more detail
the reputation as well as the expert information and political support networks,
as these networks are used for the empirical application of the proposed policy
framework.
As described above, the reputation network is used to specify the network bound-
ary from the actors' point of view. Respondents were asked to mark organizations
on the list that according to their opinion, stand out as especially inﬂuential with
respect to the agricultural policy process. The question was framed in a way that
instructed interviewees not to exert great eﬀort on a detailed investigation but to
mark those organizations that came to mind instantly. This framing assumes that
highly important organizations will come to mind quickly. Further, the intervie-
wees had the option to use blank lines to add missing inﬂuential organizations.
The respondents were asked in particular to
Please check those organizations that stand out as especially inﬂuential
and if you know other organizations which are not on the list, please
use the free lines to specify them.
Based on our theoretical framework, networks of expert information and po-
litical support are especially relevant. The expert information network is the
centerpiece of our belief formation model for characterizing the policy process.
We consider expert information to be any kind of information about policy im-
pacts that an actor can communicate to another actor (e.g., knowledge about the
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impact of farm input subsidies on central policy outcomes, such as the welfare
of diﬀerent social groups). To collect data on the information ﬂow in the elite
network, the interviewees were asked to check those organizations on the list of
organizations with which they share information about the consequences of agri-
cultural policies. Speciﬁcally, expert information transfers were collected from a
supplier perspective (i.e., an organization delivers information to another orga-
nization) and a demander perspective (i.e., an organization receives information
from another organization). Therefore, we could construct a conﬁrmed expert
knowledge network, which is more reliable from a network theoretic point of view
(Pappi et al., 1995). A particular knowledge transfer is considered `conﬁrmed' if
both the supplier and demander of knowledge independently report the transfer.
Hence the respondent was asked to state independently both directions of com-
munication based on the list of organizations. The relevant data of the conﬁrmed
communication network is then collected by asking the respondent:
Using the list of organizations again, please check all organizations to
which your organization provides expert information on agricultural
policies.
followed by the request
Using the list of organizations again, please check all organizations
from which your organization receives expert information on agricul-
tural policies.
The weight that an actor places on her own initial belief is another key input in
our model. To identify an actor's level of own control, interviewees were asked to
ascertain the extent to which they use externally provided expert information as
opposed to their own expertise when formulating policy strategies. In detail, the
respondents were asked to distribute 100 points to indicate the relative importance
of external versus internal expert information. Own control is then calculated as
the relative importance of own internal expertise.
The political support network is the centerpiece of the lobbying module in our the-
oretical framework. Similar to the expert information network, we construct the
conﬁrmed political support network from the supplier and demander perspective.
The exchange of political support is characterized by political agents who seek to
increase their chance of reelection and stakeholder organizations who try to me-
diate their clientele's interest to the politicians, i.e. trying to inﬂuence policies to
generate as much welfare as possible for their members. In exchange for votes by
members of the stakeholder organization the politician supports the favored pol-
icy position in the decision-making process. Political agents also represent their
electorate in parliament and therefore try to ﬁnd political solutions supported by
the majority of their electorate. Thus, they have to decide how much political
control they are willing to pass to the stakeholder organizations at the expense of
potential voters if the political position of the interest group diﬀers from the ma-
jority of voters. The weight that a political agent puts on the position supported
by voters is another key input in our framework. Speciﬁcally, governmental in-
stitutions were asked to distribute 100 points to indicate the relative importance
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of their intrinsic position (i.e. the orientation towards stakeholder organizations)
versus the position supported by the majority of potential voters. The interest
in political inﬂuence is then calculated as the relative importance of the position
supported by voters.
In part b), we collected data on the policy preferences of organizations. We
asked for the relative interest θik and the preferred position, γˆik, of an organization
i with respect to relevant CAADP policy issues k. Speciﬁcally, we assumed a
nested structure of policy preferences. At the top level, we asked for the relative
interest in and preferred position regarding relevant policy concerns. These policy
concerns are relevant policy outcomes determined by CAADP and include:
• Growth in incomes
• Budget
• Poverty reduction
• Environmental sustainability.
The respondent was then asked to distribute 100 points according to the relative
interest of her aﬃliated organization. `Growth in incomes' was further speciﬁed
according to sectors the organization might show particular interest in. Again the
respondent was asked to state the organization's relative interest in the welfare
of the agricultural sector, welfare of the non-agricultural industry sector, and the
welfare of the market services sector. To collect detailed information on speciﬁc
interests in the agricultural sector, the welfare of the agricultural sector was fur-
ther subdivided into the welfare of agricultural producers, the agricultural export
and the agro-processing sector, food security, and gender equity.
In the second step we asked for the organization's concrete policy positions re-
garding each policy concern. Therefore we formulated two extreme policy po-
sitions for each policy concern on a 7-point scale. These positions comprised
levels of income and poverty, decisions on taxing or subsidizing speciﬁc sectors,
government expenditure, economic costs of environmental management, gender
responsive agricultural budgeting, and diﬀerent yield gaps.
The next three chapters present the country studies of Ghana, Senegal, and
Uganda. We begin with the Republic of Ghana that constitutes the compara-
tively most advanced economy in our sample in terms of economic and political
development. First we provide an overview of the country characteristics fol-
lowed by a description of the relevant stakeholder organizations that establish the
CAADP policy domain on country level. Subsequently, we present the identiﬁed
network structure of political participation by applying methods of quantitative
network analysis on the collected communication and support network. Building
on the theoretical model described in chapter 3 we analyze the underlying inﬂu-
ence structure in the CAADP policy domain. In particular, we determine the
inﬂuence arising from political communication and lobbying activities. These in-
ﬂuence measures are essential for the empirical application of the network-based
indicators developed in chapter 4 that constitute the basis for the quantitative
assessment of stakeholder participation in policy processes.
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Ghana
Ghana is a country in Western Africa, bordering the Gulf of Guinea, located
between Cote d'Ivoire and Togo. It is divided into ten administrative regions
(Western, Central, Greater Accra, Volta, Eastern, Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, North-
ern, Upper East and Upper West) (see Figure 6.1). The population size of Ghana
is 25.9 million (2013), which is among the ten biggest states of Sub-Saharan Africa.
The country is home to many diﬀerent ethnic groups, the dominant group is the
Akan tribe with a population share of 47.5%, 16.6% belong to the Mole-Dagbon
tribe, 13.9% to the Ewe tribe, 7.4% to the Ga-Dangme tribe and 5.7% to the
Gurma tribe. The country is considered to be one of the more stable nations in
West Africa and was categorized as a lower middle income country by The World
Bank (2013) with a GNI per capita of US $1,770 and a PPPpc of US $3,900 in
2013. The economy mainly relies on cocoa, gold and lately oil. Although agricul-
ture is only providing 21.5% towards the GDP, more than half of the workforce
is employed in the agricultural sector (56%). The oil production in Ghana just
started in 2010 and led to a rapid GDP growth by 14.4% in 2011, the score dropped
again to 7.6% in 2013, but Ghana is still experiencing one of the highest growth
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana has the lowest infant mortality of the three countries with 13.4 deceases
per 1,000 births, whereas the maternal mortality rate of 380 per 100,000 live births
is higher than in Uganda or Senegal. The youth literacy accounts to 86% of pop-
ulation ages 15-24 years which bears witness of a good education system. The
unemployment rate of 5% is similar to Uganda.
The Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2014) considers Ghana to be a free
country, with a political rights rating of one and a civil rights rating of two. It
is further considered to be a democracy with a Polity IV score of eight in 2012
(Marshall et al., 2012).
Of the three case-countries covered in this study, Ghana is the most advanced
economy. Both, in a political as well as in an economic sense, Ghana is in the
lead compared to Senegal and Uganda.
This chapter provides the assessment of the CAADP policy process based on
the theoretical framework we developed in part I. The next section gives a short
overview on the relevant organizations included in our sample. Subsequently, we
perform a blockmodel analysis to reveal the underlying network structures of the
communication and lobbying network. To assess the participatory character of
the policy process in Ghana we apply the network-based measures described in
chapter 4.
36
Chapter 6. Ghana
Figure 6.1.: Administrative Regions in Ghana
Source: Map No. 4186 Rev. 3, February 2005, UNITED NATIONS
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6.1. Relevant Organizations in the CAADP Policy Domain
Table A.4 in the Appendix lists the 46 political actors in Ghana and the cor-
responding type of organization. The boundary speciﬁcation for the CAADP
policy domain of Ghana is based on the indegree centralities (IC) of the reputa-
tion network. The reputation network is an adjacency matrix that depicts the
nominations of political actors that are perceived as especially inﬂuential in the
formulation of agricultural policy programs. The indegree centrality measures the
prominence of actors in a directed network and relates in our case to the inﬂuence
held by political actors in the agricultural policy domain in Ghana. Summarizing
an organization's received nominations and standardizing by the number of max-
imal possible nomination yields the indegree centrality whereby self-nominations
are excluded.
In Ghana, two groups of political actors stand out in terms of perceived political
inﬂuence. With an average indegree centrality of 0.79, the group of donors rep-
resent the most inﬂuential organizations in agricultural policy in Ghana, followed
by the Executive (0.71) and the Public Sector Agencies (0.69) (see Table A.2).
However, the high average indegree for the Executives is primarily determined by
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). With a maximal indegree of 1
MOFA stands out as the top most inﬂuential stakeholder in Ghana, whereas both
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) and the Ministry of
Trade and Industry (MOTI) share an indegree of 0.72, followed by the Ministry of
Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) and the Ministry of Environment, Science,
and Technology (MEST) who both obtain only a share of 0.52 (Table A.1).
6.2. Identiﬁed Network Structures of Political Participation
in Ghana
To identify the network structure of political participation in Ghana we apply
blockmodel analysis using the SNA package for the statistical software `R.' by
Butts (2008). Blockmodel analysis is a method of positional analysis based on
structural equivalence. The idea behind positional analysis is to simplify the
information in a network data set. Blockmodeling allows us to identify actors
that have the same pattern of relation to all other actors in the network. Actors
that are structural equivalent have identical entries in rows and columns of the
socio-matrix and are aggregated into blocks. Actors in the same block do not
necessarily have a direct connection to each other, they rather share the same
structural relation, i.e. all in- and outgoing connections, to all other stakeholders
in the respective network. The Hamming distances between all pairs of positions
in the adjacency matrices are computed and classes are formed through hierar-
chical cluster analysis. The input graphs are reordered by class and blockmodel
reduction is applied based on the blockdensity.
The result is a reduced graph of the original network that consists of blocks that
depict the underlying structure within the network. Application to quantitative
network data of political communication and political support enables us to iden-
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tify the embeddedness of stakeholders in political communication and lobbying
mechanisms.
6.2.1. Political Communication
The blockmodel analysis yields a 6-block solution and reveals that political com-
munication is clearly structured in Ghana. We identify a center-periphery struc-
ture in the agricultural policy domain of Ghana. The central position is occupied
by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) which acts as a broker by link-
ing the peripheral blocks. Political communication in Ghana is characterized by a
very close connection between stakeholder organizations in the periphery and the
ministry. Interestingly, stakeholders tend to exchange expert information within
rather than across the peripheral blocks.
Analyzing the corresponding blockmemberships yields further interesting insights2.
In addition to a political core which includes the central governmental institu-
tions (Block 2) and a political periphery (Block 3) primarily comprised of interest
groups, we identify a highly active position of Donors (Block 4) and International
Organizations (Block 5). Block 1 and Block 6 both consist of only one political
actor. MOFA (Block 1) plays a key role in political communication in Ghana and
holds a broker position by connecting all of the remaining blocks. The General
Agricultural Worker's Union (GAWU, Block 6) is located at the receiving end of
political communication and acts as a passive observer.
Figure 6.2 displays the underlying structure of political communication in Ghana.
The reduced graph consists of six blocks. The blocksize reﬂects the number of
actors in the respective block. Sender and receiver of expert information are
depicted by arcs representing the existence of established communication ties be-
tween blocks. Edge-weights are based on the corresponding density between or
within blocks and range from dark gray if communication is very dense to light
gray if only few actors relate to each other in providing information on agricultural
policies. The communication pattern depicted in the reduced graph in Figure 6.2
is based on the mean block density. The density reﬂects the ratio of established
ties and possible ties in a graph or subgraph. The mean block density is then just
the average of the ratios between and within the identiﬁed blocks. In order to
better identify the underlying relational structure we omit the ties between and
within positions if the corresponding density is below the mean.
The exchange of expert information is determined by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture (Block 1). Its central position has already been noted earlier as it stands out
with the highest indegree possible in the reputation network (see Table A.1 in the
Appendix). Political communication in Ghana is dominated by the broker posi-
tion held by MOFA which enables the ministry to channel the information ﬂow
across and between various stakeholder organizations. Except for Block 6, MOFA
sends and receives expert information by almost all stakeholders in the agricul-
tural policy domain. Table 6.1 provides a more detailed picture of the information
exchange in the agricultural policy domain by depicting the corresponding intra-
and inter-blockdensities, i.e. the share of established communication ties in rela-
2Table A.5 in the Appendix lists the corresponding blockmembership accordingly.
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Figure 6.2.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Communication in Ghana
tion to all ties possible between and within the blocks of interest. The seemingly
strong (one-sided) connection between Block 1 and Block 6 in comparison to the
remaining relational patterns results from the fact that both blocks consist of only
one political actor. Hence, the inter-blockdensity between MOFA and GAWU can
only take the value of 1 if one actor communicates with the other, or 0 otherwise.
The missing intra-blockdensity observed for both MOFA and GAWU is the result
of the number of blockmembers. As we do not allow for self-ties in the actor-actor
matrix of the communication network the intra-blockdensity is omitted.
Table 6.1.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Expert Information
MoFA Political Peripheral Donor Research GAWU
MoFA 0.88 0.76 1.00 0.86 1.00
Political 0.88 0.64 0.18 0.28 0.09 0.00
Peripheral 0.71 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.24 0.29
Donor 1.00 0.23 0.11 0.70 0.18 0.50
Research 1.00 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.76 0.43
GAWU 0.00 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.43
Interestingly, in addition to the leading ministries and public agencies that
determine the agricultural policy process in Ghana, the political core (Block 2)
includes two non-agricultural interest groups (IG:NA), i.e. The Association of
Ghana Industries (AGI) and The Private Enterprise (PEF). The political periph-
ery (Block 3) represents with 21 political actors the largest group of stakeholders
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in our blockmodel analysis. Even internally, peripheral organizations are only
weakly connected to each other. The information exchange within the peripheral
Block 3 is almost non-existent as indicated by a density of only 0.09 and thus con-
stitutes not only the lowest absolute value given its size. Interestingly, we ﬁnd the
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), one of the leading
think tanks in Ghana, among the very heterogeneous peripheral stakeholders in
Block 3. Apart from the majority of top donor organizations such as World Bank,
FAO, USAID and the german GTZ, Block 4 includes with the Ghana Irrigation
Development Authority (GIDA) and the International Water Management Insti-
tute (IWMI) two political actors focusing on water management. Stakeholders
in this block are highly integrated in the policy process by its very close collab-
oration with MOFA. Every stakeholder in Block 4 exchanges expert information
with MOFA on a mutual level. Block 5 consists mainly of research organizations
and is characterized by the same pattern of mutual information exchange with
MOFA. The dialog with the political core (Block 2) is at the lowest level ob-
served. This is particularly surprising as Block 5 also includes the two political
parties in Ghana, i.e. the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the ruling party New
Democratic Congress (NDC).
6.2.2. Lobbying
In addition to the expert network of political communication, one of the key
components of our theoretical framework is the political support network. In
democracies stakeholder organizations are representatives of their members and
their interests. Therefore the policy position of such a group is highly connected
with the resulting welfare for their members. Thus, a major role of stakeholder
organizations in democracies is to intermediate their clientele's interest to politi-
cians, i.e. trying to inﬂuence policies or politicians to generate as much welfare as
possible for their members. Obviously, politicians won't support a stakeholder or-
ganization's position without any reward. On their part they expect in return the
political support of members of the stakeholder organization. However, political
agents also represent their electorate in parliament. Therefore, political agents are
interested to ﬁnd political solutions supported by a majority of their electorate.
The underlying support network, other than the communication network, is deter-
mined by mutual beneﬁt of the respective actors in form of interest mediation and
support seeking. We have to diﬀerentiate between political actors (i.e. EXEC,
LEG) who receive support and advocate the stakeholders' interests in return, and
the stakeholders who send political support in return for a representative of their
interest. As not all stakeholders have direct access to political actors they ap-
proach a broker to represent their interests. Thus, we do not necessarily observe
a clear politician-stakeholder structure.
The blockmodel analysis of the political support network yields a 6-block solu-
tion and displays that lobbying is clearly structured in Ghana. As already noted,
lobbying is the approach of interest groups and stakeholders to inﬂuence polit-
ical actors in charge by oﬀering political support in exchange for advocacy by
the politician. Not surprisingly, the central position within the political support
network is occupied by the leading ministries that determine agricultural policy
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in Ghana. In contrast to political communication, lobbying is determined by the
exchange of support between rather than within the identiﬁed blocks. This results
from the nature of lobbying as well as from the properties of blockmodel analy-
sis. Stakeholders have either direct access to political actors or indirect access via
political brokers. Since blockmodel analysis identiﬁes actors that have the same
patterns of relation to all other actors in the network, they do not approach stake-
holder in the same block since they would have the same access to the politicians.
Interestingly, the only block for which we observe exchange of political support
within is the group of donors.
Figure 6.3.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Support in Ghana
Figure 6.3 displays the underlying structure of political support in Ghana. The
reduced graph consists of six blocks with the blocksize reﬂecting the number of
actors in the respective block. Sender and receiver of political support are de-
picted by arcs representing the existence of political exchange between blocks.
Edge-weights are based on the corresponding density between or within blocks
and range from dark gray if support is very dense to light gray if only few actors
relate to each other. As before, we based the relational patterns of the reduced
graph on the mean block density, i.e. we omit ties between and within positions
if the corresponding density is below the mean in order to better identify the pat-
terns of political support.
The blockmodel analysis yields a 6-Block solution and shows that political support
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is clearly structured in Ghana. Interestingly, almost 46% of the political actors do
not participate actively in the exchange of political support in Ghana (Bl5). The
blockmembership of the support network reveals a clear aﬃliation of stakeholder
groups in correspondence to their political stance in accordance to the nature of
lobbying (see Table A.5). Not surprisingly, the center of political support is occu-
pied primarily by the main governmental institutions (Bl1). It is closely related
to Ghana's leading national think tank (ISSER, Bl6) as well as the group of top
donors (Bl3). The pattern of political support in Ghana is further characterized
by two very heterogeneous groups of stakeholders who are clearly distinguished by
their level of access to Ghana's policy makers. Whereas Block 2 consists mainly of
governmental institutions and has only indirect access to the political center via
the broker position obtained by ISSER (Bl6), Block 4 is primarily determined by
iNGOs and has direct as well as indirect access via the donor block. The largest
group of stakeholders (Bl5) has very limited access to the political core in Ghana.
Table 6.2.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Political Support
Political Environment Donor iNGO Periphery ISSER
Political 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.64 0.30 1.00
Environment 0.06 0.13 0.39 0.36 0.14 0.83
Donor 0.92 0.44 0.83 0.58 0.10 0.50
iNGO 0.64 0.33 0.58 0.03 0.10 0.17
Periphery 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.24
ISSER 1.00 0.83 0.33 0.17 0.43
Table 6.2 displays the density table of the underlying lobbying structure in
Ghana. As already seen in Figure 6.3, the diagonal indicates a very low exchange
of political support within the blocks. The group of donors (Bl3) is a special
case. A possible explanation for the very high intra-blockdensity (0.83) is the
alignment of policy preferences among donors which ultimately leads to an increase
in lobbying power. Though below the mean and thus omitted in Figure 6.3, we
observe a mutual exchange of political support between the peripheral Block 5
and the political Block 1 as indicated by an inter-blockdensity of 0.3. This value
is mainly determined by MOFA which receives political support by over 76%
of the stakeholders in Block 5. This further underlines the dominance of the
ministry in the agricultural policy domain of Ghana. Moreover, the extremely
close connection between the political core and the donor group on the one hand
and the dense relation with ISSER on the other points to a donor-led knowledge-
based agricultural policy in Ghana which we will investigate in the next section.
6.3. Political Inﬂuence and Power
According to the belief-module in our theoretical framework, communication struc-
tures determine political inﬂuence among governmental and non-governmental or-
ganizations. At a descriptive level, an analysis of the ways in which organizations
are inﬂuenced by each other is of interest. Beyond a descriptive analysis, it is
especially interesting to evaluate the impact of political inﬂuence structures on
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diﬀerent aspects of political performance. For example, evaluating the extent to
which the ﬁnal policy positions of governmental organizations are inﬂuenced by
the political views of non-governmental organizations by measuring the eﬀective
participation using political power indices. Or, evaluating the extent to which
central organizations take political leadership vis-à-vis civil society in a top-down
political process using network multipliers. Moreover, a high political inﬂuence
exerted by donor organizations would characterize a donor-led policy process,
which might undermine political ownership if national stakeholder organizations
feel ignored. Furthermore, an analysis of the extent to which the identiﬁed polit-
ical inﬂuence and power structures reﬂect the political expertise of the involved
governmental and non-governmental organizations is of interest. To assess these
interesting questions, we provide a descriptive analysis of the identiﬁed political
inﬂuence and power structures in the following section and evaluate the impact of
the identiﬁed structures on political performance in the next section. The network
multipliers derived from political communication, as described in section 3.2, are
the centerpiece of our political inﬂuence model.
6.3.1. Polticial Inﬂuence
Table 6.3.: Network Multipliers per Group: Expert information
EXEC PUB LEG DON iNGO RES AG PROD NA CSO
EXEC 0.70 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02
PUB 0.16 0.50 0.05 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
LEG 0.04 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
DON 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.65 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00
iNGO 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.68 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
RES 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.80 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
AG 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.60 0.07 0.03 0.01
PROD 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.05
NA 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.59 0.03
CSO 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.48
Table 6.3 displays the communication network multipliers that were calculated
for speciﬁc categories of governmental and non-governmental organization. The
network multipliers presented in Table 6.3 correspond to the aggregated weight of
the policy positions of the column category in determining the ﬁnal policy posi-
tion of the average individual row category. For example, the ﬁrst row represents
the aggregated inﬂuence of the column category on Ghana's executive (EXEC).
The ﬁnal policy position of the executive after communication is determined to
70% by its own initial position. The aggregated weight of Donors' initial position
(DON) on the executive's ﬁnal position is 5% compared to only 2% for the civil
society organizations (CSO).
Please note, that the relatively high network multipliers on the diagonal result
from a very high own control stated by the respective organizations within the
groups. The own control is an indicator for the trust in external information, i.e.
the relative importance of an actor's own expertise versus external information
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received from other organizations. An own control of 1 indicates that the actor
relies on her expertise exclusively whereas an own control of 0 is indicative to the
dependence on external information.
We identify a decrease in the own network multipliers in accordance with the po-
sition of the respective group in the policy domain. Research organizations (RES)
consider themselves as technical leaders with high political knowledge as indicated
by a high own network multiplier of 80%, followed by the legislative (LEG) and
the executive (EXEC) with 73% and 70%, respectively. International Organi-
zations are in midﬁeld and exhibit own network multiplier of 68% (iNGO) and
65% (DON), followed by the agricultural sector, whereas interest groups rely to a
greater extent on expert information than other stakeholder groups with multipli-
ers as low as 48% (CSO). Public sector agencies (PUB) report a relatively low own
control and are more open to expert information provided by other organizations.
Like their counterparts in the ministries and in the parliament, public agencies are
supposed to be technical leaders with high political knowledge and thus should
pay less attention to other positions. Beyond own control, the inﬂuence proﬁles of
organizations are interesting. Inﬂuence proﬁles identify inﬂuential organizations
and describe the extent to which other organizations inﬂuence the initial policy
position of an organization. Formally, inﬂuence proﬁles can be described by the
vector of relative network multipliers that operate as an inﬂuence ﬁeld on an or-
ganization. Based on our belief formation model, the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on
an actor is determined by her local communication structures. Hence, the more
actors are structurally equivalent in the communication network, the more sim-
ilar c.p. are their inﬂuence ﬁelds. Accordingly, we conducted a cluster analysis
using the inﬂuence proﬁles of the identiﬁed organizations. Based on the reported
statistical ﬁt values, we preferred a 6 cluster solution. Overall, we ﬁnd that gov-
ernmental actors exhibit the highest inﬂuence in the agricultural policy domain,
followed by international organizations and research organizations alike.
Even though the optimal number of clusters is identical to the solution ob-
tained in the blockmodel analysis, the resulting clusters do not correspond to
the computed blockmemberships of the communication network. Cluster analyz-
ing the computed inﬂuence proﬁles yields a very large cluster which comprises
67% of the actors involved in the CAADP policy domain (Cluster 1). Except for
non-agricultural interest groups, cluster 1 corresponds to the relative distribution
of associated stakeholder organizations in the whole data-set and thus delivers
a relatively complete overview of the structural properties of political inﬂuence
exerted by the aggregated stakeholder groups3. The membership in cluster 2
to 6 however are characterized by institutional and advocacy aﬃliation which is
also reﬂected in the inﬂuence ﬁelds operating on the same. Cluster 2 constitutes
the non-agricultural cluster and comprises next to governmental institutions pri-
marily concerned with trade and economic development (i.e. MOTI, MOFEP,
NDPC) three interest groups related to the private industry sector as well as a
representative of the Ghanaian agricultural export sector (FAGE). Cluster 3 is
composed of two organizations engaged in environmental protection (i.e. EPA,
EPAG), whereas cluster 4 (Research) and cluster 5 (IG:Agrar) are determined by
3Table A.5 in the Appendix lists the corresponding cluster memberships.
45
Chapter 6. Ghana
Figure 6.4.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle in the CAADP Policy Network in Ghana
institutional aﬃliation. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) constitutes its own
cluster (i.e. cluster 6).
We aggregated the relative inﬂuence of stakeholders according to their institu-
tional aﬃliation (see Table 5.1) and diﬀerentiated between agricultural AG (i.e.
IG: AGIND and IG: PROD) and non-agricultural NA (i.e. IG:NONAGRAR and
CSO) stakeholder organizations. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 indicate that governmental
organizations exert the highest inﬂuence on other organizations with an average
inﬂuence share of 38%, followed by international organizations and research orga-
nizations with an average inﬂuence of 22% and 21%, respectively. Interest groups
exert low inﬂuence on other organizations with shares between 5%-6%. The in-
ﬂuence of civil society organizations is negligible with an average value as low as
3%.
A more detailed analysis of the inﬂuence of governmental organizations reveals
that the main inﬂuence on other organizations is exerted by MOFA and other
ministries (i.e. MLNR, MEST, MOTI, and NDPC). In contrast, political par-
ties (i.e. NDC and NPP), public agencies and MOFEP exert little inﬂuence on
other organizations (see Figure 6.5). A comparison of the average inﬂuence across
clusters reveals interesting characteristics.
Cluster 1 is strongly inﬂuenced by the three stakeholder groups that account
for the highest average inﬂuence on all organizations, which is intuitive as cluster
1 represents the majority of stakeholder organizations in our analysis. Except for
the NA interest group the cluster membership reﬂects the relative distribution of
actors in the agricultural policy domain of Ghana. However, while governmental
organizations exhibit a slightly lower inﬂuence share of 36% compared to the av-
erage of 38% for all organizations, the inﬂuence of interest groups, international
as well as research organizations is above the average value.
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Figure 6.5.: Relative Inﬂuence of Governmental Organizations in Ghana
In contrast, cluster 2 which is comprised equally of ministries and non-agricultural
interest groups, is heavily inﬂuenced by governmental institutions (45%) and NA
(23%). While it is conceivable that cluster 2 is primarily inﬂuenced by NA and
ministries that represent the majority of cluster 2, the extremely high value for
NA compared to its average value of 8.8% for all actors is of particular interest.
The high inﬂuence of NA exerted on cluster 2 is not only the result of a very high
own control of non-agricultural stakeholders, but also the outcome of a signiﬁcant
impact of NA interest groups on the executive in cluster 2, among which we also
identify the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP).
Cluster 3 corresponds to the environment advocacy and is composed of the CSO
`Environmental Protection Association of Ghana' (EPAG) and the public agency
`Environmental Protection Agency' (EPA). The very high inﬂuence of governmen-
tal institutions on cluster 3 is primarily determined by public agencies (27%) and
other ministries (21%) rather than MOFA and MOFEP (see Figure 6.5). How-
ever, while EPAG is heavily inﬂuenced by public agencies, with EPA leading the
way, the executive has an impact on the policy position of EPA. International
Organizations account for 23% of the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on cluster 3, with
donor organizations outweighing iNGOs by far with 21% compared to only 2%.
As expected, the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on research organizations (cluster 4)
is primarily determined by research institutions (67%) followed by International
Organizations (22%). In contrast to cluster 3, the inﬂuence of international or-
ganizations is equally distributed with donor organizations and iNGOs exhibiting
the same values (11%). The inﬂuence exerted by governmental institutions on
cluster 4 is the lowest observed with only 9%.
Cluster 5 is characterized by a particularly high inﬂuence of agricultural organi-
zations (44%) whereas governmental and research organizations are almost equal
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with 25% and 26%, respectively. Within the governmental institutions MOFA ac-
counts for 20% of the inﬂuence on cluster 5, while IFPRI determines the relatively
high inﬂuence within research organizations. With two organizations related to
the agricultural industry sector and one agricultural producer, cluster 5 is entirely
composed of the agricultural sector. Hence it is not surprisingly that we observe
such an extremely high impact of agricultural organizations. However, there are
only few organizations determining this high inﬂuence, above all the Apex Farm-
ers Organization of Ghana (APFOG), Wienco Ghana Limited (WGL), and the
Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana (PFAG).
The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) constitutes its own cluster. Heavily inﬂu-
enced by governmental institutions, primarily determined by MOFA, this cluster
emerged in the very beginning of our hierarchical cluster analysis. In contrast to
the other NGOs in our sample (cluster 1) who receive inﬂuence shares by govern-
mental institutions in the range of 26%-44%, this stakeholder organizations is a
clear outlier.
6.3.2. Political Power
As we are interested in the impact of these speciﬁc inﬂuence structures on political
performance, we combine the network multipliers with political decision-making
power to derive the total political power of the individual stakeholder organiza-
tions.
By constitution, Ghana is a presidential democracy, where legislative regulations
are decided by the parliament under a simple majority rule. The president lacks
a binding veto power and the government has no binding agenda-setting power
vis-à-vis the parliament. Nevertheless, in political practice, the parliament exerts
no signiﬁcant legislative power and is reduced to a pure acclamation machine;
the real legislative power rests in the government. Accordingly, we constructed
relevant legislative games, accounting for the dominant role of governmental insti-
tutions as legislative norms. However, the literature is ambiguous regarding the
speciﬁc role of diﬀerent governmental institutions, namely the power of the in-
volved ministries and the president. Therefore we constructed diﬀerent legislative
games. In particular, we assumed that agricultural policy in Ghana is decided fol-
lowing the principle of departmental responsibility, i.e. the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture (MOFA) has agenda-setting power vis-à-vis the cabinet including the
president, and the cabinet decides with a simple majority. Alternatively, in the
power scenario PRES, we assume that the president functions as a `primus inter
pares' in his cabinet (i.e. we assume that the president has agenda-setting power
vis-à-vis his cabinet). In the contrasting scenario DUO, the president and MOFA
share agenda-setting power. In the three scenarios MOFAPARL, PRESPARL,
and DUOL we assume that legislative decision making in Ghana is furthermore
characterized by party leadership (i.e. the ruling party NDC) in combination
with the aforementioned scenarios. Table 6.4 summarizes the calculated banzhaf
indices for the diﬀerent scenarios. In the three government-led scenarios, legisla-
tive decision-making power is shifted among MOFA, the President, MOFA and
the President, and the leading party NDC in combination. Please note, that the
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opposing party NPP is included for the sake of completeness and does not have
agenda-setting power in any of the above mentioned scenarios.
Table 6.4.: Banzhaf Power Indices
MOFA PRES DUO MOFAPARL PRESPARL DUOL
MOFA 0.3478 0.1304 0.2273 0.2581 0.0968 0.1852
MLNR 0.1304 0.1304 0.1364 0.0968 0.0968 0.1111
MEST 0.1304 0.1304 0.1364 0.0968 0.0968 0.1111
MOTI 0.1304 0.1304 0.1364 0.0968 0.0968 0.1111
MOFEP 0.1304 0.1304 0.1364 0.0968 0.0968 0.1111
NDPC 0.1304 0.3478 0.2273 0.0968 0.2581 0.1852
NDC 0 0 0 0.2581 0.2581 0.1852
NPP 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Calculated with IOP 2.0
Informational Inﬂuence and Lobbying Power
To analyze how much political inﬂuence an actor gains from participation in the
policy process we combine the respective network multipliers with banzhaf-power
indices to yield the belief and lobbying power, respectively.
In detail, the belief power reﬂects the informational inﬂuence4 an actor without
original voting power attains from her interaction in the communication network.
Informational inﬂuence results from combining the model of belief formation with
(in)formal political power indices as described in section 6.3.2. In detail, informa-
tional inﬂuence summarizes
• the political inﬂuence of actors without any original voting power according
to their information provision to actors endowed with formal or informal
political power and
• the political inﬂuence of actors with original power who give oﬀ original
power when they rely on information provided by elite members to form
their ﬁnal policy position.
The lower the number of actors having access to an information receiver, the
higher is the inﬂuence of the sender's position on the ﬁnal position of the receiver.
While actors might be able to contact inﬂuential players directly, they might also
gain indirect access to inﬂuential players via policy brokers. Thus, the belief-
power of an actor follows from the weight of actor j's initial position for agents
i's ﬁnal position (mgi) and an agent's original voting power Cg (see section 3.2).
Accordingly, we combine the support multiplier with the banzhaf power indices
to analyze the political power resulting from an actor's access structure in the
political support network.
The belief power represents both, the political inﬂuence of actors without any
original voting power that results from provision of expert information to actors
4From now on we will use the terms belief power and informational inﬂuence synonymously.
The same holds for lobbying power and support inﬂuence.
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Figure 6.6.: Political Power: Lobbying and Communication
Note: mean belief (0.022), lobby (0.022);
mean w/o EXEC: belief (0.008), lobby (0.012)
endowed with formal or informal power, and the political inﬂuence of actors with
original power who give oﬀ power when they rely on the information provided by
elite members to form their ﬁnal policy position. The lobbying power reﬂects the
political inﬂuence of an actor without any original voting power that results from
her access structure to powerful legislators in the support network. The better
access an interest group has to powerful legislators, the more successful are the
inﬂuential activities of this organization. Following this theoretical approach we
expect to ﬁnd a pattern of power distribution that reﬂects the institutional af-
ﬁliation of elite members in the CAADP policy domain. For example, research
organizations are clearly a provider of knowledge and expert information and
therefore are expected to have greater political inﬂuence resulting from knowl-
edge provision than from successful lobbying. Donor organizations on the other
hand are expected to have relatively greater lobbying power.
Figure 6.6 displays the resulting political power from access to powerful legisla-
tors in the communication and support network by organization. We include the
means of both power indices to create quadrants within the coordinate plane which
enables us to identify organizations according to their relative power, i.e. being
relatively inﬂuential due to either its provision of expert information or success-
ful lobbying activities. Governmental organizations are extremely inﬂuential and
yield comparatively very high values in both belief and lobbying power as can be
seen in the small ﬁgure in the top right corner. In order to better distinguish the
power distribution of non-governmental organizations we exclude the ministries
and the oﬃce of the president from the scatter plot and adjust the means of belief
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and lobbying power, respectively.
In general, the power distribution in Ghana depends on the organizational aﬃlia-
tion of the political actors as expected. The executive (i.e. the ministries and the
president) account for the largest share of power due to its original voting power
in the legislative game. Even though the executive is located in the top right
quadrant which indicates above average values for both power indices, we can
clearly identify a comparatively greater share in belief power which is in contrast
to the non-governmental organization who appear to gain slightly more inﬂuence
through access in the support network.
Comparing the mean power indices before and after exclusion of the ministries
supports this ﬁnding and shows that the executive is responsible for balancing
the average political power with mean values of 2.2% whereas the exclusion of
the executive yields asymmetrical values for the lobbying and belief power of
1.2% and 0.8%, respectively. International organizations include donor organiza-
tions and iNGOs alike. Nearly all iNGOs are located in the lower left quadrant
whereas the majority of donor organization appear to be quite powerful lobbyists
as expected. Especially the french development agency AFD is extremely well
connected to powerful legislators in the support network, while its informational
inﬂuence is clearly below average. Multinationals like FAO and World Bank ap-
pear as all-rounders and hold above average shares in both belief and lobbying
power. Ghana's leading think tank ISSER is the most inﬂuential research insti-
tute and yields high values in both its belief- and lobbying power with 1.7% and
2%, respectively. While the Science and Technology Policy Research Institute
(STEPRI) is comparatively more engaged in lobbying activities, IFPRI and the
Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) are linked with powerful legislators
in the communication network. We ﬁnd the agricultural sector (AG), which in-
cludes both farmers and agribusiness, in the lower left quadrant indicating that
agricultural interest groups exert only little political inﬂuence. However, we iden-
tify two agricultural interest groups who exhibit signiﬁcant power shares above
average. The agribusiness interest group Wienco Ghana Limited (WGL) is among
the top four inﬂuential stakeholder organizations (1.7%) in terms of belief power,
whereas the Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers (GNAPF) appears to
be comparatively more successful in its lobbying activities (1.9%). Interestingly,
non-agricultural interest groups (NA) including CSOs clearly outweigh stakehold-
ers engaged in the agricultural sectors, both in terms of belief- and lobbying power.
Total Power
Following equations (4.1) to (4.3), we calculate the total political power5 that
determines the ﬁnal policy position (y∗) by combing the political power derived
from the political bargaining game, including lobbying, with the informational
inﬂuence derived from political communication networks.
Figure 6.7 displays the total power on group level. Not surprisingly, the ma-
jor share of total political power is held by the executive (43%), where MOFA
and the NDPC as a proxy for the president are particularly powerful institutions
5From now on we will use the term total inﬂuence synonymously.
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Figure 6.7.: Total Political Power
with individual total power of 12.4% and 9.3%, respectively (see Figure A.1 in
the Appendix). These high power shares are primarily the result of the assumed
constitutional scenario (DUO) in which the president and MOFA share agenda-
setting power. The other four involved ministries (i.e. MOFEP, MOTI, MEST,
and MLNR) are comparatively less powerful as individual institutions with a
joint power of only 21.5%. Donor and research organization are with 14.1% and
12.4%, respectively, the most powerful non-governmental organizations whereas
the remaining stakeholder organizations range between 6.1% (PUBAG) and 3.3%
(CSO).
The distribution of total power among stakeholder groups in the CAADP pol-
icy domain in Ghana suggests a top-down policy process as the vast majority
of political power is held by governmental organizations. Further, the compar-
atively large shares of donor and research organizations hint at a donor-led and
knowledge-based process which might undermine the identiﬁcation of the general
public with formulated policy goals. Whether or not the agricultural policy pro-
cess in Ghana is of participatory nature will be examined in the next section in
which we apply the network indicators derived in chapter 4.
6.4. Stakeholder Participation in the Policy Process
So far we concentrated our analysis on the distribution of power and the inﬂuence
of governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process. In this sec-
tion we discuss how the identiﬁed network and power structures impact political
performance. In particular, we used the derived indicators to measure political
accountability, capture and ownership. Unfortunately, we were not able to collect
empirical data to apply the knowledge indicator which is therefore not further
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considered in this chapter. While the accountability indices primarily consist of
the political power held by particular stakeholder groups, the measures of cap-
ture and ownership additionally take account of the relative importance of certain
policies and the ideal policy positions, respectively.
We distinguish three stakeholder groups. In particular, we aggregate CSOs, iN-
GOs, and farmer interest groups as general representatives of the Society. We
include the group of CSOs as the representative of the interests and needs of the
general public. The group of NGOs is often considered suitable for promoting par-
ticipatory grassroots development and self-reliance, especially among marginalized
segments of society (Ndegwa, 1996) and thus constitutes another valid representa-
tive. While CSO and NGOs represent the desires of the civil society, we also want
to include the group of agricultural producers as the agricultural sector occupies
the majority of the labor force and contributes a signiﬁcant share to the Ghana's
GDP.
To adequately assess the level of accountability held by the society compared to
other inﬂuential stakeholder groups we additionally include the Industry, i.e. non-
agricultural and agribusiness interest groups. Furthermore, we include the group
donor organizations (Donor). One argument in favor of the explicit participation
of donors is the contribution to evidence-based policy-making. In Sub-Sahara
African countries, statistical data is often weak or absent. Thus, additional infor-
mation available through the participation of donor organizations can be of high
value as long as it is not biased by particular interests (Zimmermann et al., 2009).
6.4.1. Accountability
The ability of citizens to hold governmental organizations accountable for their
actions is important to reduce the risk of biased incentives of politicians and pub-
lic administrators that would lead to ineﬃcient policies. To measure the degree
of accountability we use the sum of the total political power of important stake-
holder organizations as a general indicator (GA-Total). To understand how policy
network structures interact with constitutional rules and to comparatively evalu-
ate the extent of political power due to communication and access structures, we
use the belief power (GA-Belief) and lobbying power (GA-Lobby) as additional
sub-indicators.
Figure 6.8 depicts the general accountability as well as the two sub-indicators
for all three stakeholder groups. In general, the government of Ghana appears to
be more accountable to the society than to the industry as indicated by values
in GA-Total of 13.2% and 10%, respectively. However, we ﬁnd that governmen-
tal institutions appear to be primarily accountable towards donor organizations
who outweigh the domestic stakeholders with a share of 14.1%. These results
are basically determined by the access structure of the political support network.
Both the society and donor organizations show a similar pattern in GA-Lobby
with 12.4% and 15.1%, respectively, whereas the industry is comparatively more
engaged in the provision of expert knowledge (GA-Belief).
This ﬁnding implies that donor organizations are better able to control governmen-
tal actions and policy choices which might correspond to the concepts of donors
rather than reﬂecting the desires of domestic stakeholder organizations. How-
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Figure 6.8.: Governmental Accountability
ever, even though donor organizations hold the largest share of political control in
Ghana - which might undermine ownership of national stakeholders indicating a
donor-led policy process - the superior position within the CAADP policy domain
does not necessarily imply a conﬂict of interests between the three stakeholder
groups. In how far the inclusion of stakeholders in the policy process decreases
governmental capture or increases political consensus among the political actors
is subject to analysis in the next two subsections.
6.4.2. Capture
Governmental capture corresponds to the concept that governmental political ac-
tions and policy choices are biased towards the particular interests of organized
social groups at the expense of the general public. We follow a two step procedure
to determine the extent of a possible interest bias. In the ﬁrst step we calculate
the weighted mean interest bias towards a particular policy issue to display the
general over- or underrepresentation of a particular policy issue.
Figure 6.9 shows the ten diﬀerent policy concerns as surveyed in the policy
preference part of the elite questionnaire (see chapter 5). Stakeholder organiza-
tions were asked to distribute 100 points among the mentioned policy concerns
according to their relative interest. Table A.6 in the Appendix lists the ten policy
issues as well as the group and total mean interest in each issue. Taking the mean
interest as a proxy for the policy concern of the general public we calculate the
diﬀerence of an organization's interest to the mean interest per issue and weight
this diﬀerence with the organization's political power. Figure 6.9 represents the
total deviation from the general interest. Please note, that Figure 6.9 displays
only relative values and hence no direct conclusion can be drawn on the general
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Figure 6.9.: Governmental Capture (Policy Issues)
importance of a particular policy issue. For instance, if the mean interest by
stakeholders is high in a particular issue and stakeholders do not diﬀer much in
their interest in this issue we ﬁnd a comparatively small value. On the other hand,
even if the general interest is quite small we may identify large values if stake-
holders have strong opposing interests. According to our proposed measurement
of general capture, two options arise causing the performance of total deviation.
Taking the mean as the general public's policy interest may in fact overstate the
importance of a policy issue if few political actors put particular emphasis on
this issue whereas the majority of stakeholders show only moderate interest. This
would result in a general negative bias as most of the actors yield a negative value
in the mean-diﬀerence. The other option stems from the distribution of political
power and is the result of particular powerful actors being comparatively more
(less) interested in a certain policy issue than actors with equal or less political
power. As our analysis aims at the identiﬁcation of policy issues that are biased
towards particularly powerful actors, we consider our approach valid for two rea-
sons: First, the mean interest as a proxy for the general public is rational as we
regard the stakeholders included in our analysis as representatives of the CAADP
policy domain and thus the mean interest portrays the general policy concern as a
result thereof. Second, it is not irrational for political actors to emphasize speciﬁc
policy issues while showing no interest in other subjects at all. This holds true
especially for contradicting issues like the welfare of agricultural producers versus
the welfare of the industry or market services sector.
The welfare of farmers (Farm) clearly yields a negatively bias in Ghana indicating
that the majority of stakeholders show less interest in the well-being of agricul-
tural producers. This somewhat unexpected ﬁnding is basically the result of the
combination of the two scenarios mentioned above. While the majority of stake-
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holders show moderate interest in the farmer's well-being, we identify a few actors
who regard this policy issue as particularly important, pushing up the mean inter-
est which leads to negative values in the mean-diﬀerence for most actors. Among
these are for instance IFPRI, which is only interested in two policy issues accord-
ing to our survey results, i.e. the welfare of agricultural producers (90%) and food
security (10%). Other organizations advocating for the agricultural producers are
the farmer's interest group APFOG (80%), the donor organization IFAD (70%),
and the public agencies COCOBOD (57%) and GIDA (50%). In comparison, the
majority of stakeholders state a relative interest of only 14-19%. However, we
identify a second channel that reinforces the negative bias, i.e. the distribution of
lobbying power. The executive is comparatively less interested in the well-being
of farmers' with values of 13% (MOFA) and 10% (other ministries) while holding
a combined share in total power of 43%. The comparatively strong negative bias
against the welfare of farmer's is particularly interesting as we identify a positive
bias in favor of poverty reduction (Poverty).
While the bias in the income of the agricultural export and the food process-
ing sector as well as food security in general is negligible, the industry sector is
captured by the ministries (except MOFA).
In the second step we incorporate a directional parameter to take account of
the interests of vested groups in regard of four global policy dimensions favoring
either the rural or urban, the poor or the rich population. However, as the two
dimensions `pro-urban' and `pro-rich' basically constitute the anti poles to `pro-
rural' and `pro-poor' in our setting, respectively, we only depict the latter as can
be seen in Figure 6.10.
Figure 6.10.: Governmental Capture (Total)
We account for country speciﬁc diﬀerences while mapping the ten policy issues
according to the global dimensions `pro-poor' and `pro-rural' which leads to simi-
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lar values for both indices in the case of Ghana. Figure 6.10 displays governmental
capture towards or against the rural and the poor population in Ghana both in
total as well as by stakeholder group. The total capture index represents the
general bias and includes the weighted interest of all actors, whereas the indices
on group level represent a stakeholder group's interest against the general public.
The capture indices on group level are nothing else than the disaggregated total
capture indices, but provide valuable information by enabling us to identify the
stakeholder groups who determine the direction of governmental capture.
We ﬁnd a considerable bias against the rural (and poor) population in Ghana as
indicated by the total capture index of -4.8%. While donor and research orga-
nizations as well as farmer interest groups are pro-rural, the capture in favor of
the urban and rich population, respectively, is primarily determined by the strong
position of the executive and to a lesser extent by the industry sector (IG:NA).
6.4.3. Ownership
Political ownership corresponds to the concept that a society identiﬁes with a
speciﬁc policy and is committed to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals. To
measure political ownership implied by stakeholder participation, we calculate the
level of political consensus resulting from political communication and lobbying
activities. The higher the level of consensus achieved through stakeholder partic-
ipation, the higher the political ownership of the society in the decided policies
will be. Whether communication enables consensus building among actors de-
pends on the embeddedness of actors with clashing beliefs in the communication
network and the openness of actors to other opinions, i.e. the level of own con-
trol. Firstly, consider that the communication network is a connected component.
A connected component says that any two agents are connected to each other
by direct or indirect communication ties. Assuming our belief formation process
would now result in a perfect consensus (Golub & Jackson 2009). In practice
the assumption of the communication network as a connected component cannot
be hold easily. Communication is actually structured and restricted, e.g. agents
communicate directly only with a small subset of the total population. If these
subsets of the population have clashing beliefs, communication will not enable
consensus building among elite members. Further, it follows from equation 5 that
the trust actors put in the beliefs of other actors determines the level of consen-
sus within reach by communication. Assuming implies that communication still
converges to an equilibrium, but agents will hold heterogeneous policy positions.
In our more general model, actors might diﬀer regarding the relative trust they
put in their own position and on that of other actors, respectively. For example,
diﬀerent levels of own control might reﬂect an actors' information level. Poorly
informed actors might put more weight in the communicated positions of other
actors than experts. Consequently, consensus building is not self-evident in our
model but relies upon country speciﬁc attributes of the elite communication net-
work.
Figure 6.11 displays the conﬂict indices including lobbying and communication
(γ∗) and without lobbying and communication (γ#).
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Figure 6.11.: Political Conﬂict
As indicated by ﬁgure 6.11, participation increases the level of consensus for al-
most all stakeholder organizations whereas the ministries and to some extent also
the civil society organizations lose from the involvement of stakeholder organiza-
tions. The negative value for the executive is intuitive and a direct consequence of
the change in the ﬁnal policy (γ∗) due to the participation of stakeholder organi-
zations. In the scenario without lobbying and political communication, the ﬁnal
policy decision (γ#) is only determined by political agents with original voting
power, i.e. the ministries and the president in our scenario of legislative decision-
making. Including political participation of stakeholders leads to a change in the
ﬁnal policy and thus increases the diﬀerence to the ministries' ideal policy po-
sition. Interestingly, though negligible small, civil society organizations yield a
negative value in PO-Consensus.
Figure 6.12 displays the resulting ownership indices as formulated in chapter 4.3.
As before, we aggregate CSOs, iNGOs, and farm interest groups as representa-
tives of the Society, and include the Industry and Donor organizations as bench-
mark stakeholder groups.
According to our deﬁnition of ownership, the political conﬂict of donors de-
creases comparatively more by including political communication and lobbying.
Hence, donor organizations yield a higher level of consensus (13.1%) than national
stakeholders of the society (9.4%) and industry (11.4%), indicating a compara-
tively high political ownership of donor organizations in the decided policies.
To adequately assess the performance of political stakeholder groups in the
CAADP policy process we provide a comparative perspective in chapter 9 by ﬁrst
contrasting the ﬁnal results of the country case studies with each other. We then
apply the derived indicators to estimated networks which enables us to validate
and to check for robustness of the empirical network data.
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Figure 6.12.: Political Ownership
Comparing the results of the three countries with each other may yield inter-
esting insights as it allows us to draw conclusions from the diﬀerent participation
indicators and the distinct levels of political and economic development. With the
analysis of the structural properties of inﬂuence and participation in the policy
process in Ghana in this chapter we covered already the most advanced country
of our case studies. The next chapter (ch. 7) presents the case study of Senegal
which reﬂects the midﬁeld before we continue with Uganda in chapter 8.
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Senegal
Senegal is the westernmost country on the African continent. The Atlantic Ocean
marks the western border, to the north you ﬁnd Mauritania, to the east is Mali,
and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau are located in the south of the country. Fur-
thermore, within Senegal lies the small country of Gambia (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2013). Senegal is divided into 14 administrative regions, which can be
seen in Figure 7.1. The largest city and also the country's capital is Dakar, which
is located on the Cap-Vert peninsula at the westernmost tip of the country. 14.1
million people live in Senegal (2013), it is hence the least populated country com-
pared to Ghana and Uganda. Just like in many other countries in Africa, in
Senegal live many diﬀerent ethnic groups, most of them speaking their own tribal
language. The biggest ethnic group are the Wolof with 43%. While French is the
oﬃcial language in Senegal, Wolof is the language that is mainly spoken among the
people, especially in Dakar. The Pular are the second largest group with 23.8%
followed by the Serer with 14.7%. The remaining ethnic groups are smaller, with
population shares of less than 5%. The GNI per capita (Atlas method) was US$
1,050 and the PPPpc was US$ 2,210 in 2013, just like Ghana, Senegal is considered
a lower middle income country (The World Bank, 2013). The economy strongly
relies on agriculture, 14.9% of the GDP are due to the primary sector and 77.5%
of the labor force are occupied in the sector. The dominant agricultural products
are peanuts, millet, corn and rice. Other industries are phosphate mining and
fertilizer construction. Additionally due to its location, another important sector
is commercial ﬁshing. The GDP growth rate was 3.7% in 2012 and is close to
the average GDP growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although GDP growth is
expected to increase in the future in Senegal, it will not be suﬃcient to reach
the same growth rates as Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. The mortality rate of
under-ﬁves in Senegal is with 55 per 1,000 births comparatively high, whereas
the maternal mortality rate of 320 per 100,000 live births is the lowest compared
to Ghana and Uganda. Prevalence of HIV accounts to only 0.5% of population
ages 15-49 and is the lowest in all three countries. Only 66% of the population
between 15-24 years is literate and Senegal's labor market bears an unemployment
rate of 10%. Senegal is among the oldest democracies in Africa (Olympio, 2012)
and also often classiﬁed as one of the showpieces of African democracies (Galvan,
2001). Marshall et al. (2012) agree and classify Senegal on the Polity IV scale as
a democracy with a polity score of 7. Additionally, Senegal is considered to be
a free country with a political rights and civil rights rating of 2. The civil rights
ranking just improved from 3 to 2 since the last survey in 2013 (Freedom House,
2014), which is mainly due to the peaceful change of government in 2012.
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Figure 7.1.: Administrative Regions in Senegal
Source: Map No. 4174 Rev. 3, January 2005, UNITED NATIONS
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7.1. Relevant Organizations in the CAADP Policy Domain
Table A.10 in the Appendix lists the 46 political actors in Senegal, the corre-
sponding type of organization, as well as the degree centrality measures for all
three networks. The reputation network is an adjacency matrix that depicts the
nominations of political actors that are perceived as especially inﬂuential in the
formulation of agricultural policy programs by stakeholders. The indegree cen-
trality measures the prominence of actors in a directed network and relates in
our case to the inﬂuence held by political actors in the agricultural policy domain
of Senegal. Summarizing an organization's received nominations and standardiz-
ing by the number of maximal possible nomination yields the indegree centrality
whereby self-nominations are excluded.
With an average indegree of 0.9 the group of supranational organizations has
the highest reputation in Senegal, followed by donor organizations (0.81) and
the executive (0.77). As opposed to this, civil society organizations and interest
groups are less prominent in the agricultural policy domain which indicates a top-
down political process (see Table A.8 in the Appendix). On individual level, the
Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances (MEF) is the most inﬂuential actor in
Senegal (0.93), followed by the Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Equipement Ru-
ral (MAER), the supranational Communauté économique des états de l'afrique
de l'ouest (CEDEAO), and Senegal's leading think tank Institut Sénégalais de
Recherches Agricoles (ISRA) with an indegree of 0.91 each (table A.7 in the Ap-
pendix).
7.2. Identiﬁed Network Structures of Political Participation
in Senegal
As for Ghana, we perform blockmodel analysis to identify the network structure of
political participation in Senegal. Blockmodel analysis is a method of positional
analysis based on structural equivalence. The idea behind positional analysis is
to simplify the information in a network data set. Blockmodel analysis allows us
to identify actors that have the same patterns of relation to all other actors in the
network. Actors that are structural equivalent have identical entries in rows and
columns of the sociomatrix and are aggregated into blocks. The result is a reduced
graph of the original network that consists of blocks that depict the underlying
structure within the network. Application to quantitative network data of political
communication and political support enables us to identify the embeddedness of
stakeholders in political communication and lobbying mechanisms.
7.2.1. Political Communication
Analyzing the exchange of expert information in the communication network
yields some interesting insights. The central position is occupied by the Ministry
of Agriculture (MAER) which constitutes the only signiﬁcant connection with the
large political periphery. Furthermore, we identify two groups that are in close
collaboration with the MAER and take up a broker position to the remaining
stakeholder organizations. The underlying structure within the communication
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network is further validated by the results of the reputation network as the aver-
age indegree centralities per block correspond with the status of the blockmembers
in the reduced graph. Figure 7.2 displays the underlying structure of political com-
munication in Senegal. The reduced graph consists of six blocks. The blocksize
reﬂects the number of actors in the respective block. Sender and receiver of expert
information are depicted by arcs representing the existence of established commu-
nication ties between blocks. Edge-weights are based on the corresponding density
between or within blocks and range from dark gray if communication is very dense
to light gray if only few actors relate to each other in providing information on
agricultural policies. In order to better identify certain communication patterns,
we based relational patterns of the reduced graph on the mean block density, i.e.
we omit ties between and within positions if the corresponding density is below
the mean.
Figure 7.2.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Communication in Senegal
Table A.11 in the Appendix lists the corresponding blockmemberships. The
political core (BL2) is determined by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAER). It is
the only link to the political periphery (Bl1) that is comprised of almost 50%
of actors in our sample and constitutes the largest block in our analysis. The
stakeholder organizations in Block 1 are very heterogeneous and are characterized
by very sparse exchange of expert information. Interestingly, among the actors
in the political periphery we identify institutions that are perceived as especially
inﬂuential in the reputation network like the supranational UEMOA or donor
organizations such as the European Union (UE) and the World Bank (BM). Fur-
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thermore, MAER receives expert information by two research organizations, ISRA
and ITA, that occupy a technical broker position (Bl6) and are both among the
most inﬂuential actors in Senegal. They constitute the only connection to Block 4
that is comprised of research and governmental organizations to which they share
a very close relation in terms of expert information exchange. In particular, this
means that both ISRA and ITA channel the information received from research
and governmental organizations to the ministry of agriculture. Like the technical
broker, Block 3 is comprised of ﬁve actors that were already identiﬁed as extremely
inﬂuential in the reputation network. They establish the second broker position
in the reduced graph. However, unlike the Research Broker Block, the political
broker position of Block 3 is characterized by a heterogeneous group of actors.
It comprises the executive (MEF, MINEL), supranational (CEDEAO) and donor
organizations (USAID, AFD) who are engaged in development and cooperation
(D&C). The two peripheral blocks (Bl4, Bl5) are mainly comprised of research
organizations. However, Block 5 includes with CONGAD and FONGS two inﬂu-
ential civil society organizations and has established communication ties to both
broker blocks, as opposed to Block 4 which is mainly determined by research or-
ganizations and public agencies and is linked to the technical broker block.
Table 7.1 displays the corresponding blockdensities and provides a more detailed
picture of the structural properties of political communication in Senegal. Please
note, that while the reduced graph in Figure 7.2 displays only the main communi-
cation paths in the expert network based on the average blockdensity, the density
table reveals the complete picture of expert information exchange.
Table 7.1.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Expert Information
Peripheral MAER D&C Research CSO-RES Broker
Peripheral 0.09 0.57 0.25 0.08 0.24 0.38
MAER 0.67 0.80 0.31 0.50 0.50
D&C 0.31 1.00 0.85 0.31 0.55 0.70
Research 0.16 0.38 0.37 0.49 0.33 0.88
CSO-RES 0.35 0.50 0.65 0.46 0.75 0.75
Broker 0.45 1.00 0.70 0.92 0.62 1.00
The missing intra-blockdensity observed for MAER (Bl2) is the result of the
number of blockmembers. As we do not allow for self-ties in the actor-actor matrix
of the communication network the intra-blockdensity is omitted. Even internally,
peripheral organizations are only weakly connected to each other. This is particu-
lar the case for the Peripheral Block 1 in which the information exchange is almost
non-existent as indicated by a blockdensity of only 0.09. The political periphery
marks the largest group of stakeholders and includes donor organizations, govern-
mental institutions, and interest groups alike and thus constitutes not only the
lowest absolute value given its size. Political communication in Senegal is deter-
mined by the D&C and Research Broker Block (Bl3, Bl6) that exhibit the highest
densities both in receiving (column) and sending (row) expert information. Both
blocks mediate between stakeholder organizations and the MAER. However, even
though actors in the political periphery (Bl1) are remote and have only limited
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access to the remaining actors in the agricultural policy domain at least 57% have
direct access to the MAER.
7.2.2. Lobbying
In addition to the expert network of political communication, one of the key
components of the network approach is the structure of political support. In
democracies stakeholder organizations are representatives of their members and
their interests. Therefore the policy position of such a group is highly connected
with the resulting welfare for their members. Thus, a major role of stakeholder or-
ganizations in democracies is mediating their clientele's interest to politicians, i.e.
trying to inﬂuence policy or politicians to generate as much welfare as possible for
their members. Obviously, politicians won't support a stakeholder organization's
position without any reward. On their part they expect in return the political
support of members of the stakeholder organization. However, political agents
also represent their electorate in parliament. Therefore, political agents are inter-
ested to ﬁnd political solutions supported by a majority of their electorate.
The underlying support network, other than the communication network, is deter-
mined by mutual beneﬁt of the respective actors in form of interest mediation and
support seeking. We have to diﬀerentiate between political actors (i.e. EXEC,
LEG) who receive support and advocate the stakeholders' interests in return, and
the stakeholders who send political support in return for a representative of their
interest. As not all stakeholders have direct access to political actors they ap-
proach a broker to represent their interests. Thus, we do not necessarily observe
a clear politician-stakeholder structure.
Figure 7.3 displays the main lobbying paths in Senegal. The reduced graph
consists of six blocks with the blocksize reﬂecting the number of actors in the
respective block. Sender and receiver of political support are depicted by arcs
representing the existence of political exchange between blocks. Edge-weights are
based on the corresponding density between or within blocks and range from dark
gray if support is very dense to light gray if only few actors relate to each other.
As before, we based the relational patterns of the reduced graph on the mean
blockdensity, i.e. we omit ties between and within positions if the corresponding
density is below the mean in order to better identify the patterns of political
support.
The reduced graph of political support reveals two stakeholder organizations who
are central in the lobbying proﬁle of Senegal's agricultural policy and occupy a
single-actor block each, i.e. USAID (Block 4) and ISRA (Block 6). Furthermore,
we identify two blocks that are located in the periphery of political support. The
larger Political Periphery Block 3 is engaged in the exchange of political support
in the policy domain only indirectly via USAID and ISRA. We do not observe
any signiﬁcant lobbying activities among the stakeholders in Block 3, as opposed
to the second peripheral Block 5. The Peripheral iNGO Block has no visible
connection with actors from other blocks but rather operates among its own as
indicated by the pronounced self-tie. In addition, the two blocks that participate
actively in the exchange of political support with the center of lobbying do so
in diﬀerent ways. While the Food and Agriculture Block 2 appears to be a net-
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Figure 7.3.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Support in Senegal
sender of political support to ISRA, actors in the Political Core Block 1 receive
political support from the Food and Agriculture Block and are engaged in mutual
exchange of political support with USAID. Table 7.2 provides detailed insights into
the lobbying structure of Senegal. Surprisingly, the center of political support is
determined by a donor (USAID) and a research organization (ISRA), respectively.
Among others, both ISRA and USAID were already assigned broker positions in
the communication network. Additionally, they were identiﬁed among the most
inﬂuential actors in Senegal according to the calculated indegree centralities in the
reputation network. However, we would have expected that the central position
within the political support network is occupied by the leading ministries that
determine agricultural policy in Senegal, i.e. MAER and MEF.
Table 7.2.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Political Support
Pol.Core Food Peripheral USAID iNGO ISRA
Pol.Core 0.59 0.25 0.08 0.75 0.15 0.38
Food 0.38 0.50 0.32 0.33 0.07 1.00
Peripheral 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.46 0.11 0.61
USAID 0.75 0.33 0.46 0.40 1.00
iNGO 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.20 0.65 0.20
ISRA 0.62 0.33 0.36 1.00 0.20
66
Chapter 7. Senegal
7.3. Political Inﬂuence and Power
According to our network model of political belief updating, communication struc-
tures determine political inﬂuence among governmental and non-governmental
organizations. Hence, at a descriptive level, an analysis of the ways in which
organizations are inﬂuenced by each other is of interest. Beyond a descriptive
analysis, it is especially interesting to evaluate the impact of political inﬂuence
structures on diﬀerent aspects of political performance. For example, evaluating
the extent to which the ﬁnal policy positions of governmental organizations are
inﬂuenced by the political views of non-governmental organizations by measur-
ing the eﬀective participation using political power indices. Or, evaluating the
extent to which central organizations take political leadership vis-à-vis civil soci-
ety in a top-down political process using network multipliers. Moreover, a high
political inﬂuence exerted by donor organizations would characterize a donor-led
policy process, which might undermine political ownership if national stakeholder
organizations feel ignored. Furthermore, an analysis of the extent to which the
identiﬁed political inﬂuence and power structures reﬂect the political expertise of
the involved governmental and non-governmental organizations is of interest. To
assess these interesting questions, we provide a descriptive analysis of the iden-
tiﬁed political inﬂuence and power structures in the following section, and we
evaluate the impact of the identiﬁed structures on political performance in the
next section. The network multipliers derived from political communication, as
described in section 3.2, are the centerpiece of our political inﬂuence model.
7.3.1. Political Inﬂuence
Table 7.3 displays the communication network multipliers that were calculated
for speciﬁc categories of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The
network multipliers presented in Table 7.3 correspond to the aggregated weight of
the policy positions of the column category in determining the ﬁnal policy position
of the average individual row category. For example, the ﬁrst row represents the
aggregated inﬂuence of the column category on Senegal's executive (EXEC). The
ﬁnal policy position of the executive after communication is determined to 68% by
its own initial position. The aggregated weight of donors' initial position (DON)
on the executive's ﬁnal position is 7% compared to only 2% for the civil society
organizations (CSO), whereas research organizations exhibit a comparatively high
inﬂuence of 14%.
Like in Ghana, the relatively high network multipliers on the diagonal are the
result of the own control stated by the respective stakeholder organizations. The
own control is an indicator for the trust in external information, i.e. the relative
importance of an actor's own expertise versus external information received from
other organizations. An own control of 1 indicates that the actor relies on her
expertise exclusively whereas an own control of 0 is indicative to the dependence
on external information.
Research organizations (RES) exhibit a high own network multiplier of 86% as
expected, indicating that they consider themselves as technical leaders with high
political knowledge. In contrast, the executive (EXEC) and legislative (LEG)
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Table 7.3.: Network Multipliers per Group: Expert information
EXEC LEG PUB SUPR DON iNGO RES AG PROD CSO
EXEC 0.68 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.02
LEG 0.08 0.50 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 0.04
PUB 0.10 0.00 0.61 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.03
SUPR 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.72 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01
DON 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.61 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.02 0.02
iNGO 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.61 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.06
RES 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.86 0.01 0.00 0.02
AG 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.47 0.02 0.07
PROD 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.77 0.02
CSO 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.66
report a comparatively low own control. Except for the group of agricultural
producers (PROD) and supranationals (SUPR) who obtain own network multi-
pliers of 77% and 72%, respectively, the other stakeholder groups are more open
to external information. Especially the legislative and the agricultural industry
(AG) rely on expert information shared by other stakeholders as indicated by
own network multipliers of 50% and 47%, respectively. Civil society organizations
(CSO) obtain a value of 66% and are thus close to the executive (EXEC, 68%)
and hence rank higher than public agencies (PUB), donor organizations (DON),
and iNGOs who are at par with 61%. This is particularly interesting, as we would
have assumed that donor organizations and public agencies put more trust in their
own information. Both stakeholder groups are regarded as technical leaders and
therefore should be less open to external information.
As before, we derive inﬂuence proﬁles to identify inﬂuential organizations and
describe the extent to which other organizations inﬂuence the initial policy po-
sition of an organization. Formally, inﬂuence proﬁles can be described by the
vector of relative network multipliers that operate as an inﬂuence ﬁeld on an or-
ganization. Based on our belief formation model, the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on
an actor is determined by her local communication structures. Overall, we ﬁnd
that research organizations exhibit the highest inﬂuence in the agricultural policy
domain, followed by governmental actors and international organizations.
We identify three larger clusters of similar size (i.e. Cluster 1 - 3) that comprise
with 40 out of 45 actors the vast majority of political stakeholders included in our
sample, whereas Cluster 4 contains three and Cluster 5 and 6 only one stakeholder
organization each6. However, the number of clusters has no signiﬁcant impact on
the resulting membership for clusters 4 to 6 as UNCS (Cluster 6) is assigned to a
cluster for its own already in the 3-cluster solution. Table A.11 in the Appendix
lists the clustermemberships accordingly.
Cluster 1 and 2 are equally comprised of actors representing the executive, donor
and research organizations. Cluster 1 further includes the only two iNGOs and
6Please note, that the cluster analysis comprises only 45 instead of 46 actors due to data
cleaning issues. As IFPRI stated an own control of 100% the resulting inﬂuence proﬁle was
not computable. However, this aﬀects the passive inﬂuence proﬁle only and IFPRI is still
included in the RESEARCH group of actors exerting inﬂuence on the remaining 45 actors.
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Figure 7.4.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle in the CAADP Policy Network in Senegal
supranational institutions and appears to be internationally oriented as opposed
to cluster 2 which contains all four public agencies and two civil society organi-
zations and can be categorized as nationally oriented. The majority of actors in
clusters 3 and 4 are interest groups engaged in the promotion of the agricultural
sector and thus constitute the two agricultural clusters in our analysis. Cluster 5
(RESOPP, IG:PROD) and 6 (UNCS, CSO) consist both of one single actor only
are thus negligible for further analysis.
We aggregated the relative inﬂuence of stakeholders according to their institu-
tional aﬃliation (see Table 5.1). We diﬀerentiated between agricultural AG (i.e.
IG: AGIND and IG: PROD) and non-agricultural NA (i.e. CSO) stakeholder or-
ganizations. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that research organizations exert by far
the highest inﬂuence on other organizations with an average inﬂuence share of
43%. Governmental and international organizations have only moderate impact
with an average inﬂuence of 26% and 16%, respectively. Interestingly, the civil
society (8%) slightly exceed the agricultural interest groups who only account for
an average inﬂuence of 7%.
A more detailed analysis of the inﬂuence of governmental institutions reveals that
the main inﬂuence on other organizations is primarily exerted by public agencies
with an average of 10%. The two leading ministries that determine agricultural
policy in Senegal (i.e. MAER and MEF) diﬀer substantially in their inﬂuence
on other stakeholders. We included two political agents in our analysis, i.e. the
Oﬃce of the President (PRES) and the Prime Minister (PM). While the President
exerts an average inﬂuence of 2.5%, the Prime Minister and the legislative (i.e.
the Assemblee Nationale) have very limited inﬂuence in the agricultural policy
domain in Senegal. A comparison of the average inﬂuence across clusters reveals
further interesting characteristics.
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Figure 7.5.: Relative Inﬂuence of Governmental Organizations in Senegal
Taking a closer look at ﬁgure 7.4 we ﬁnd that the inﬂuence proﬁles of cluster
1 and cluster 2 are quite similar. However, it is the slight variation in the in-
ﬂuence ﬁeld and the structure of the cluster-memberships that distinguish both
clusters. As already mentioned, cluster 1 can be regarded as an internationally
oriented group of actors whereas cluster 2 relates to stakeholders linked to na-
tional policy issues. This is also reﬂected in the inﬂuence proﬁles of both clusters
to a certain degree. The main diﬀerence between both clusters lies in the compo-
sition of stakeholder organizations and the individual average inﬂuence of these.
Both clusters are comprised of three members of each the executive, donor and
research organizations. Cluster 1 is comprised of the President, the Prime Min-
ister, and the Minister for Economic Aﬀairs and Finance (MEF) who exhibit an
average inﬂuence of 2.6%, 0.7%, and 1.8%, respectively. Cluster 2 contains with
the Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Equipement rural (5.8%), the Ministère de
l'Élevage (3.1%), and the Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie et du Secteur
Informel (1.2%) the most inﬂuential actors of the executive in Senegal. The same
holds true for research organizations in cluster 2, which include with ISRA (8.5%)
and IFPRI (7.3%) the two top-level think tanks in Senegal. While cluster 1 con-
tains with the Agence Française de Developpement (3.5%) the most inﬂuential
donor, the Banque Africaine de Developpement (BAD) and Fonds International
pour le Developpement Agricole (FIDA) have only limited average inﬂuence of
0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. This is in contrast to the three donor organizations
included in cluster 2, i.e. the World Bank (BM), European Union (UE), and
USAID, who reach average inﬂuence values of 2.4%, 2.6%, and 1%, respectively.
Furthermore, cluster 1 contains all iNGOs and supranational organizations in our
data-set whereas cluster 2 includes the majority of public agencies and civil soci-
ety organizations. Thus, we conclude that cluster 2 is not only comprised of the
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most inﬂuential actors (i.e. the executive, donors, and research), but it also in-
cludes with the public agencies and civil society organizations nationally oriented
stakeholder organizations as well. Cluster 1 comprises iNGOs and supranationals
and is more internationally oriented. This composition is also reﬂected in the
inﬂuence proﬁles of both clusters. Especially the shift from cluster 1 to cluster
2 in the percentage share of International Organizations (21% to 17%) to the
agricultural sector (6% to 9%) is worth noting. The civil society (NA) and the
agricultural sector (AG) are with 9% and 8%, respectively, at par with the group
of international organizations (17%) which indicates a balanced policy process
given cluster 2 incorporates the leading ministries and stakeholder organizations
that determine agricultural policy in Senegal. The inﬂuence of governmental in-
stitutions increases by two percentage points from 24% to 26%, which is primarily
determined by public agencies (6% to 10%) whereas we observe a decrease in the
inﬂuence exerted by other ministries. Interestingly, we note an increase of MAER
from 5% to 6% while MER decreases by one percentage point.
Cluster 3 is primarily characterized by stakeholders engaged in the agricultural
sector and research, but also includes two governmental institutions and one actor
of the civil society. Research organizations and civil society organizations denote
an increase in the inﬂuence exerted on cluster 3. The impact of governmental in-
stitutions and international organizations is reduced signiﬁcantly. Especially the
MAER looses and accounts for only 2%, whereas the Oﬃce of the President yields
3%.
Cluster 4 to 6 are comprised of only ﬁve actors in total, thus the inﬂuence proﬁles
are very speciﬁc and on an individual level so that a general message is neither
feasible nor meaningful. All three clusters exhibit extreme values in their inﬂuence
proﬁles and are either inﬂuenced to a very high degree (cluster 4 and 5) or very
low degree (cluster 6) by governmental institutions which is not representative of
our sample. All ﬁve actors (i.e. UNIS, ACDI, and CSA in cluster 4, RESOPP as
cluster 5, UNCS as cluster 6) are located in the large peripheral Block 1 (see 7.2).
RESOPP and UNCSO are furthermore among the least inﬂuential actors in our
sample with an average inﬂuence of 0.5% and 0.1%, respectively, but also happen
to be among the actors with the lowest nominations in the reputation network
(see Table A.10).
7.3.2. Political Power
To determine the impact of these speciﬁc inﬂuence structures on political perfor-
mance we follow the procedure described in chapter 6 and combine the network
multipliers with political decisionmaking power to derive the total political power
of organizations.
Similar to Ghana, Senegal is a presidential democracy where legislative regulations
are decided by the parliament under a simple majority rule. By constitution, the
president lacks a binding veto power and the government has no binding agenda-
setting power vis-à-vis the parliament. Nevertheless, in political practice, the
parliament exerts no signiﬁcant legislative power and is reduced to a pure accla-
mation machine; the real legislative power rests in the government. Accordingly,
we constructed relevant legislative games, accounting for the dominant role of
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governmental institutions as legislative norms.
In particular, we assumed that agricultural policy in Senegal is decided following
the principle of departmental responsibility, i.e. the Ministère de l'agriculture
et de l'equipement rural (MAER) has agenda-setting power vis-à-vis the cabinet
including the president, and the cabinet decides with a simple majority. In the
power scenario PRES, we assume that the president has agenda-setting power
vis-à-vis his cabinet. In the contrasting scenario DUO the president and MAER
share agenda-setting power. In the three scenarios MAERPARL, PRESPARL,
and DUOL we assume that legislative decisionmaking in Senegal is furthermore
characterized by leadership of the Assemblee Nationale in combination with the
aforementioned scenarios. Table 7.4 summarizes the calculated Banzhaf indices
for the diﬀerent constructed legislative scenarios.
Table 7.4.: Banzhaf Power Indices
MAER PRES DUO MAERPARL PRESPARL DUOL
Pres 0.1220 0.2683 0.2581 0.0962 0.2115 0.2051
PM 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MAER 0.2683 0.1220 0.2581 0.2115 0.0962 0.2051
MINEL 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MPEM 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MEF 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MTA 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
Assemblée 0 0 0 0.2115 0.2115 0.2051
Belief and Lobbying Power
To analyze how much belief power an actor gains from her inclusion into the elite's
communication network, we combine the network multipliers with Banzhaf-power
indices. Accordingly, we combine the support network multiplier with Banzhaf-
power indices to assess an organization's level of lobbying power.7. Figure 7.6
displays the resulting political power from access to expert communication and
political support.
The belief power represents the political inﬂuence of an actor by exchanging
expert information in the communication network and is a result of belief updat-
ing. The lobbying power results from an actor's access structure in the support
network. The better access an interest group has to powerful legislators, the more
successful are the lobbying activities of this organization. Following this theo-
retical approach we expect to ﬁnd a pattern of power distribution that reﬂects
the institutional aﬃliation of elite members in the CAADP policy domain like
we did in the case study of Ghana (ch. 6). For example, research organizations
are clearly a provider of knowledge and expert information and therefore are ex-
pected to have greater political inﬂuence resulting from knowledge provision than
from successful lobbying activities based on the access structure in the support
network. Donor organizations on the other hand, are expected to have relatively
greater lobbying power.
7In this study we assume DUO as the underlying scenario.
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Figure 7.6.: Political Power: Lobbying and Communication
Note: mean belief (0.022), lobby (0.022);
mean w/o EXEC: belief (0.008), lobby (0.010)
Figure 7.6 displays the resulting political power from access to powerful legislators
in the expert communication and political support network by organization. We
include the means of both power indices to create quadrants within the coordinate
plane which enables us to identify organizations according to their relative power,
i.e. being relatively inﬂuential due to either its provision of expert information
or successful lobbying activities. Governmental organizations are extremely in-
ﬂuential and yield comparatively high values in both belief and lobbying power
as can be seen in the small ﬁgure in the top right corner. In order to better
distinguish the power distribution of non-governmental organizations we exclude
the ministries and the oﬃce of the president from the scatter plot and adjust the
means of belief and lobbying power, respectively.
Interestingly, the distribution of political belief and lobbying power in Senegal
conﬁrms our assumption of dependence on the organizational aﬃliation of po-
litical actors only partly. The executive account for the largest share of power
due to its original voting power in the legislative game. Located in the top right
quadrant the ministries and the president exhibit above average values in both
power indices. However, we can clearly identify a comparatively greater share in
belief power. Comparing the mean power indices before and after exclusion of the
ministries support this ﬁnding and show that the executive is responsible for bal-
ancing the average political power with mean values of 2.2% whereas the exclusion
of the executive yields asymmetrical mean values of the lobbying and belief power
of 1% and 0.8%, respectively. The executive clearly dominates the policy process
in Senegal and holds shares of 69.2% and 60% in belief and lobbying power, re-
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spectively. These very high values are primarily determined by the president who
accounts for almost one third of lobbying (21.9%) and belief power (19.4%), fol-
lowed by the MAER with shares of 12.3% and 17.3%, respectively. The remaining
ministries are more diversiﬁed in the belief power with individual values between
4.7% (MEF) and 8.3% (MINEL) compared to their degree of lobbying power with
an average share of 5%. After excluding the ministries, Figure 7.6 reveals that the
vast majority of stakeholder organizations is located in the lower left quadrant in-
dicating that they lack signiﬁcant access to powerful legislators in the support and
communication network. We ﬁnd research organizations to be primarily engaged
in the provision of expert knowledge as assumed. The same holds for international
organizations who were expected to be comparatively better linked with political
agents in the support network. International organizations are comprised of donor
organizations, iNGOs, and supranational institutions. Only four organizations ex-
hibit individual informational inﬂuence above average, of which only two exceed
the mean lobbying power of 1%. While this ﬁnding is somewhat unexpected,
donor organizations typically engage in lobbying activities with the Ministry of
Finance (MEF) which itself achieves the lowest power values compared to other
governmental actors. Only 50% of the research organizations in the CAADP pol-
icy domain of Senegal hold signiﬁcant power shares. While IFPRI, CRES, and
UCAD are located in the top left quadrant indicating that they are valuable dis-
tributors of expert knowledge in the communication network, the leading think
tank in Senegal, ISRA, yields high shares in both belief (3%) and lobbying power
(2.6%), followed by ITA with individual power values of 1.6%. Both research or-
ganizations have been identiﬁed as central stakeholders in the communication and
support network. This further underlines the inﬂuential position of both research
institutes and is an indication of an evidence-based policy process. Representing
the civil society, CONGAD is the only non-agriculture stakeholder organization
that participates actively in the policy process as indicated by values above aver-
age in belief (0.9%) and lobbying power (5.1%). However, two representatives of
the agricultural sector exceed this comparatively large share in lobbying power.
As a representative of the agricultural industry, UNIS yields the highest lobbying
power (6.9%) among non-governmental organizations followed by the farmers as-
sociation RESOPP (6.5%) that formed its own cluster in the analysis of political
inﬂuence.
Total Power
We calculate the total political power following equations (4.1) to (4.3) by combin-
ing the political power derived from the lobbying game with the political inﬂuence
derived from the exchange of expert information.
Figure 7.7 displays the total power on group level. As already implied in the
analysis of belief and lobbying power, the major share of total political power is
held by the executive (45.2%). The distribution of total power within the executive
is rather unbalanced. The president holds the largest share of 16.7% followed by
the MAER with 9.7%. The remaining ministries hold an average total inﬂuence
of only 3.8%. Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance (MEF) obtains the lowest
value in total power of all the governmental institutions with only 2.6%. Research
74
Chapter 7. Senegal
Figure 7.7.: Total Political Power
organizations are the only stakeholder group in Senegal that exhibit more than
10% of total power. Their seemingly strong position within the CAADP policy
domain with a total inﬂuence of 18.3% is primarily determined by ISRA (5%),
IFPRI (2.5%), and ITA (2.5%) compared to the remaining research institutes who
hold an average of 1.2%. The comparatively low performance of the remaining
stakeholder organizations in combination with the very powerful executive points
at a top-down policy process. However, the relatively strong position of research
organizations might indicate knowledge-based policies. The application of the
participatory network indicators derived in section 3.2 will provide more insights
in Senegal's political performance.
7.4. Stakeholder Participation in the Policy Process
So far we concentrated our analysis on the distribution of power and the inﬂuence
of governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process. In this sec-
tion we discuss how the identiﬁed network and power structures impact political
performance. In particular, we used the derived indicators to measure political
accountability, capture and ownership. Unfortunately, we were not able to collect
empirical data to apply the knowledge indicator which is therefore not further
considered in this chapter. While the accountability indices primarily consist of
the political power held by particular stakeholder groups, the measures of cap-
ture and ownership additionally take account of the relative importance of certain
policies and the ideal policy positions, respectively.
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7.4.1. Accountability
The successful functioning of any government depends on the ability of citizens to
hold politicians and public administrators accountable for their actions. To mea-
sure the degree of accountability we use the sum of the total political power of
important stakeholder organizations as a general indicator (GA-Total). Further-
more, to understand how policy network structures interact with constitutional
rules, we use the belief power (GA-Belief) and lobbying power (GA-Lobby) as
additional sub-indicators to comparatively evaluate the extent of political power
due to communication and access structures. In particular, we distinguish three
stakeholder groups. We aggregate CSOs, iNGOs, and farmer interest groups as
general representatives of the Society. To adequately assess the level of account-
ability held by the society compared to other inﬂuential stakeholder groups we
additionally include the Industry, i.e. NA and agribusiness interest groups, as
well as donor organizations (Donor).
Figure 7.8.: Governmental Accountability
Figure 7.8 depicts the general accountability as well as the two sub-indicators
for all three stakeholder groups. In general, the government of Senegal is partic-
ularly accountable towards the society (13.3%) whereas donor organizations and
the industry exhibit relative shares of only 8.2% and 6.4%, respectively. This
implies that the society is better able to control governmental actions and that
policy choices correspond to the desires of domestic stakeholders. These results
are primarily determined by the successful lobbying activities of the society which
has better access to inﬂuential actors in the political support network. Interest-
ingly, while the industry exhibits a higher share in GA-Lobby compared to donor
organizations, the comparatively higher share of GA-Belief held by donor organi-
zations compensates this lack and ultimately leaves donors better oﬀ in GA-Total.
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In how far the inclusion of stakeholders in the policy process decreases governmen-
tal capture or increases political consensus among the political actors is subject
to analysis in the next two subsections.
7.4.2. Capture
Governmental capture corresponds to the concept that governmental political ac-
tions and policy choices are biased towards the particular interests of organized
social groups at the expense of the general public. We follow a two step procedure
to determine the extent of interest bias. In the ﬁrst step we calculate the weighted
mean interest bias towards a particular policy issue to display the general over-
or under-representation of a particular policy issue.
Figure 7.9.: Governmental Capture (Policy Issues)
Figure 7.9 displays the ten diﬀerent policy concerns as surveyed in the policy
preference part of the elite questionnaire (see chapter 5). As for Ghana, we take
the mean interest in the respective policy concern stated by all involved stake-
holder organizations as a proxy for the general public. Subsequently, we calculate
the diﬀerence of an organization's interest to the mean interest per issue and
weight this diﬀerence with the organization's political power. Figure 7.9 repre-
sents the total deviation from the general interest. However, as it reﬂects relative
values we can make no direct conclusion on the general importance of a particular
policy issue. For instance, if the mean interest by stakeholders is high in a par-
ticular issue and stakeholders do not diﬀer much in their interest in this issue we
ﬁnd a comparatively small value. On the other hand, even if the general interest
is quite small we may identify large values if stakeholders have strong opposing
interests. The total deviation results from two possible situations: the distribu-
tion of total political power and biased interests (see chapter 6). We consider
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our approach valid for two reasons: First, as we regard the stakeholders included
in our analysis as representatives of the CAADP policy domain taking the mean
interest as a proxy for the general public is rational. Second, it is not irrational
for political actors to emphasize speciﬁc policy issues while showing no interest
in other subjects at all. This holds true especially for contradicting issues like
the welfare of agricultural producers versus the welfare of the industry (NA) or
market services sector.
In general, we ﬁnd a bias towards the welfare of the agricultural sector and
against the industry- and service sector. The interest in public goods and poverty
reduction exhibit negative values, whereas environmental sustainability yields a
positive bias. However, the welfare of the agricultural sector is primarily deter-
mined by few powerful actors who regard these policy issues as particularly impor-
tant whereas the interest of the general public is at a comparatively low level and
yields average values between 5.3% (welfare of farmers) and 2.2% (welfare of the
agro-processing sector). The strong bias in favor of farmers' income is driven by
powerful actors who put this issue high on the agenda like the president and the
MAER, ISRA, or RESOPP. As shown in Table A.12 in the Appendix, poverty re-
duction, public goods, and environmental sustainability exhibit the highest shares
in relative interest by the general public with values as high as 32.8% (Poverty),
23.2% (Budget), and 17.2% (Environment). However, all three issues are subject
to extreme variation in the importance perceived by stakeholders, even within the
same stakeholder groups. In the case of poverty reduction for instance, two mem-
bers of the executive (MINEL and PM) regard this issue as extremely important
and state a relative interest of 50% each, whereas the president is comparatively
less interested (10%). Thus the negative values in these three issues are basically
the result of opposing interests and the domination of powerful stakeholder orga-
nizations in the policy process in Senegal.
In order to identify governmental capture towards organized social groups we in-
corporate a directional parameter to take account of the interests of vested groups
in regard of four global policy dimensions favoring either the rural or urban, the
poor or the rich population. However, as the two dimensions `pro-urban' and `pro-
rich' basically constitute the anti poles to `pro-rural' and `pro-poor', respectively,
we only depict the latter as can be seen in Figure 7.10.
We account for country speciﬁc diﬀerences while mapping the ten policy issues
according to the global dimensions 'pro-poor' and 'pro-rural'. Figure 7.10 dis-
plays governmental capture towards or against the rural and the poor population
in Senegal both in total as well as by stakeholder group. The total capture in-
dex represents the general bias and includes the weighted interest of all actors,
whereas the indices on group level represent a stakeholder group's interest against
the general public. The capture indices on group level reﬂect the disaggregated
total capture indices, but provide valuable information and enable us to identify
the stakeholder groups who determine the direction of governmental capture.
In general, the capture indices are comparatively low. We ﬁnd a bias in favor of
the rural and a minor bias in favor of the poor population in Senegal as indicated
by the total capture indices of 1.39% and 0.25%, respectively. Capture in Sene-
gal is primarily determined by agricultural producers and research organizations,
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Figure 7.10.: Governmental Capture (Total)
whereas the executive is biased towards the rich and urban population. This
results from the opposing interest in the executive. For example, the president
shows strong interest in the welfare of agricultural producers, whereas he has little
interest in poverty reduction. This annihilates his position in favor of the rural
and the poor at the same time. While only two ministries advocate for the rural
(PM and MTA), this positive bias is oﬀset by the majority of the executive and
leads to a bias towards the urban and rich. However, except for the executive and
CSOs, all other stakeholder groups advocate at least to some extent in favor of
the rural and poor population which ultimately leads to positive values for our
capture indices.
7.4.3. Ownership
Political ownership corresponds to the concept that a society identiﬁes with a
speciﬁc policy and is committed to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals. To
measure political ownership implied by stakeholder participation, we calculate the
level of political consensus resulting from political communication and lobbying
activities. The higher the level of consensus achieved through stakeholder partic-
ipation, the higher the political ownership of the society in the decided policies
will be. Figure 7.11 displays the conﬂict indices in the scenario with (γ∗) and
without (γ#) the active participation of stakeholder organizations as well as the
resulting ownership index (PO-Consens).
As indicated by Figure 7.11, participation increases the level of consensus for
almost all stakeholder organizations. Public agencies and the legislative yield nei-
ther a signiﬁcant reduction nor an increase in the political conﬂict index. The
negative value of the executive is intuitive and a direct consequence of the change
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Figure 7.11.: Political Conﬂict
in the ﬁnal policy (γ∗) due to the participation of stakeholder organizations. In
the scenario without lobbying and political communication, the ﬁnal policy deci-
sion (γ#) is only determined by political agents with original voting power, i.e.
the ministries and the president in our scenario of legislative decision-making. In-
cluding political participation of stakeholders leads to a change in the ﬁnal policy
and thus increases the diﬀerence to the ministries' ideal policy position.
Figure 7.12 displays the resulting ownership indices as formulated in section 4.3.
As before, we aggregate CSOs, iNGOs, and farm interest groups as representa-
tives of the Society, and include the Industry and Donor organizations as bench-
mark stakeholder groups. The society and the group of donor organizations are
able to signiﬁcantly decrease the level of political conﬂict which leads to an in-
crease of political ownership of 13.22% and 12.03%, respectively. Including polit-
ical communication and lobbying in the CAADP policy process leads only to a
moderate improvement of the industry 5.08%, indicating that the decided policies
in the agricultural policy domain of Senegal are primarily owned by the society
and donor organizations.
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Figure 7.12.: Political Ownership
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Uganda
Of the three case study countries compared in this study, Uganda is the only one
located in East Africa and also the only landlocked country. Uganda shares a
border with Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Sudan
and Tanzania. Lake Victoria, Africa's largest lake is situated in the south of the
country and deﬁnes part of it's southern boundary. Uganda is divided into four
administrative regions, i.e. the Central, Western, Eastern and Northern Region,
and subdivided into 111 districts (see Figure 8.1). 37.6 million people live in
Uganda (2013), it has the largest population compared to Ghana and Senegal and
is further the second most populated landlocked country in the world. Uganda is
ethnically very diverse with more than 40 ethnic tribes, most of them speak their
own tribal language. The largest and politically and economically most important
tribe are the Baganda to which 16.9% of the population belong to. They live
mainly in the Central Region around the country's capital Kampala. Other large
tribes are the Banyankole (9.5%), the Basoga (8.4%), the Bakiga (6.9%), Iteso
(6.4%) and the Langi (6.1%). The ethnic heterogeneity of the country that is due
to the former colonial boundaries created by Britain, is one reason for the political
instability especially during the regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote.
The GDP growth rate declined from 2012 to 2013 from 4.6% to 3.3% and fell below
the average growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda's economy still strongly
relies on the agricultural sector, which has a share of 23.1% of the countries GDP
and an employment share of over 80%. Uganda's main export good is coﬀee. The
country is rich in natural resources. Copper, gold, and other minerals can be
found in Uganda. Lately, oil was also discovered in Uganda which will further
increase income from exports. The World Bank (2013) classiﬁes Uganda as a low
income country with a GNI per capita (Atlas method) of US$ 600 and a PPPpc of
US% 1,630 in 2013. Uganda has the highest infant mortality of the three countries
with 66 deceases per 1,000 births. One issue that separates Uganda from the two
other SSA countries is the high prevalence of HIV with 7.4% of population ages
15-49. Similar to Ghana, the youth in Uganda is comparatively well educated as
demonstrated by a literacy rate of 87% of population ages 15-49. Uganda displays
the lowest unemployment rate in all three countries (4%). Compared to Ghana
and Senegal, Uganda only has a short history of multi party elections and has not
witnessed any peaceful electoral turnovers yet. (Freedom House, 2014) classiﬁes
Uganda as a partly free country, with a political rights ranking of ﬁve and a civil
liberties ranking of four. The polity IV score of Uganda is minus one, which
deﬁnes it as an anocracy (Marshall et al., 2012).
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Figure 8.1.: Administrative Regions in Uganda
Source: Map No. 3862 Rev. 4, May 2003, UNITED NATIONS
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8.1. Relevant Organizations in the CAADP Policy Domain
Table A.16 lists the 43 political actors in Uganda, the corresponding type of
organization, and the indegree centralities. The reputation network is an adja-
cency matrix that depicts the nominations of political actors that are perceived as
especially inﬂuential in the formulation of agricultural policy programs by stake-
holders. The indegree centrality measures the prominence of actors in a directed
network and relates in our case to the inﬂuence held by political actors in the
agricultural policy domain in Uganda. Summarizing an organization's received
nominations and standardizing by the number of maximal possible nomination
yields the indegree centrality whereby self-nominations are excluded.
With an average indegree centrality of 0.82, donor organizations represent the
most inﬂuential stakeholder group in the agricultural policy process in Uganda.
Interestingly, the perceived political inﬂuence of interest groups outweighs the in-
ﬂuence of political actors. Besides the agricultural producers (IG:PROD, 0.79),
even the non-agrar interest group is (slightly) more inﬂuential than the public
sector agencies and the executive who exhibit an average indegree of 0.74 and 0.7,
respectively. However, the low indegree of the executive is mainly determined by
the Ministry of Local Government (0.5), whereas the Ministry of Agriculture, An-
imal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) is perceived as the most inﬂuential player
in Uganda with an indegree of 0.97 (see Table A.13 in the Appendix). Like the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Uganda National Farmers' Federation (UNFFE)
exhibits an indegree of 0.9 and ranks among the most inﬂuential organizations in
the CAADP policy domain.
8.2. Identiﬁed Network Structures of Political Participation
in Uganda
Similar to Ghana and Senegal, we perform blockmodel analysis to identify the
network structure of political participation in Uganda. Blockmodel analysis is a
method of positional analysis based on structural equivalence. The idea behind
positional analysis is to simplify the information in a network data set. Block-
model analysis allows us to identify actors that have the same patterns of relation
to all other actors in the network. Actors that are structural equivalent have
identical entries in rows and columns of the sociomatrix and are aggregated into
blocks. The result is a reduced graph of the original network that consists of
blocks that depict the underlying structure within the network. Application to
quantitative network data of political communication and political support en-
ables us to identify the embeddedness of stakeholders in political communication
and lobbying mechanisms.
8.2.1. Political Communication
We identify a clearly structured exchange of expert information among the stake-
holders in Uganda. The blockmodel analysis yields a 6-block solution and displays
the pattern of political communication in Uganda, with a political core (Bl1) which
includes the central governmental institutions, a political (Bl2) and a technical
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broker (Bl6), a political periphery (Bl3), as well as a donor block (Bl4) and a
block primarily comprised of interest groups and research organizations (Bl5).
Interestingly, the political core is only weakly connected in the communication
network. The exchange of expert information with the governmental organiza-
tions that determine the agricultural policy process in Uganda takes place only
via broker relations.
Figure 8.2 displays the underlying structure of political communication in Uganda.
The reduced graph consists of six blocks. The blocksize reﬂects the number of
actors in the respective block. Sender and receiver of expert information are
depicted by arcs representing the existence of established communication ties be-
tween blocks. Edge-weights are based on the corresponding density between or
within blocks and range from dark gray if communication is very dense to light
gray if only few actors relate to each other in providing information on agricultural
policies. In order to better identify certain communication patterns, we based re-
lational patterns of the reduced graph on the mean block density, i.e. we omit
ties between and within positions if the corresponding density is below the mean.
Figure 8.2.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Communication in Uganda
Table A.17 in the Appendix lists the corresponding blockmemberships. The
political core (BL1) is determined by the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Indus-
try and Fisheries (MAAIF), the Oﬃce of the Prime Minister (OPM) along with
the ruling party of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and two political
actors engaged in environmental issues, i.e. the Ministry of Water and Environ-
ment (MWE) and the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA).
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It is in close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development (MoFPED) and the National Agricultural Research Organization
(NARO) that constitute the political broker block (Bl2) located at the center of
political communication in Uganda. The technical broker block (Bl6) is occupied
by the Uganda National Farmers' Federation (UNFFE) and the Private Sector
Foundation Uganda (PSFU). These two interest groups provide the link between
the relatively large agribusiness and research block (Bl5) to the political core and
to the donor block (Bl4). The group of donors on the other hand is linked with
the political core only via the political broker position obtained by MoFPED
and NARO. The close connection between the donor block and MoFPED is not
unexpected as both are related due to ﬁnancial development assistance. The het-
erogeneous group in the political periphery (Bl3) holds an outsider position in the
agricultural policy domain of Uganda and primarily receives information via the
political broker block.
Table 8.1 provides a more detailed picture of the structural properties of political
communication in Uganda and displays the corresponding blockdensities.
Table 8.1.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Expert Information
Pol Pol.Broker Periphery Don AG-RES Tech.Broker
Pol 0.75 1.00 0.42 0.29 0.11 0.60
Pol.Broker 0.90 0.50 0.42 0.71 0.63 0.50
Periphery 0.38 0.54 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.38
Don 0.49 0.93 0.07 0.71 0.25 0.57
AG-RES 0.00 0.57 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.50
Tech.Broker 0.50 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.60 1.00
Taking a look at the diagonal of the density table indicates that the intensity
of expert information exchange within the blocks varies. The political core and
the donor block exhibit a comparatively high degree of political communication
as indicated by intra blockdensities of 0.75 and 0.71, respectively. Exchange of
expert information among the technical brokers, UNFFE and PSFU, is mutual
and hence the density yields the maximum density of 1. However, these two
stakeholder organizations pursue diﬀerent interests. UNFFE represents the agri-
cultural producers whereas PSFU is an advocate of the private enterprises. Both
actors are among the ten most inﬂuential stakeholders according to the reputation
network (see Table A.13). Though below the mean and therefore not displayed
in Figure 8.2, the entries in the density table indicate that the political periphery
(Bl3) is not as isolated as expected. In fact, 42% of the actors in Block 3 exchange
expert information with the political core and the political broker block. In gen-
eral, communication in the agricultural policy domain of Uganda is determined by
the political broker position inhibited by MoFEP and NARO. Both, as a receiver
and a sender the political broker block exhibits the highest share of information
exchange overall as indicated by its column and row entries in Table 8.1.
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8.2.2. Lobbying
The lobbying structure in Uganda divides the stakeholder engaged in the agri-
cultural policy domain into two equally sized groups: one group is engaged in
lobbying activities whereas the other group is only loosely connected in the polit-
ical support network. Though the memberships across the empirical blocks vary
compared to the previous analysis of political communication, we still identify a
similar structure of political support. Especially the organizations who emerged
as brokers in the communication network occupy a similar position in the sup-
port network. As already noted, lobbying is the approach of interest groups and
stakeholders to inﬂuence political actors in charge by oﬀering political support
in terms of votes in exchange for advocacy by the politician. Hence, unsurpris-
ingly the central position within the political support network is occupied by the
leading ministries that determine agricultural policy in Uganda (i.e. MAAIF and
MoFEP).
Figure 8.3.: Blockmodel Structure of Political Support in Uganda
Figure 8.3 displays the underlying structure of political support in Uganda. The
reduced graph consists of six blocks. Like before, we based the relational patterns
of the reduced graph on the mean blockdensity, i.e. we omit ties between and
within positions if the corresponding density is below the mean in order to better
identify the patterns of political support.
We identify ﬁve smaller blocks which are closely related to each other and one
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large peripheral block (Bl3) consisting of 56% of all relevant political actors in
Uganda whose access to political support is rather limited. Neither are they able to
connect to the remaining stakeholders nor do they approach each other. However,
the majority of actors within Block 3 is linked indirectly to the other stakeholders
via the political broker Block 2. Table A.17 reveals that the distribution of actors
across the six blocks is very heterogeneous. The political broker Block 2 consists of
MoFPED and NARO and is thus in one to one correspondence with the structure
identiﬁed in the communication network. This underlines the prominent position
both organizations occupy within the agricultural policy domain of Uganda. The
same applies for UNFFE and PSFU who occupy the technical broker position in
the communication network. In the political support network they hold the same
position and constitute the technical broker Block 6 together with the research
organization Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE).
Both, the technical and the political broker block connect Donor & Research (Bl4)
with the Agricultural Block 1. Block 5 is only linked to the political broker block
and is comprised of agribusiness interest groups and international organization.
Table 8.2.: Density of Empirical Blocks: Support
Agrar Pol.Broker Peripheral DON-RES Agind Tech.Broker
Agrar 0.53 0.92 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.94
Pol.Broker 0.67 0.50 0.38 0.75 0.75 0.17
Peripheral 0.15 0.54 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.18
DON-RES 0.17 0.88 0.20 0.75 0.12 0.83
Agind 0.08 1.00 0.20 0.19 0.67 0.50
Tech.Broker 1.00 0.50 0.21 0.75 0.42 0.67
Table 8.2 displays the corresponding blockdensities. Except for the peripheral
group in Block 3, the exchange of political support within the blocks is relatively
high in Uganda as indicated by the diagonal in Table 8.2. The extremely low intra-
blockdensity of 0.06 for peripheral block (Bl3) is particular interesting. Not only
represents this block with 24 actors the largest group aggregated by blockmodel
analysis, but it is comprised of the majority of governmental organizations as
well. Except for MAAIF (Bl1), MoFPED (Bl2) and NARO (Bl2), all identiﬁed
institutions of the executive, legislative, and public agencies are located in the
periphery of political support. Only 6% of the possible ties within Block 3 are
realized, implying that political support among these organizations is almost non-
existent. The exchange of political support is concentrated among the political
broker position of MFPED and NARO who are engaged in lobbying activities in
which NARO sends and MFPED receives political support.
8.3. Political Inﬂuence and Power
According to our network model of political belief updating, communication struc-
tures determine political inﬂuence among governmental and non-governmental
organizations. Hence, at a descriptive level, an analysis of the ways in which
organizations are inﬂuenced by each other is of interest. Beyond a descriptive
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analysis, it is especially interesting to evaluate the impact of political inﬂuence
structures on diﬀerent aspects of political performance. For example, evaluating
the extent to which the ﬁnal policy positions of governmental organizations are
inﬂuenced by the political views of non-governmental organizations by measur-
ing the eﬀective participation using political power indices. Or, evaluating the
extent to which central organizations take political leadership vis-à-vis civil soci-
ety in a top-down political process using network multipliers. Moreover, a high
political inﬂuence exerted by donor organizations would characterize a donor-led
policy process, which might undermine political ownership if national stakeholder
organizations feel ignored. Furthermore, an analysis of the extent to which the
identiﬁed political inﬂuence and power structures reﬂect the political expertise of
the involved governmental and non-governmental organizations is of interest. To
assess these interesting questions, we provide a descriptive analysis of the iden-
tiﬁed political inﬂuence and power structures in the following section, and we
evaluate the impact of the identiﬁed structures on political performance in the
next section. The network multipliers derived from political communication as
described in section 3.2, are the centerpiece of our political inﬂuence model.
8.3.1. Politicial Inﬂuence
Table 8.3.: Network Multipliers per Group: Expert information
EXEC PUB LEG DON iNGO RES AG PROD NA CSO
EXEC 0.53 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02
PUB 0.09 0.65 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01
LEG 0.12 0.12 0.49 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.02
DON 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.56 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01
iNGO 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.52 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.02
RES 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00
AG 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.57 0.07 0.03 0.01
PROD 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.74 0.01 0.01
NA 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.36 0.02
CSO 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.61
Table 8.3 displays the communication network multipliers that were calculated
for speciﬁc categories of governmental and non-governmental organizations. The
network multipliers presented in Table 8.3 correspond to the aggregated weight of
the policy positions of the column category in determining the ﬁnal policy position
of the average individual row category. For example, the ﬁrst row represents the
aggregated inﬂuence of the column category on Uganda's executive (EXEC). The
ﬁnal policy position of the executive after communication is determined to 53% by
its own initial position. The aggregated weight of Donors' initial position (DON)
on the executive's ﬁnal position is 4% whereas public agencies (PUB) yield 12%.
Please note, that the relatively high network multipliers on the diagonal result
from a very high own control stated by the respective organizations within the
groups. The own control is an indicator for the trust in external information, i.e.
the relative importance of an actor's own expertise versus external information
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received from other organizations. An own control of 1 indicates that the actor
relies on her expertise exclusively whereas an own control of 0 is indicative to the
dependence on external information.
Research organizations (RES) exhibit a high own network multiplier of 83% as
expected, indicating that they consider themselves as technical leaders with high
political knowledge. The same applies to the group of agricultural producers
(PROD) which features the second highest own network multiplier (74%). In
contrast, the executive and the legislative report a comparatively low own con-
trol. In fact, both governmental institutions obtain with 53% (EXEC) and 49%
(LEG) own network multipliers which are among the lowest in the whole network.
This implies that both institutions rely on expert information to a greater extent
than other stakeholder groups. Non-agricultural interest groups is an exception.
With an own network multiplier of 36% they clearly don't consider themselves
as experts in agricultural policy which is intuitive. Public sector agencies (PUB)
report a relatively high own control (65%) compared to other governmental orga-
nization and are less open to expert information provided by other organizations.
International organizations such as donors (56%) and iNGOs (52%) and the in-
terest group of agricultural industries (AG, 57%) are in midﬁeld. The civil society
(CSO) exhibits a value of 61% which indicates a solid position within the policy
domain of Uganda, an aspect we will investigate more thoroughly in the next
paragraph.
Beyond own control, the inﬂuence proﬁles of organizations are interesting. In-
ﬂuence proﬁles identify inﬂuential organizations and describe the extent to which
other organizations inﬂuence the initial policy position of an organization. For-
mally, inﬂuence proﬁles can be described by the vector of relative network multi-
pliers that operate as an inﬂuence ﬁeld on an organization. Based on our belief
formation model, the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on an actor is determined by her
local communication structures. We conducted a cluster analysis using the in-
ﬂuence proﬁles of the identiﬁed organizations. Based on the reported statistical
ﬁt values, we preferred a 6 cluster solution. Overall, we ﬁnd that governmental
actors exhibit the highest inﬂuence in the agricultural policy domain, followed by
research organizations and agricultural interest groups alike.
Cluster analyzing the computed inﬂuence proﬁles yields a very large cluster
which comprises 53% of the actors involved in the CAADP policy domain (cluster
1). Except for research organizations, cluster 1 corresponds to the relative dis-
tribution of associated stakeholder organizations in the whole dataset and thus
delivers a relatively broad overview of the structural properties of political inﬂu-
ence exerted by the aggregated stakeholder groups (see Table A.17). Cluster 2
is primarily composed of members of governmental institutions, whereas cluster
3 comprises interest groups and international organizations engaged in the pro-
motion of the agricultural industry and trade sector. Clusters 4-6 are primarily
occupied by research organizations. Though most of them rely heavily on their
own expertise as already indicated by the very high own network multipliers, the
composition of inﬂuence exerted on research organizations by other stakeholder
groups still exhibits variations.
We aggregated the relative inﬂuence of stakeholders according to their institu-
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Figure 8.4.: Relative Inﬂuence of Governmental Organizations in Uganda
tional aﬃliation (see Table 5.1) and diﬀerentiated between agricultural AG (i.e.
IG: AGIND and IG: PROD) and non-agricultural NA (i.e. IG:NONAGRAR and
CSO) stakeholder organizations. Figures 8.4 and 8.5 indicate that governmental
organizations exert the highest inﬂuence on other organizations with an average
inﬂuence share of 33%, followed by research organizations and agricultural interest
groups who hold average inﬂuence shares of 27% and 23%, respectively. Interna-
tional organizations exert low inﬂuence on other organizations with average shares
of 9% (DONOR) and 2% (iNGOs). The inﬂuence of civil society organizations is
negligible with an average value as low as 3%.
A more detailed analysis of the inﬂuence of governmental institutions reveals that
the main inﬂuence on other organizations is primarily exerted by public agen-
cies. The two leading ministries that determine agricultural policy in Uganda
(i.e. MAAIF and MoFEP) exert only little inﬂuence on other organizations. The
president (OP) and the prime minister (OPM) are at par with the legislative (i.e.
NRM and FDC).
With 23 actors cluster 1 comprises more than half of the stakeholders repre-
sented in our dataset. Except for research organizations, the cluster-membership
depicts the relative distribution of actors in the agricultural policy domain of
Uganda which is also reﬂected in its inﬂuence ﬁeld. The inﬂuence exerted by the
ﬁve stakeholder groups aggregated corresponds almost completely to the average
computed regardless of cluster membership. While the inﬂuence of research and
governmental institutions (Politics) is slightly underrepresented, international or-
ganizations (Int. Org) and the agricultural sector (AG) exceed the average by
two percentage points. This is straightforward as research organizations are not
included in cluster 1. The predominant position of the governmental institutions
however is primarily determined by public agencies who account for an inﬂuence
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Figure 8.5.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle in the CAADP Policy Network in Uganda
share of 14% and thus exert more inﬂuence on stakeholder organizations in this
cluster than all ministries combined (see Figure 8.5). The agricultural sector (AG)
exhibits a value of 25% and is at par with research organizations. This might in-
dicate ownership of national stakeholders in the political process rather than a
donor-led policy in Uganda. The most inﬂuential organizations determining the
inﬂuence ﬁeld of cluster 1 are the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC) and
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) who exert a combined
inﬂuence of 19%, followed by the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) and the
National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO) who represent the agricul-
tural sector and public agencies with 6% and 5%, respectively.
In contrast to the balanced inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on cluster 1, cluster 2 is heav-
ily inﬂuenced by governmental institutions (62%). The impact of international or-
ganizations, research, and the agricultural sector is decreased signiﬁcantly. Public
agencies, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFPED), and
political parties (LEG) are the institutions who primarily determine the strong
governmental inﬂuence operating on cluster 2. MAAIF exerts comparatively less
inﬂuence on cluster 2. The increased inﬂuence of the MFPED on this cluster is
consistent with the results of the blockmodel analysis. The majority of actors
in this cluster are located in the political periphery and primarily receive expert
information through the political broker (i.e. MFPED and NARO).
Cluster 3 is characterized by stakeholder organizations engaged in the agricul-
tural trade and export sector. The inﬂuence proﬁle of cluster 3 appears to be
quite similar to cluster 1 at ﬁrst. The inﬂuence exerted by governmental institu-
tions (Politics) and the agricultural sector (AG) is almost identical to the inﬂuence
ﬁeld operating on cluster 1 with values of 30% and 24%, respectively. However,
while research organizations (29%) are almost at par with governmental institu-
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tions, the NA sector exhibits the highest values across clusters (10%) whereas the
impact of international organizations decreases to only 8%.
The ﬁve research organizations included in the sample for Uganda have extremely
diﬀerent inﬂuence proﬁles and hence form separate clusters. Cluster 4 comprises
next to AFRISA and COAES also an iNGO specialized in agricultural extension
services (Sasakawa Global), cluster 5 is composed of the Advocates Coalition for
Development and Environment (ACODE) and the powerful interest group of agri-
cultural producers, i.e. the Uganda National Farmers' Federation (UNFFE). In
contrast, cluster 6 consists of the two most inﬂuential research organizations in
Uganda, i.e. the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the
Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC). Governmental institutions have only
limited inﬂuence on research organizations and exhibit the lowest values com-
pared to the other three clusters, ranging from 22% (cluster 4) to 18% (cluster
6). Decomposing the inﬂuence exerted by governmental institutions reveals that
the three clusters are inﬂuenced by diﬀerent political bodies even though the rela-
tively balanced inﬂuence proﬁles in Figure 8.4 suggest otherwise. While cluster 4
is primarily inﬂuenced by public agencies (14%) and MFPED (4%), the opposite
holds for cluster 6 for which PUBAG and MFPED yield 3% and 12%, respectively.
While cluster 5 is also primarily inﬂuenced by public agencies (9%), other min-
istries (MoLG, MTTI, MWE) and political parties are more inﬂuential than both
MFPED and MAAIF. As already indicated by the high own network multiplier
in Table 8.3, research organizations exert a very high inﬂuence among each other.
This is also reﬂected in the inﬂuence proﬁles of clusters 4 to 6. However, while
cluster 4 and 6 exhibit values of 50% and 51%, respectively, this does not hold
true for cluster 5 (17%) which receives an unmet 47% by the agricultural sector
instead. The inﬂuence exerted by research organizations on cluster 4 and cluster
6 is almost entirely determined by the two leading think tanks in Uganda. Both
EPRC and IFPRI exhibit an inﬂuence of 23% on cluster 4, which underscores
their predominant position among technical experts in Uganda. This is further
underlined by the inﬂuence ﬁeld operating on their own cluster 6. Both research
organizations consider themselves as technical experts in the ﬁeld of agricultural
policy research which is reﬂected by an extremely high own control of 90% stated
by both organizations. This results in a mutual inﬂuence on the ﬁnal policy posi-
tions of 24% (IFPRI) and 25% (EPRC) exerted on cluster 6. However, we identify
a further stakeholder group that has a relatively big inﬂuence on the two think
tanks in cluster 6. International organizations hold an average inﬂuence share of
23%, which is primarily determined by USAID (19%). In contrast, cluster 4 and
especially cluster 5 obtain a large share by the agricultural sector which yields
values of 17% and 47%, respectively, with the interest groups of agricultural pro-
ducers being the driving force with an average inﬂuence of 13% (cluster 4) and
31% (cluster 5).
8.3.2. Political Power
To determine the impact of these speciﬁc inﬂuence structures on political perfor-
mance we follow the procedure described in chapter 6 and combine the network
multipliers with political decisionmaking power to derive the total political power
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of organizations.
Like Ghana and Senegal, Uganda is a presidential democracy, where legislative
regulations are decided by the parliament under a simple majority rule. By con-
stitution, the president lacks a binding veto power and the government has no
binding agenda-setting power vis-à-vis the parliament. Nevertheless, in political
practice, the parliament exerts no signiﬁcant legislative power and is reduced to a
pure acclamation machine; the real legislative power rests in the government. Ac-
cordingly, we constructed relevant legislative games, accounting for the dominant
role of governmental institutions as legislative norms.
In particular, we assumed that agricultural policy in Uganda is decided follow-
ing the principle of departmental responsibility, i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture
Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) has agenda-setting power vis-à-vis the
cabinet including the president, and the cabinet decides with a simple majority.
Alternatively, in the power scenario PRES, we assume that the president func-
tions as a `primus inter pares' in his cabinet (i.e. we assume that the president
has agenda-setting power vis-à-vis his cabinet). In the contrasting scenario DUO
the president and MAAIF share agenda-setting power. In the three scenarios
MAAIFPARL, PRESPARL, and DUOL we assume that legislative decisionmak-
ing in Uganda is furthermore characterized by party leadership (i.e. the ruling
party NRM) in combination with the aforementioned scenarios. Table 8.4 sum-
marizes the calculated Banzhaf indices for the diﬀerent constructed legislative
scenarios. This table demonstrates that for the 3 government-led scenarios, leg-
islative decisionmaking power is shifted among MAAIF, the president, MAAIF
and the president, and the leading party NRM in combination. Please note, that
the opposing party FDC is included for the sake of completeness and does not
have agenda-setting power in any of the above mentioned secenarios.
Table 8.4.: Banzhaf Power Indices
MAAIF PRES DUO MAAIFPARL PRESPARL DUOL
MAAIF 0.2683 0.1220 0.2581 0.2115 0.0962 0.2051
MFPED 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MoLG 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MTTI 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
MWE 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
OP 0.1220 0.2683 0.2581 0.0962 0.2115 0.2051
OPM 0.1220 0.1220 0.0968 0.0962 0.0962 0.0769
FDC 0 0 0 0 0 0
NRM 0 0 0 0.2115 0.2115 0.2051
Belief and Lobbying Power
To analyze how much belief power an actor gains from his inclusion into the elite's
communication network, we combine the network multipliers with Banzhaf-power
indices8. Figure 8.6 displays the resulting political power from access to expert
communication and political support.
8In this study we assume DUO as the underlying scenario.
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Figure 8.6.: Political Power: Lobbying and Communication
Note: mean belief (0.023), lobby (0.023);
mean w/o EXEC: belief (0.013), lobby (0.015)
The belief power represents the political inﬂuence of an actor by exchanging ex-
pert information in the communication network and is a result of belief updating.
The lobbying power stands for the political inﬂuence of an actor without any orig-
inal voting power that results from her access structure to powerful legislators in
the support network. The better access an interest group has to powerful legisla-
tors, the more successful are the lobbying activities of this organization. Following
this theoretical approach we expect to ﬁnd a pattern of power distribution that
reﬂects the institutional aﬃliation of elite members in the CAADP policy domain.
For example, research organizations are clearly a provider of knowledge and ex-
pert information and therefore are expected to have greater political inﬂuence
resulting from knowledge provision than from successful lobbying activities based
on the access structure in the support network. Donor organizations on the other
hand, are expected to have relatively greater lobbying power.
Figure 8.6 displays the resulting political inﬂuence from access to powerful legisla-
tors in expert communication and support networks by organization. We included
the means of both power indices to create quadrants within the coordinate plane
which enables us to identify organizations according to their relative power, i.e.
being relatively inﬂuential due to either provision of expert information or success-
ful lobbying activities. Governmental organizations are extremely inﬂuential and
yield comparatively very high values in both belief and lobbying power as can be
seen in the small ﬁgure in the top right corner. In order to better distinguish the
power distribution of non-governmental organizations we exclude the ministries
and the oﬃce of the president from the scatter plot and adjust the means of belief
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and lobbying power, respectively.
The distribution of political power in Uganda yields a clear picture and conﬁrms
our assumption that political communication and lobbying activities depend on
the organizational aﬃliation of political actors. The executive accounts for the
largest share of power due to its original voting power in the legislative game.
The executive is located in the top right quadrant which indicates above average
values for both power indices. However, we can clearly identify a comparatively
greater share in belief power. Comparing the mean power indices before and after
exclusion of the ministries support this ﬁnding and show that the executive is
responsible for balancing the average political power with mean values of 2.3%
whereas the exclusion of the executive yields asymmetrical values for the lobbying
and belief power of 1.5% and 1.3%, respectively. The executive exhibits signiﬁ-
cant shares in belief and lobbying power with values of 53% and 46%, respectively,
whereas the ratio of belief power to lobbying power is less balanced for the remain-
ing governmental institutions. Both public agencies and the legislative (i.e. Poli-
tics) exhibit below average values in terms of lobbying power. Figure 8.6 reveals
however, that all public agencies (except for UCDA) as well as the ruling party
NRM are powerful actors in the communication network as indicated by individ-
ual values of belief power between 1% (NRM) and 2.9% (NARO). International
organizations comprise both donor organizations and iNGOs. Both stakeholder
groups exhibit only low values in belief and lobbying power and are located in the
lower left quadrant in Figure 8.6. The low performance of donor organizations in
Uganda is particularly interesting as they comprise prominent multilateral donors
like the World Bank, FAO, or USAID. However, they lack access to powerful leg-
islators in both the communication and support network. This is also displayed in
the reduced graphs of political communication and support (Figures 8.2 and 8.3).
They hold a share in political power of only 5% and rank in between the group
of non-agricultural stakeholder organizations (NA) who hold shares of 3.7% and
7.2% in belief and lobbying power, respectively. Except for the Advocates Coali-
tion for Development and Environment (ACODE) who is clearly successful in its
lobbying activities, research organizations are primarily engaged in the provision
of expert information with individual belief powers as high as 4.1% (EPRC). The
majority of agricultural interest groups (i.e. producers and agribusiness) is po-
sitioned among organizations with below average political power. However, we
identify four agricultural stakeholders who are comparatively well connected with
powerful legislators in both the expert communication and the support network.
While all four interest groups hold individual values of belief power between 1.8%
and 2.5%, the equipment with lobbying power is subject to more variation. The
Uganda Fish processors and Exporters Association (UNFPE) as a representative
of the agricultural industry yields the highest lobbying power (7.2%) apart from
MAAIF and OP. Next to UNFPE, we identify three stakeholder organizations
representing agricultural producers who hold signiﬁcant shares of political power.
The Uganda National Farmers Association (UNFFE) and the Uganda Cooperative
Alliance (UCA) both appear as quite powerful lobbyists with individual lobbying
power of 5.9% and 3.4%, respectively, whereas the National Organic Agricultural
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Movement of Uganda (NOGAMU) is comparatively more engaged in the provision
of expert knowledge.
Total Power
Following equations (4.1) to (4.3), we calculate the total political power that
determines the ﬁnal policy position (y∗) by combing the political power derived
from the political bargaining game, including lobbying, with the political inﬂuence
derived from political communication networks.
Figure 8.7.: Total Political Power
Figure 8.7 displays the total power on group level. The major share of total po-
litical power is held by the executive (27.8%), yet the power distribution among the
ten stakeholder groups is less pronounced and suggests a bottom-up knowledge-
based policy process as research organizations and agriculture interest groups yield
relatively high power shares of 16% and 13%, respectively. Furthermore, the power
within the executive is evenly distributed among the ministries and the president
with individual shares between 5.7% (MOFA) and 2.1% (MoLG). These values
are met and even exceeded by the very powerful non-governmental organizations
in research and the agricultural sector. The cooperative alliance UCA holds with
5.8% the highest share among all non-governmental organizations involved in the
CAADP policy domain, while the agribusiness association UFPEA is at par with
MOFA at 5.7%. The strong position of research organizations is primarily deter-
mined by the EPRC and IFPRI who hold individual shares of 5.1% and 4.7%,
respectively. The most striking result however is the comparatively low perfor-
mance of donor organizations who hold only 5.8% of total power and rank ﬁfth
behind public agencies. While this ﬁnding supports the impression of a participa-
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tory policy process in Uganda, the application of the indicators derived in chapter
4 will provide more insights in the political performance.
8.4. Stakeholder Participation in the Policy Process
So far we concentrated our analysis on the distribution of power and the inﬂuence
of governmental and non-governmental actors in the policy process. In this sec-
tion we discuss how the identiﬁed network and power structures impact political
performance. In particular, we used the derived indicators to measure political
accountability, capture and ownership. Unfortunately, we were not able to collect
empirical data to apply the knowledge indicator which is therefore not further
considered in this chapter. While the accountability indices primarily consist of
the political power held by particular stakeholder groups, the measures of cap-
ture and ownership additionally take account of the relative importance of certain
policies and the ideal policy positions, respectively.
8.4.1. Accountability
The successful functioning of any government depends on the ability of citizens to
hold politicians and public administrators accountable for their actions. To mea-
sure the degree of accountability we use the sum of the total political power of
important stakeholder organizations as a general indicator (GA-Total). Further-
more, to understand how policy network structures interact with constitutional
rules, we use the belief power (GA-Belief) and lobbying power (GA-Lobby) as
additional sub-indicators to comparatively evaluate the extent of political power
due to communication and access structures. In particular, we distinguish three
stakeholder groups. We aggregate CSOs, iNGOs, and farmer interest groups as
general representatives of the Society. To adequately assess the level of account-
ability held by the society compared to other inﬂuential stakeholder groups we
additionally include the Industry, i.e. NA and agribusiness interest groups, as
well as donor organizations (Donor).
Figure 8.8 depicts the general accountability as well as the two sub-indicators
for all three stakeholder groups. In general, national stakeholder organizations
in Uganda yield very high values in GA-Total indicating that the government
is particular accountable towards the society (19.1%) and to the industry (17%)
who clearly outweigh donor organizations with a share of 5.8%. These results are
primarily determined by society's access to inﬂuential actors in the communication
network as the industry is comparatively better linked in the political support
network. The low performance of donor organizations in combination with the
high shares exhibited by domestic stakeholders implies that governmental actions
and policy decisions particularly reﬂect the desires of the society and industry in
Uganda. However, the similarly large share of political control might induce a
conﬂict of interests between the two domestic stakeholder groups even though it
implies a bottom-up policy process. In how far the inclusion of stakeholders in
the policy process decreases governmental capture or increases political consensus
among the political actors is subject of the analysis in the next two subsections.
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Figure 8.8.: Governmental Accountability
8.4.2. Capture
Governmental capture corresponds to the concept that governmental political ac-
tions and policy choices are biased towards the particular interests of organized
social groups at the expense of the general public. We follow a two step procedure
to determine the extent of interest bias. In the ﬁrst step we calculate the weighted
mean interest bias towards a particular policy issue to display the general over-
or under-representation of a particular policy issue.
Figure 8.9 shows the ten diﬀerent policy concerns as surveyed in the policy
preference part of the elite questionnaire (see chapter 5). Stakeholder organiza-
tions were asked to distribute 100 points among the mentioned policy concerns
according to their relative interest. Taking the mean interest as a proxy for the
policy concern of the general public we calculate the diﬀerence of an organization's
interest to the mean interest per issue and weight this diﬀerence with the organi-
zation's political power. Figure 8.9 represents the total deviation from the general
interest. Please note, that ﬁgure 8.9 only displays relative values and hence no
direct conclusion can be drawn on the general importance of a particular policy
issue. For instance, if the mean interest by stakeholders is high in a particular
issue and stakeholders do not diﬀer much in their interest in this issue we ﬁnd a
comparatively small value. On the other hand, even if the general interest is quite
small we may identify large values if stakeholders have strong opposing interests.
According to our proposed measurement of governmental capture, two options
arise causing the performance of total deviation. Taking the mean as the general
public's policy interest may in fact overstate the importance of a policy issue if
few political actors put particular emphasis on this issue whereas the majority of
stakeholders show only moderate interest. This would result in a general nega-
tive bias as most of the actors yield a negative value in the mean-diﬀerence. The
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Figure 8.9.: Governmental Capture (Policy Issues)
other option stems from the distribution of political power and is the result of
particular powerful actors being comparatively more (less) interested in a certain
policy issue than actors with equal or less political power. As our analysis aims
at the identiﬁcation of policy issues that are biased towards particularly powerful
actors, we consider our approach valid for two reasons: First, the mean interest as
a proxy for the general public is rational as we regard the stakeholders included in
our analysis as representatives of the CAADP policy domain and thus the mean
interest portrays the general policy concern as a result thereof. Second, it is not
irrational for political actors to emphasize speciﬁc policy issues while showing no
interest in other subjects at all. This holds true especially for contradicting issues
like the welfare of agricultural producers versus the welfare of the industry (NA)
or market services sector.
In general, the majority of stakeholders show less interest in the welfare of the
agricultural sector in Uganda. This negative bias is reinforced by the distribution
of total power. This ﬁnding holds in general as the interest of the public is ap-
proximated by the mean interest of the stakeholders involved and yields average
values between 5.3% for the welfare of farmers and 2.5% for the welfare of the
agricultural export sector (see Table A.18).
Only three stakeholder organizations advocating for the welfare of farmers hold a
signiﬁcant share in total power, i.e. the two agricultural interest groups UNFFE
an UFPEA, and the research organization EPRC. More interestingly, however, is
the strong bias in favor of the non-agricultural and services sector compared to
the huge advocacy for poverty reduction and the negative result for environmental
stability. All four policy issues exhibit the highest relative interest by the gen-
eral public with values as high as 28.5% (Poverty), 20.6% (Environment), 7.6%
(Services), and 7.1% (NA). This is basically the result of the power distribution
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in Uganda that goes hand in hand with opposing interests. Clearly, we identify a
diﬀerence between the interest in environmental sustainability and poverty reduc-
tion. While both of these issues yield high percentages in relative interest by the
general public, stakeholder organizations tend to concentrate on one issue only.
Members of the executive for instance regard poverty reduction as more impor-
tant than the general public and hold the highest shares in total political power
in Uganda. On the other hand, advocates of environmental sustainability like
donor organizations hold the lowest share in power and are clearly outweighed
by powerful actors like MAAIF or MFPED who both show comparatively less
interest in this particular issue. The discrepancy identiﬁed between the welfare
of the agricultural sector and the welfare of the industry and services sectors can
be reduced to the same pattern. The ministries hold combined the largest share
in total power in Uganda. All of the executive have below average interest in the
welfare of the agricultural sector, while advocating for the industry- and services
sector at the same time. To some extent, this even holds for the MAAIF which
only shows signiﬁcant interest in the welfare of the agricultural export sector.
In order to identify governmental capture towards organized social groups we in-
corporate a directional parameter to take account of the interests of vested groups
in regard of four global policy dimensions favoring either the rural or urban, the
poor or the rich population. However, as the two dimensions `pro-urban' and `pro-
rich' basically constitute the anti poles to `pro-rural' and `pro-poor', respectively,
we only depict the latter as can be seen in Figure 8.10.
Figure 8.10.: Governmental Capture (Total)
We account for country speciﬁc diﬀerences while mapping the ten policy issues
according to the global dimensions `pro-poor' and `pro-rural'. Figure 8.10 displays
governmental capture towards or against the rural and the poor population in
Uganda both in total as well as by stakeholder group. The total capture index
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represents the general bias and includes the weighted interest of all actors, whereas
the indices on group level represent a stakeholder group's interest against the
general public. The capture indices on group level correspond to the disaggregated
total capture indices, but provide valuable information by enabling us to identify
the stakeholder groups that determine the direction of governmental capture.
We ﬁnd a moderate bias in favor of the poor and a minor bias in favor of the rural
population in Uganda as indicated by the total capture indices of 2.4% and 1.5%,
respectively. Capture in Uganda is primarily determined by the executive and by
research organizations. However, the executive is particularly biased towards the
poor whereas research organizations are comparatively more biased towards the
rural population. Both CSOs and donor organizations as well as agribusiness and
public agencies are biased towards the urban and rich. Nevertheless, the policy
process in Uganda is dominated by the executive and by research organizations
who are in favor of the rural poor.
8.4.3. Ownership
Political ownership corresponds to the concept that the society identiﬁes with a
speciﬁc policy and is committed to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals. To
measure political ownership implied by stakeholder participation, we calculate the
level of political consensus resulting from political communication and lobbying
activities. The higher the level of consensus achieved through stakeholder partic-
ipation, the higher the political ownership of the society in the decided policies
will be. Figure 8.11 displays the conﬂict indices including lobbying and communi-
cation (γ∗) and without lobbying and communication (γ#) as well as the resulting
ownership index (PO-Consens) on group level.
Figure 8.11.: Political Conﬂict
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As indicated by Figure 8.11, participation increases the level of consensus for al-
most all stakeholder organizations whereas the ministries, donor and civil society
organizations lose from the involvement of stakeholder organizations. The nega-
tive value for the executive is intuitive and a direct consequence of the change in
the ﬁnal policy (γ∗) due to the participation of stakeholder organizations. In the
scenario without lobbying and political communication, the ﬁnal policy decision
(γ#) is only determined by political agents with original voting power, i.e. the
ministries and the president in our scenario of legislative decision-making. Includ-
ing political participation of stakeholders leads to a change in the ﬁnal policy and
thus increases the diﬀerence to the ministries' ideal policy position. Interestingly,
civil society and donor organizations yield a negative value in PO-Consensus.
Figure 8.12 displays the resulting ownership indices as formulated in section 4.3.
Figure 8.12.: Political Ownership
As before, we aggregate CSOs, iNGOs, and farm interest groups as representa-
tives of the Society, and include the Industry and Donor organizations as bench-
mark stakeholder groups. In general, the political consensus reached through
stakeholder participation in Uganda is only marginal. The society yields the
highest value (5%), whereas the industry shows almost no signiﬁcant improve-
ment (1.2%). Donor organizations exhibit a negative value (-2.8%) indicating
that the inclusion of stakeholder organizations increases the gap between the pol-
icy preferred by donors' and the ﬁnal policy decision.
To adequately assess the eﬀect of stakeholder participation in the CAADP pol-
icy process we provide a comparative perspective in the next chapter 9. We ﬁrst
review the central results of the network structures of political participation in a
cross-country analysis. In a second step we take account of the variance in gov-
ernment performance of the three countries and examine the results of the applied
participation indicators. We then apply the derived indicators to estimated net-
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works which enables us to validate and to check for robustness of the empirical
network data.
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A Comparative Perspective
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the central results from the coun-
try studies. Section 9.1 summarizes the identiﬁed network inﬂuence structures of
political participation. Subsequently, we examine the results of the applied partic-
ipation indicators in section 9.2 and discuss the relationship between government
performance and participation in the policy process. Finally, we present insights
into the limits of network analysis and test for robustness in an ERGM-MCMC
framework in section 9.3.
9.1. Network Structures of Political Participation
Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal diﬀer from each other in terms of political communi-
cation and lobbying structures which ultimately aﬀects the distribution of political
inﬂuence and power in the respective country. With 43 stakeholders in Senegal and
46 political actors both in Ghana and Uganda, the policy networks establishing
the CAADP policy domain in these countries are almost equally sized. Govern-
mental institutions represent the largest share in all three countries. However,
while international organizations including donor and iNGOs (and supranational
organizations) account for the second largest stakeholder group in Ghana (26%)
and Senegal (24%), agricultural interest groups are especially strong represented
in Uganda (26%).
Primarily used for the boundary speciﬁcation of the empirical networks, the repu-
tation network yields valuable ﬁrst insights into the inﬂuence structure. It reveals
the prevalent inﬂuence distribution in the policy domain as perceived by the po-
litical actors involved in the policy process. The reputation network contains
information about the inﬂuence each political actor holds in the policy process as
perceived by all actors within our country data set. Based on the indegree central-
ity of the reputation network we are able to tell which stakeholders are perceived
as extremely inﬂuential in the policy process. On individual level, members of the
executive are considered to be the most inﬂuential actors in all three countries.
The ministry of agriculture ranks ﬁrst in Ghana (1.00) and Uganda (0.97), whereas
the ministry of ﬁnance (0.93) yields the highest indegree in Senegal. On group
level, donor organizations obtain the highest values in Ghana and Uganda. Gov-
ernmental institutions like the executive (0.79) and public agencies (0.69) place
second and third, respectively, in terms of group-level indegree in Ghana, the
agricultural sector is particular inﬂuential in Uganda. Two supranational organi-
zations, CEDEAO and UEMOA, are included in the analysis for Senegal and yield
the highest aggregate value with an indegree of 0.9, followed by donor organiza-
tions (0.81) and the executive (0.77). The indegree centrality of the reputation
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network gives a ﬁrst idea of the composition and structure of political inﬂuence
in the three countries. The analysis of access to expert knowledge and political
support is particularly important in order to evaluate political participation as
these networks provide the basis for the theoretically founded framework to ana-
lyze participatory policy processes.
With global densities of 0.23 (Ghana), 0.25 (Uganda), and 0.28 (Senegal) of the
conﬁrmed expert networks, political communication in the CAADP policy domain
is comparatively equal in the three countries. For example, Knoke et al. (1996)
identify in the comparison of labor market policy domains signiﬁcant variations
in the densities of the U.S (0.39), Germany (0.29), and Japan (0.17).
In general, we ﬁnd distinct communication patterns. Blockmodel analysis of the
political communication networks reveals that political communication is clearly
structured in all three countries. In both Ghana and Senegal, the ministry of
agriculture occupies a block by itself whereas the MAER in Uganda is located
among other governmental actors within the political core. We identify block
memberships according to the aﬃliation of the stakeholders involved in political
communication.
Political communication in Ghana is determined by a clear center-periphery struc-
ture. Surrounded by satellite-blocks, the ministry of agriculture holds a central
position and acts as a broker linking all other blocks. Signiﬁcant exchange of
expert information only occurs between MOFA and the political actors rather
than among the remaining stakeholder organizations, indicating the extremely
inﬂuential position the ministry occupies in Ghana as already pointed out by its
individual indegree centrality in the reputation network. Interestingly, we ﬁnd
Ghana's leading think tank ISSER among the heterogeneous actors in the periph-
eral instead of the research block.
In contrast to Ghana, the exchange of political expert knowledge is much more
diverse in Uganda. The ministry of agriculture is not exposed as a single actor
occupying a gate-keeper position, but rather constitutes the political core together
with other governmental institutions like the Prime Minister (OPM) and the rul-
ing party NRM. Political communication in Uganda is primarily determined by
two broker blocks that link political actors with the political core. The political
broker position is occupied by MFPED and NARO who mediate between donor
organizations and the political core, whereas the technical broker (UNFFE, PSFU)
primarily send expert information received by research and interest groups to the
governmental organizations. All four actors exhibiting broker positions have been
identiﬁed as especially inﬂuential in the reputation network.
Similarly to Ghana, the ministry of agriculture in Senegal constitutes a block by
itself. However, the MAER is primarily linked with the technical and political
broker and loosely connected with the political periphery. The technical bro-
ker block comprises the two research organizations ISRA and ITA who occupy a
gate-keeper position for research organizations and governmental institutions (in-
cluding the National Assemblee) with whom they exchange expert knowledge on a
mutual basis. The political broker position is occupied by two ministries (includ-
ing MEF) and with AFD, USAID, and CEDEAO three important international
organizations. Interestingly, the large peripheral group of stakeholders is not only
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comprised of the majority of donor organizations and agricultural interest groups,
but also consist of six governmental actors including the president and the prime
minister.
As indicated by global densities of 0.21 and 0.23, the exchange of political support
is comparatively intense in Ghana and Uganda, whereas it is less pronounced in
Senegal (0.16). Nevertheless, these densities indicate particularly dense lobbying
networks in these countries9. We ﬁnd that lobbying activities are primarily de-
termined by few political actors who obtain central position within the support
network in all three countries. Donor organizations are particularly engaged in lob-
bying central governmental institutions. In contrast to Senegal, political support
is directed towards the leading ministries in Ghana and Uganda. In Ghana, lobby-
ing activities are determined by three stakeholder groups. Located at the center
of political support are the main governmental institutions (MOFA, MOFEP,
PRES). Donor organizations engage actively in the exchange of political support
with the leading governmental organizations and constitute the only group that
exhibits signiﬁcant intra-block densities (0.83). The other block that is closely
connected with governmental institutions is comprised of one actor only who ob-
tains a broker position by linking peripheral stakeholders with the ministries. This
position is occupied by ISSER which is in stark contrast to its peripheral position
in the communication network. Furthermore, the exposed position of ISSER in
the support network contradicts our assumption that research organizations are
primarily engaged in knowledge provision.
The lobbying structure in Uganda is similar to the pattern identiﬁed in the commu-
nication network. However, instead of building a block with leading governmental
institutions, MAAIF is structural equivalent to agricultural interest groups and is
only connected with two broker blocks who establish the main support path with
political actors. These two broker positions are occupied by the same actors who
determine the exchange of expert information. Holding the political broker po-
sition in the communication network, MFPED and NARO also channel political
support between MAAIF and peripheral organizations. Donor organizations are
directly linked with MFPED and NARO, while also approaching the two organi-
zations that constitute the technical broker block in the communication network,
i.e. UNFFE and PSFU.
In contrast to Ghana and Uganda, lobbying activities are comparatively weak in
Senegal. The structure of political support is primarily determined by two orga-
nizations. As opposed to Ghana and Uganda, the ministry of agriculture is not
the receiver of political support in Senegal. With USAID and ISRA we identify a
donor and a research organization who act as a gatekeeper to the central political
organizations in Senegal. Both organizations constitute a block on their own and
are engaged in mutual exchange of political support. ISRA and USAID both send
political support to the political core which is comprised of the president, the
prime minister and the national assemblee, as well as two donor and two supra-
national institutions. Whereas ISRA constitutes the only signiﬁcant link to the
9In the seminal work by Knoke et al. (1996) the support networks of the U.S., Germany, and
Japan yield densities of 0.04, 0.05, and 0.05, respectively.
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MAER and primarily receives political support which it passes on to the political
core, USAID is characterized by mutual exchange of support.
Analyzing the provision of expert information and the exchange of political
support yields interesting insights into the role of diﬀerent stakeholder groups
within the CAADP policy domain. While this analysis remains on a descriptive
level, the application of a theoretically founded framework enables us to provide
more details on the inﬂuence structures and distribution of political power. The
cross country comparison of the own network multipliers is especially interest-
ing. Based on an actor's own control these values are indicative of the relative
importance of an actor's expertise compared to expert information received from
other organizations. In all three countries, research organizations consider them-
selves as technical leaders with high political knowledge and are thus less open
to information provided by other stakeholders. In Ghana political parties and
ministries trust their own expertise the most. Donor organizations and iNGOs
report a comparatively high own control, whereas agricultural interest groups and
especially public agencies and CSOs are more open to expert information. In con-
trast to Ghana, farm interest groups and CSOs in Uganda and Senegal consider
themselves as experts in agricultural policy whereas international organizations
put more weight on information provided by other stakeholders, which is also re-
ﬂected in the inﬂuence proﬁles.
The calculated inﬂuence proﬁles aggregated by stakeholder groups yield diﬀer-
ent results for Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal. Governmental institutions exert the
highest inﬂuence in Ghana and Uganda with average inﬂuence shares of 38% and
33%, respectively. Stakeholders in Senegal are primarily inﬂuenced by research
organizations (43%). Furthermore, Uganda exhibits a particularly high inﬂuence
of agricultural interest groups whereas they are less inﬂuential in Ghana and Sene-
gal. The disaggregation of governmental inﬂuence reveals that the major share of
inﬂuence in Ghana is held by MOFA (12%), whereas public agencies are the most
inﬂuential stakeholder group in Uganda and Senegal with average values of 14%
and 10%, respectively.
The very high inﬂuence of governmental organizations is also reﬂected in the large
shares of belief and lobbying power held by the executive. Combining the banzhaf
power indices with the network multipliers calculated from the communication
and support network yields the respective power distribution. In general, the dis-
tribution of belief- and lobbying power depends on the organizational aﬃliation
of political actors as assumed. As already indicated by the inﬂuence proﬁles, the
executive yields the highest power shares in all three countries. However, the ex-
ecutive comprises next to the ministries also the president who does not appear
as especially inﬂuential in the inﬂuence proﬁles and whose large share in belief
and lobbying power is thus primarily the result of the chosen legislative scenario
(i.e. DUO). Please note that the mean of belief and lobbying power including
the executive yield identical values in all three countries. This however results
from the fact that it is simply the average of 46 actors in Ghana and Senegal and
43 actors in Uganda, respectively, in the policy domain. As the sum of political
power equals 1, the average is just 1/46 and 1/43, respectively.
We ﬁnd research organizations to be primarily engaged in the provision of expert
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knowledge and thus achieving comparatively high values in belief power in all
three countries. Donor organizations are subject to greater variation. While they
appear as strong lobbyist in Ghana as expected, the majority of donor organi-
zations exhibits below average values in both power indices in Uganda whereas
they hold comparatively more belief power in Uganda. Furthermore, we identify
individual actors representing the civil society organizations and the agricultural
sector to hold comparatively large shares in lobbying power in Uganda and Sene-
gal, respectively, which is also reﬂected in the distribution of total power.
Combining the original voting power from the political bargaining game with the
multipliers of the communication and support network yields the total political
power of an actor. The executive holds the major share of total power in all coun-
tries. In Ghana, the total power is primarily distributed among the executive,
research and donor organizations whereas research organizations hold a compar-
atively large share in Senegal. In Uganda, agricultural interest groups obtain
signiﬁcant power shares while the executive is considerably less equipped with
total power compared to Ghana and Senegal.
9.2. Network Structure and Government Performance
In the previous section we provided a comparative analysis of the central results
from the descriptive policy network analysis. While this analysis gives a sound
overview of the political inﬂuence structures operating in the three countries, we
now want to focus on the indicators derived in chapter 4. We assume that govern-
ment performance is a monotonous function of government accountability, govern-
ment capture, political ownership and political knowledge. The hypothesis of a
monotonous function simply implies that more participation equals more beneﬁts.
A higher level of participation increases the ability to hold government oﬃcials
accountable for their actions and reduces government capture. Furthermore, par-
ticipation of stakeholder organizations leads to ownership over the policy process
which reduces transaction costs of implementation. The inclusion of stakeholders
in the policy process and the resulting increase in political knowledge further leads
to more eﬃcient policy choices. According to the relevant literature, the beneﬁcial
properties of political participation result in improved government actions, which
leads the way to sound economic and political performance.
In chapter 4 we derived network-based indicators to measure political participa-
tion. However, while these indicators enable a quantitative assessment of the level
of political participation in the countries under investigation we still do not know
much about the eﬀects on government performance. For example, we would like
to know how diﬀerent levels of participation aﬀect the performance. This would
allow for the derivation of optimal political participation in diﬀerent contexts.
Does government performance increase if we observe a higher level of govern-
ment accountability or is a low level of government capture the crucial factor?
How is government performance connected with political ownership? In order to
address these interesting questions we combine the participation indicators with
government performance. However, performance is generally diﬃcult to measure.
Therefore we use relevant economic and political indices to diﬀerentiate between
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the case countries in order to approximate the performance of the respective gov-
ernment.
(a) Economic
(b) Political
Figure 9.1.: Economic and Political Performance (2012)
Source: illustrated by author based on diﬀerent data sets.
Figure 9.1 displays the relevant performance indices for Ghana, Senegal, and
Uganda. In terms of economic development we include the gross national income
(GNI) per capita both nominal and in purchasing power parities (PPP). The
poverty line reﬂects the percentage of population living on less than US$ 1 a day
(in 1985 prices, adjusted for purchasing power parity).
The measure of political performance includes the Freedom House Indices of Po-
litical Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House, 2014) as well as the Polity IV
index (Marshall et al., 2012). It is worth noting that a degree of 1 in Political
Rights and Civil Liberties indicates a great degree of freedom. In contrast, a high
Polity IV score represents democratic structures whereas a low score is indicative
of an anocracy or autocracy.
Based on Figure 9.1 we identify an increase in government performance from
Uganda to Senegal in both economic and political terms. Uganda represents the
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least developed country in our sample. The GNI per capita in purchasing power
(2012) is with US$ 1140 considerably lower compared to Senegal (US$ 1920) and
Ghana (US$ 1940) who both exhibit similar values. Furthermore, Uganda ac-
counts for the highest poverty rate among the three countries. With a head-count
ratio of 38% Uganda reports a signiﬁcantly higher share of the poor and exceeds
Senegal (29.6%) and Ghana (28.6%) by roughly 10 percentage points.
The pattern of economic development is also observed in the political performance.
Both Ghana and Senegal are considered a democracy with Polity IV scores of 8
and 7, respectively, whereas Uganda is classiﬁed as a closed anocracy (-1) accord-
ing to Marshall et al. (2012). Political and civil liberties are signiﬁcantly less
pronounced in Uganda with scores of 5 and 4, respectively. Contrary to Uganda,
Senegal exhibits a value of 2 for both indices which is exceeded by Ghana. While
the civil liberties are at the same level (2) as in Senegal, the population of Ghana
enjoys the highest political rights with a political rights score of 1.
While Ghana and Uganda are relatively similar in terms of political and economic
development Uganda clearly lags behind. Given these performance indicators we
would expect considerable diﬀerences in the applied participation indicators in
the cross-country comparison, especially between Uganda on the one hand and
Ghana and Senegal on the other.
According to the relevant literature of political economy theory one of the main
reasons for poor political performance in developing countries are biased incen-
tives, i.e. a lack of government accountability and government capture (Keefer and
Khemani, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002). A lack of government account-
ability arises when elected politicians have not enough incentives to implement
sound policies that beneﬁt their electorate but rather serve their self-interests.
Government capture complies with biased electoral competition in favor of par-
ticular interests. According to Keefer and Khemani (2005) missing incentives
of politicians are the result of imperfections in political markets that are facili-
tated by information asymmetries, social polarization, and the inability to make
credible promises in elections. According to the theory of biased incentives we
expect distinct degrees in the two developed participation indicators of govern-
ment accountability and government capture in line with the observed government
performance.
Figures 9.2 and 9.3 present the results of the two indicators applied to the coun-
try case studies of Uganda, Senegal, and Ghana. We do not identify the expected
patterns, i.e. the results of both indicators yield no indication of the expected
relationship between accountability and capture on the one hand and government
performance on the other. In fact, we identify similarities between Senegal and
Ghana, whereas the structure of government accountability is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent in the case of Uganda. The distribution of political control in Ghana and
Senegal is primarily determined by inﬂuential stakeholders representing the soci-
ety and donor organizations whereas the industry is comparatively less signiﬁcant
in both countries. Uganda on the other hand is characterized by a weak position
of donor organizations while both the society and the industry are able to hold
the government accountable for its actions.
The society is comparatively well represented in all three countries as indicated
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Figure 9.2.: Government Accountability (comparative)
Figure 9.3.: Government Capture (comparative)
by accountability indices of 13% (Ghana and Senegal) and 19% (Uganda). The
government of Ghana appears to be primarily accountable towards donor orga-
nizations implying that these are better able to control government actions and
policy choices which might undermine ownership of national stakeholders. While
this might be an indication of a donor-led policy process, governments of Uganda
and Senegal are both primarily accountable towards the society, implying that
governmental actions and policy decisions particularly reﬂect the desires of do-
mestic stakeholders. The similarly large share of political control held by the
society and the industry in Uganda might induce a conﬂict of interests between
the two domestic stakeholder groups even though it implies a bottom-up policy
process.
We cannot conﬁrm the theory of biased incentives as the accountability indica-
tor yields mixed results for the three countries. According to the literature on
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participatory processes, the inclusion of stakeholder organizations in the policy
process leads to improved government performance by increasing government ac-
countability. Thus, we would have expected to identify an increase in the degree
of accountability that represents the performance of the three countries. Ghana
is the high performer in our sample, followed closely by Senegal. Comparing the
share of control held by the society in these three countries reveals that the least
developed country exhibits the highest value. In fact, the same holds true for the
industry. Interestingly, both advanced economies exhibit a rather balanced distri-
bution of political control. In Ghana, donor organizations even hold the largest
share of government accountability whereas their position in Uganda is clearly
outweighed by the society and the industry.
The second indicator that is expected to reveal biased incentives in political
decision-making, i.e. government capture, is displayed in Figure 9.3. We do
not identify a monotonous decrease in the capture indicators that correspond to
improved government performance. The observed values are only marginal and
contradict the assumption that biased incentives shape government performance
in the three case countries. We identify a bias against the rural poor in Ghana,
whereas both Uganda and Senegal yield positive capture indices. The capture is
primarily determined by the executive in Ghana and Uganda leading to a bias in
favor of the rich and urban in Ghana and towards the rural poor in Uganda. In
Senegal, the bias in favor of the rural poor is dominated by agricultural produc-
ers and research organizations as we ﬁnd opposing positions within the executive
which oﬀsets the diverting interests of the president and the ministries. However,
these values are considerably small and range between 1.48% in favor of the poor
in Uganda and -1.5% against the rural poor in Ghana and cannot explain the
signiﬁcant diﬀerences observed in government performance.
In general, we ﬁnd no evidence for the theory of biased incentives according to
our measurement of government accountability and government capture. If bi-
ased incentives were the determining factor of poor government performance we
expected to ﬁnd evidence in the two applied indicators, at least between Uganda
and Ghana where the diﬀerences in the economic and political indices are espe-
cially pronounced.
Political ownership is the third indicator developed to measure participation.
It corresponds to the concept that the society identiﬁes with a speciﬁc policy
which increases the commitment to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals. In-
creased citizen compliance decreases implementation costs and hence increase the
eﬀectiveness of the implemented policies. While ownership by stakeholder orga-
nizations is increasingly emphasized in the literature there has been no attempt
to quantitatively measure political ownership to the best of our knowledge.
Figure 9.4 depicts the ownership indicators for all three countries. According
to our deﬁnition of political ownership, the participation of stakeholders in the
policy process signiﬁcantly reduces the political conﬂict leading to higher politi-
cal consensus among stakeholder organizations in Ghana and Senegal. Especially
donor organizations are able to decrease the level of political conﬂict in these two
countries. In contrast, the political consensus of the society and the industry in
Uganda is only marginally increased. Donor organizations even yield negative
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Figure 9.4.: Political Ownership (comparative)
values implying that a consensual policy process leads to a ﬁnal policy that is less
favored by these organizations. The results show that the involvement of stake-
holder organizations leads to an increase in political ownership that corresponds
to the observed level of government performance. Comparing stepwise the degree
of ownership across the three countries we ﬁnd a steady increase of ownership
from Uganda up to Ghana. In Uganda, donor organizations exhibit a decrease in
political ownership (-2.8%) whereas they gain considerably from participation in
the policy process in Senegal (12%) and Ghana (13.1%). The industry in Uganda
denotes a small increase in ownership (1.2%) which is exceeded by the industry in
Senegal (5.1%) and especially in Ghana with 11%. The society in Uganda yields
the highest increase in political ownership (5%) compared to donor organizations
and the industry. Again, the values achieved in Senegal and Ghana are signif-
icantly higher. Interestingly, the society in Senegal exhibits greater ownership
(13.2%) than the society in Ghana (9.4%). However, government performance
does not vary too much in both countries and we can conclude that this indicator
represents the economic and political diﬀerences between the three case countries
pretty well. Rather than biased incentives, political ownership appears to be the
most important dimension in participatory processes according to our results.
Though brieﬂy covered in chapter 4, a central issue of stakeholder participation
has been neglected so far in our analysis. Including relevant stakeholder organiza-
tions in the policy process yields access to knowledge that enables evidence-based
and eﬃcient policy decisions. Grassroots knowledge may enhance the capacity to
meet local needs and priorities. Furthermore, the integration of scientiﬁc and local
knowledge may induce a comprehensive understanding of complex development
processes.
Due to a lack of empirical data we did not include knowledge in the country
studies. Nevertheless, we are able to shed light on this issue by drawing on the
theoretically derived relation of knowledge and political inﬂuence (see Henning,
forthcoming; Henning et al., 2016). The knowledge-bias is minimized and hence
optimally adopted if the ratio of total power equals just the ratio of knowledge of
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two actors. Even without relevant data we are able to comment on the distribution
of knowledge by examining the ratio of total political inﬂuence of stakeholders.
Figure 9.5.: Optimal Knowledge Ratio (comparative)
Figure 9.5 displays the ratio of total political inﬂuence among stakeholder
groups. We apply the same grouping as in the previous analysis and include donor
organizations, the industry, and the society. Furthermore, we add research orga-
nizations as they are the primary distributors of expert knowledge. Theoretically,
the ratio of inﬂuence represents the ratio of political knowledge in the optimum.
Thus the bar plot in Figure 9.5 represents the optimal knowledge distribution
given the inﬂuence structure in these countries. Taking research organizations
as a benchmark we ﬁnd clear diﬀerences among the three countries. The results
imply that the industry in Uganda has more knowledge about agricultural policy
making than research organizations as indicated by an Industry/Research-ratio of
1.08. This seems quite unlikely as the industry is rather assumed to engage in lob-
bying activities. In contrast to Uganda, the industry exhibits the lowest weight
whereas research organizations have more knowledge compared to other stake-
holders. This is an indicator for evidence-based policy making. Ghana exhibits
more balanced inﬂuence ratios. According to the assumption that the inﬂuence
ratio represents the knowledge ratio, donor organizations stand out and appear
to have more expert knowledge than research organizations or the society.
In general, we conclude that the indicator of political ownership represents the
government performance the best. According to the theoretical knowledge ra-
tio, tendencies of evidence-based inﬂuence structures are found among the high-
performing countries of Senegal and Ghana whereas Uganda exhibits signiﬁcant
inﬂuence by the industry. Furthermore, our ﬁndings yield no evidence that
incentive-biases are the determining factor of poor government performance. Ac-
cording to our analysis political ownership as a result of stakeholder participation
increases eﬃciency whereas a knowledge-bias may prevent economic and political
development.
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9.3. Limits of Networks
While social network analysis and the theoretically derived indicators provide
a sound basis for a quantitative assessment of stakeholder participation in the
CAADP policy reform in particular, the question of interpretation and gener-
alization of the results derived from the empirical network data arises. Hence,
testing the robustness of the empirically-identiﬁed policy network structure is im-
portant. Empirical network studies are often criticized because collected network
data is plagued by high measurement errors. One core issue of measurement errors
are missing data (Marsden, 1990). Another form of measurement errors in the
context of social network analysis refers to mistakes in collecting or coding in a
network data set. Wang et al. (2012) classify six diﬀerent error scenarios as a re-
sult of inconsistencies in data collection and coding. For example, data collection
via snowball sampling tends to underestimate the total membership of groups un-
der study (Erickson, 1979), and non-response from surveys (Stork and Richards,
1992) may cause `false negative nodes', i.e. the absence of nodes in a network that
should be present. In contrast, respondent bias may lead to an overrepresentation
of certain elements due to underreporting nodes and relations (Feld and Carter,
2002). The same applies to `false negative edges' as a result of respondents' im-
perfect recall, or `false positive edges' if respondents report relations that are not
actually present. Wang et al. (2012) classify two more error scenarios that result
from false aggregation and disaggregation, which are less common and hence not
considered.
A common procedure to evaluate biases due to measurement errors and missing
data in quantitative network data is to simulate network errors from observed
data (see e.g. Borgatti et al., 2006; Kossinets, 2006; Smith and Moody, 2013).
However, false nodes and edges are not our primary concern. The data collection
using snowball sampling has proven useful in past studies and as long as we are
not able to collect complete networks this remains the procedure of choice. As to
false edges, we consider only conﬁrmed network ties between actors. If one ac-
tor states a particular relationship to another actor and this other actor conﬁrms
the relationship, both actors form a tie (see chapter 5). While this still leaves
space for measurement errors as we disregard a stated tie if it is not conﬁrmed by
both actors, it reduces the possibility of measurement errors and we conﬁdently
disregard the presence of false positive or negative edges in our framework. The
main concern lies in network dynamics. Quantitative network data are static and
represent a snapshot of current ties between actors in the network, which is an
often-voiced criticism of network research (Watts, 2004). Thus, the question re-
mains in how far the results of the derived participation measures are robust to
changing network structures.
In a recent study, Henning et al. (2016) apply an exponential random graph
model (ERGM) to identify the factors that determine the emergence of policy
network structures based on an econometric estimation of the policy network
generating process. Analyzing determinants of the formation of policy network
ties and applying econometric models is not a new approach (e.g. see Carpenter
et al. (2004); Adam and Kriesi (2007); Weible et al. (2010)). In particular, the
ERGM-model has already been used to analyze determinants of political commu-
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nication and participation in industrialized countries (Henry et al., 2011; Leifeld
and Schneider, 2012; Lee et al., 2012).
Henning et al. (2016) extend these approaches and draw statistical inferences on
the political inﬂuence of speciﬁc non-governmental organizations, e.g. donor ver-
sus research versus grassroots organizations. In particular, they empirically tested
if diﬀerent organizations apply diﬀerent inﬂuence mechanisms, e.g. research or-
ganizations specialize in providing expert information, while interest groups or
grassroots organizations specialize in providing political support to the govern-
ment. Further, they tested empirically to what extend political inﬂuence in de-
velopment politics is dominated by international donor organizations dictating
governmental policies via strategically granted development funds. Although the
emergence of policy network ties is an interesting social phenomena in itself, the
theory of the formation of policy network ties is of particular interest because it
enables the design of policy network structures, which imply a more eﬃcient polit-
ical decision-making process. Moreover, an econometric estimation of the network
generating process allows to draw statistical inferences on empirically-derived net-
work measures. The simulation algorithm to obtain parameter estimates can also
be used for model evaluation. In particular, they apply the same MCMC (Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo Simulation) algorithm to generate a random sample based on
the estimated ERGM models. Each random sample comprises 10,000 networks for
all three countries which is then compared with the observed network to evaluate
goodness-of-ﬁt statistics.
Following Henning et al. (2016), we apply the ERGM-MCM framework to test
the derived participation measures of Governmental Accountability, Governmen-
tal Capture, and Political Ownership for robustness. In particular, we generate
a sample of 10,000 inﬂuence vectors containing an inﬂuence measure for each or-
ganization and each policy network in all three countries. Given our sampling
procedure, the sample means represent the empirical inﬂuence of individual orga-
nizations derived from the observed network. Accordingly, we apply the derived
participation indices and calculate conﬁdence intervals and variances for each spe-
ciﬁc organization type. We further aggregate the organization types to reﬂect the
assessment of participation in the country case studies, i.e. society, industry, and
donor organizations.
9.3.1. Methodological Approach
A proper statistical model is needed to infer the driving factors of network tie for-
mation. These features have to be considered during model formulation because
social networks typically show patterns of tie variable interdependence like reci-
procity or triangulation. A well established model class for social networks is the
ERGM framework developed by Wasserman and Pattison (1996) and modiﬁed by
Snijders et al. (2006). Lusher et al., eds (2013) illustrate a wide range of ERGM
applications. This gives a detailed introduction to ERGM theory. This model
class can represent the structure and the driving factors of a network by using an
a priori deﬁned set of suﬃcient network statistics. These network statistics are
sub-graphs representing particular patterns of social behavior, and this allows for
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the modeling of the endogenous self-organization of a network. The model can
also represent the inﬂuence of exogenous covariates on network tie formation.
Let y denote a n × n directed adjacency matrix on a set of n nodes. Then,
yi,j = 1 if actor i sends a directed tie to actor j, yi,j = 0 else. As y is a digraph and
yi,j 6= yj,i results in an asymmetric adjacency matrix. Self-ties are not permitted,
and the diagonal of y is always empty. The Y is the set of all possible graphs on a
ﬁxed set of n nodes. Further, let X be an n×n× q array of exogenous covariates
like the preference similarity of two nodes (a dyadic attribute) or the type of an
organization (a nodal attribute).
Here, s(X, y) = (s1(X, y), . . . , sp(X, y))′ is a known vector of p = r+q suﬃcient
network statistics that may contain r endogenous conﬁgurations of network self
organization and q exogenous covariates. The r endogenous suﬃcient statistics
are network counts for directed sub-graph conﬁgurations like multiple triangles,
two-paths or star conﬁgurations; see also Robins et al. (2007) for a detailed intro-
duction to the ERGM framework.
The probability density function of an ERGM can be formulated as
Pr(y|X) = exp {θs(X, y)}∑
y˜∈Y exp {θs(X, y˜)}
, (9.1)
where θ = (θ1, . . . , θp).
The normalizing constant
∑
y˜∈Y exp {θs(X, y˜)} ensures that Eq. (9.1) is a prob-
ability distribution and requires summation over all possible network realizations
in Y . The most appropriate a priori set of suﬃcient statistics has to be chosen
before an ERGM can be estimated. This choice depends on the research ques-
tion and the underlying hypotheses on the network tie formation. With regard
to interpretation, a positive and signiﬁcant parameter value of a conﬁguration
indicates higher occurrence of that network conﬁguration than by chance. A neg-
ative and signiﬁcant parameter indicates lower occurrence than by chance. Due
to the enormous number of possible realizations in Y , the normalizing constant is
intractable even for networks of moderate size. This makes parameter estimation
diﬃcult within the ERGM framework. The analytical evaluation of the normal-
izing constant can be circumvented via a simulation based on the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood (MCMC ML) approach, see Snijders (2002)
and Hunter and Handcock (2006). Random graphs are sampled to approximate
the likelihood function. This results in an ML estimate of the model parameters
θˆ by maximizing the simulated likelihood. The MCMC ML estimation of the
ERGM family is a computational intensive task frequently complicated by non-
convergence of the sampling algorithm. The convergence strongly depends on the
choice of the network conﬁgurations and how they are parameterized, see Snijders
et al. (2006). The MCMC ML ERGM estimation was done using the R (R De-
velopment Core Team, 2012) package ergm (Hunter et al., 2008) included in the
statnet environment, see Handcock et al. (2008).10 The baseline parameter spec-
10Model estimation was done using 10,000 eﬀective MCMC network simulations, based on a
total chain length of 1,000,000 draws and a thinning interval of 100 after discarding the ﬁrst
1024 · 16 simulations (ergm package default). The algorithm was allowed to restart and re-
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iﬁcation is based on Leifeld and Schneider (2012). Similar results were achieved
with a Bayesian approach of ERGM estimation using the R package bergm, see
Caimo and Friel (2014).
9.3.2. Data and variables
The ERGM framework can test our hypotheses on the determinants of politi-
cal support relations and expert information exchange among governmental and
non-governmental organizations in Ghana, Senegal and Uganda. Accordingly, we
used conﬁrmed expert information exchange and political support network ties as
dependent variables, respectively. Two models were estimated for each dependent
variable: An endogenous model containing only endogenous network eﬀects and
a structural model containing the same endogenous eﬀects plus exogenous nodal
and dyadic attributes as a control. In detail, we calculated various network statis-
tics corresponding to the hypothesized mechanisms of endogenous tie formation.
Table A.19 gives an overview of the network statistics used as model terms. This
explains the internal self-organizing structure of the dependent network variable.
Counts for edges (EDGES ) can model the general propensity of tie formation and
is comparable to the intercept in a logistic regression framework providing the
unconditional probability of tie formation. Technically, the term EDGES adds
one network statistic equal to the number of edges in the network. The number
of reciprocal edges (MUTUAL) represents the tendency to answer received ties,
i.e. this term adds one network statistic to the model and equals the number of
pairs of actors i and j for which both ties exist (yij = yji = 1 ). The geometri-
cally weighted edgewise shared partner statistic (GWESP) and the geometrically
weighted dyad wise shared partner statistic (GWDSP) are used to model eﬀects
of triadic transitivity on transaction costs. These statistics are formally deﬁned
as (Snijders et al., 2006; Hunter and Handcock, 2006):
GWESP = eαv
n−2∑
h=1
(
1− (1− e−αv)h)EP (h), (9.2)
GWDSP = eαw
n−2∑
h=1
(
1− (1− e−αw)h)DP (h), (9.3)
where EP (h) is the number of directed edges that are the basis for h transitive
triads. Therefore yi,j = 1 and i, j must be connected via h two-paths, e.g. yi,kyk,j
so that i, j share exactly h neighbors. This can be imagined as stacking h transitive
triads having the base edge yi,j = 1 in common.
The DP (h) is the count of pairs of nodes i, j that are connected by h two-paths.
Unlike EP (h), the i, j do not have to be connected directly. Therefore EP (h) is
nested inDP (h). The GWESP represents multiple triangulation and the propen-
sity to form closed clustered structures, contrasted by GWDSP representing mul-
tiple two-paths. A positive GWESP and a negative GWDSP parameter can be
parametrize up to 1,000 times if non-convergence was detected. Otherwise default settings
were used.
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interpreted as a propensity to avoid structural holes like four-cycles see Lee et
al. (2012). The two shared partner statistics use a geometrical series (1− eαv)h
and (1− eαw)h to weight the importance of additional common neighbors. αv and
αw are tuning parameters-large values increase the weight on a large number of
shared partners, e.g., see Hunter and Handcock (2006). For our analysis, they
were both chosen to be ﬁxed at relatively low baseline values of αv = αw = 0.1.
This facilitates model estimation but risks the underestimation of the relevance
of conﬁgurations with many shared partners.11 For a discussion of the parame-
terization of these multiple network statistics, see Snijders et al. (2006), Hunter
and Handcock (2006), and Hunter (2007). For more details, on suﬃcient network
statistics and the analysis of policy networks, see Robins et al. (2012).
Following our theoretical considerations, three diﬀerent categories of determi-
nants of policy network ties exist: factors determining (1) actors' beneﬁts derived
form an established tie, (2) the cost of establishing and maintaining a tie and (3)
transaction costs of political interaction. As described above, the endogenous net-
work statistics are considered relevant determinants of dyadic speciﬁc transaction
costs involved with political support or expert information exchange, respectively.
Furthermore, EDGES and MUTUAL can also be interpreted as indicators of the
costs establishing and maintaining network ties. Additionally, while established
network ties can also be used to engage in new political interactions, we include
the support and the expert networks as explanatory variables for each other. The
expert structural model includes the support network as an explanatory edge at-
tribute (SUPPORT ) and vice versa. The support structural model includes the
expert information network as an explanatory edge attribute (EXPERT ). Tech-
nically, the term EXPERT (SUPPORT ) adds a single network statistic to the
ERGM model of the support network (the ERGM model of the expert informa-
tion network) equals the sum of conﬁrmed expert information ties (the sum of
conﬁrmed political support ties) that exist for all edges in the support (the expert
information) network.
Beyond network statistics, we include the following exogenous covariates as
nodal and edge speciﬁc attribute eﬀects into the estimate:
To assess the costs of establishing and maintaining network ties, we use the
number of overlapping memberships in umbrella organizations or political com-
mittees with other organizations as an indicator of meeting opportunities. The
corresponding edge-speciﬁc network statistic (MEMBER) equals the sum of over-
lapping memberships for all edges in the network.
Furthermore, as discussed above, we include perceived power and political
knowledge as indicators for the beneﬁt actors. It is not straightforward to measure
political decision-making power, and we use the collected reputation network data
to identify an organization's perceived political power. Technically, we calculated
the normalized indegrees of the reputation network as an informal power mea-
sure of an organization. Accordingly, we added a nodal speciﬁc network statistic
(POWER) to the ERGM, which equals the sum of reputation power of all or-
11The tuning parameters can be ﬁxed or may be a free parameter to be estimated. Such a
parameterization can be analyzed using a curved ERGM, see Hunter and Handcock (2006),
complicating estimation even more and increasing the risk of non-convergence.
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ganizations that receive a tie in the network. Furthermore, we included a nodal
attribute eﬀect (EXEC ) representing ties where the target is a governmental or-
ganization to check whether tie formation is driven by formal political power.
Technically, the latter term counts the number of edges in the network for which
a governmental organization is the receiver of a tie.
As explained above the beneﬁt from received information is driven by the po-
litical knowledge of the sender, while the beneﬁt of received political support tie
is c.p. the higher, the larger the capacity to mobilize voters of an organization
is. It is impossible to observe political knowledge or the capacity to mobilize vot-
ers directly, and thus we use organizational dummy variables as proxies for these
variables. Hence, we include two additional nodal attribute eﬀects (RESEARCH )
and (DONOR) representing ties where the sending node is a research organization,
or a donor organization respectively. Again, the corresponding network statistics
equal the sum of edges in the network for which the sending node is a research
or a donor organization, respectively. In particular, we expect that organizations
demand expert information primarily from scientiﬁc organizations because they
are technically knowledgeable; We further expect politicians to demand political
support from donors because these organizations often control international de-
velopment funds granted to national governments, e.g. in selected African states
40% of total CAADP expenditures comprises of donor funds (Benin et al., forth-
coming).
Finally, we include diﬀerent measures of political homophily as indicators of
dyadic speciﬁc transaction costs. In particular, we include a measure of similarity
of policy preference. As explained above, policy preferences included the actors'
political interests and positions in various policy issues nested in three levels. For a
ﬁrst homophily measure, we use top level preferences regarding policy concerns.12
In particular, we constructed a dissimilarity matrix by calculating the following
political distance index for each pair of organization i and j
DIij =
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(dik − djk)2,
where dik denotes the interest of individual i in policy concern k. Interest was
ascertained by distributing 100 points across policy concerns. The dissimilar-
ity measure was converted into a dyad speciﬁc similarity index (PREFSIM ) via
(maxi,j{DIij} −DIij).
We calculated an analogous homophily index (POLSIM ) for collected policy
positions regarding organizations' preferred budget allocations across CAADP
sub-programs. Thus the index POLSIM measures the similarity of organizations'
preferred positions regarding detailed CAADP-implementations, while the index
PREFSIM measures the similarity of the organizations' fundamental ideological
position.
12Overall, we considered seven policy concerns: Z1 = Welfare of small-scale farmers, Z2=
Poverty reduction, Z3= Provision of public goods, Z4= Proﬁts in agricultural export sectors,
Z5= Welfare of urban consumer households Z6 = Proﬁts of non-agricultural sectors, Z7 =
Environmental protection.
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Young democracies are often characterized by weakly developed interest media-
tion structures, i.e. governmental organizations grant only slight access to interest
groups representing political interest of the society. Thus, we introduced a dyad
speciﬁc binary variable (IG) to check whether polycentric governance structures
are especially focused on coalition building among interest groups. The latter
could be interpreted as empirical evidence that political conﬂicts between soci-
ety and the governing elite are still more important than political conﬂict lines
running between diﬀerent social groups, e.g. labor versus capital. Here, the cor-
responding advocacy coalitions comprise both opposing social groups and their
political leaders.
The term IG adds one network statistic that counts the edges in the networks
where both vertices are socio-economic interest groups.
To deal with missing information we proceed as follows. Given our collected
support network data, we were partly unable to calculate conﬁrmed support rela-
tions between the two governmental or two non-governmental organizations, i.e.
by design governmental organizations were only asked to mark other organizations
from whom they receive political support, while vice-versa non-governmental or-
ganizations could only mark other organizations to whom they supply political
support. It has become evident during the interviews that political support is
indirectly exchanged and organizations at least partly function as brokers. The
conﬁrmation of ties within the corresponding political supply network is not fea-
sible given the design of our questionnaire. Therefore, we used a collected social
network to conﬁrm political support ties between two governmental or two non-
governmental organizations because this network data was missing by design 13.
Missing data on political preferences have been imputed using expert knowledge.
The robustness of this approach has been checked repeatedly by hot deck impu-
tations from actors belonging to the same type of organization and by imputing
random draws from Dirichlet distributions. These random draws are speciﬁed
to have the expert imputations as expected values. Model estimation using the
diﬀerent imputed data sets provided the same results, indicating the robustness
of the expert imputation approach.
9.3.3. Results
Figures 9.6 to 9.8 display the results of the derived indicators applied to the sample
of estimated networks. The bar plots represent the mean values over the 10,000
networks in each country for the group of stakeholder organizations deﬁned earlier
for governmental accountability (Figure 9.6) and political ownership (Figure 9.8)
as well as for the capture towards the rural and poor in all three countries. The
thin lines mark the 95% conﬁdence intervals for the respective cases. Furthermore,
we included the results of the empirical indicators which are indicated by the red
lines in the plots.
We identify clear diﬀerences in terms of accountability between Ghana and
Senegal on the one hand and Uganda on the other (Figure 9.6). In Ghana and
Senegal, the government is particularly accountable towards donor organizations
13We observe missing network data only for the support network in 25 cases in Ghana, 19 cases
in Senegal and 18 cases in Uganda.
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Figure 9.6.: Government Accountability (estimate)
and the society, whereas the industry yields a comparatively lower share. In con-
trast, the government of Uganda is particularly accountable towards the industry
and the society, whereas donor organizations appear to be of less signiﬁcance.
The 95% conﬁdence intervals exhibit only minor oscillations in all three coun-
tries and indicate robustness of our accountability measure. Moreover, the major-
ity of the empirical results lie within the conﬁdence interval which validates the
ﬁnding in the case studies. The empirical results appear to overrepresent the donor
organizations in Uganda and Senegal. In the empirical study, the discrepancy in
the accountability of the Ugandan government towards donor organizations and
towards the society is more pronounced, whereas the empirical accountability
towards the industry is clearly well represented by the network estimation. Com-
pared to Ghana and Senegal, the government in Uganda gives oﬀ considerably
more political control to stakeholder organizations as indicated by Figure 9.6. All
three stakeholder groups exhibit higher values in Uganda than in the two other
countries. One of the key objectives in participatory policy making, which is also
emphasized in the literature, is the ability to hold the government accountable
for its actions. Our ﬁndings from the empirical as well as from the estimated
networks indicate a high degree of stakeholder participation in Uganda.
As we can see in Figure 9.7, our measure of governmental capture is quite
unstable. On the one hand, the capture indicators of the estimated networks
exhibit very low values ranging from -1.1% for the rural population in Senegal
to 1.1% for the rural and poor in Uganda. The 95% conﬁdence interval displays
extreme oscillations around the mean. This indicates that our measure of biased
decision-making towards particular interest groups is not robust. Additionally, the
empirical indicators for Ghana and Uganda are contrary to the estimated mean
and are not within the conﬁdence interval.
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Figure 9.7.: Government Capture (estimate)
Ownership of the policies is probably the most central objective within parti-
cipatory processes. According to Zimmermann et al. (2009), participation and
ownership go hand in hand and one could argue that ownership is the outcome of
the participation process. Figure 9.8 displays the increase in political ownership
of the society, industry, and donor organizations in all three countries as a result
of participation in the CAADP policy domain. Again, we identify clear diﬀer-
ences between Ghana and Senegal on the one hand and Uganda on the other.
The increase in ownership of donor organizations and the society is especially
pronounced in Ghana and Senegal. The industry is comparatively more involved
in the decision-making process in Ghana and is also able to decrease the political
conﬂict in Senegal. These ﬁndings stand in stark contrast to the results obtained
for Uganda where the society reaches a level of ownership similar to the industry
in Senegal. The industry in Uganda yields only marginal growth rates in own-
ership. The most striking result is the weak performance of donor organizations
in Uganda who appear to lose from participation. They experience an increase
in the political conﬂict as indicated by a negative mean ownership. The 95%
conﬁdence intervals exhibit only little oscillations and indicate a strong level ro-
bustness of our ownership measure. Moreover, the majority of the empirical values
lie within the conﬁdence interval which validates the ﬁnding in the case studies.
While the empirical ﬁnding appears to underrepresent the society in Ghana and
the industry in Uganda, both donor organizations and the society seem to be
slightly overrepresented. Overall, the derived indicator seems to be a robust mea-
sure for the increased ownership implied by stakeholder participation. One of the
central concerns in the literature are conﬂicting interests especially when multi-
ple stakeholders are involved in the process. White (1996) took account of the
interest-dimension in her framework and demonstrated that stakeholders do not
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Figure 9.8.: Political Ownership (estimate)
share the same expectations of participation. Our measure of ownership takes
account of this. Stakeholder do not share the same expectations of participation,
neither do they necessarily agree in their interest in a particular policy nor in the
favored policy position.
This chapter provided an extensive overview of the level of political partici-
pation, the pattern of communication and lobbying activities, and the inﬂuence
structure in the CAADP policy domain. Moreover, we combined government per-
formance with the results of the participation indicators in a cross country analysis
and tested the results for robustness. The next chapter extends this work by in-
vestigating the donor-recipient relation in the process of knowledge interaction.
We apply the network approach in the context of the Advocacy Coalition Frame-
work which enables us to test the theory of belief formation in communication
networks against observed policy beliefs.
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Policy Beliefs and Networks - A Tale of Two
Worlds?
So far, we argued that the development literature concerned with participatory
policy processes is primarily based on qualitative methods. Thus, we propose the-
oretically based indicators that allow to quantitatively assess participation and
enable a comparative perspective. However, the value added by qualitative ap-
proaches in reﬂecting the concerns raised by policy makers and stakeholders in
political practice is undisputed.
In our theoretical framework, stakeholder inﬂuence on a policy position originates
from two sources: political support and the provision of expert information. The
latter includes belief-formation through communication and is based on social
inﬂuence theory. Under the assumption of uncertainty in regards of the true po-
litical technology, political actors form beliefs how policies turn into outcome to
make rational policy-decisions.
A second approach that explicitly considers political beliefs as the drivers of policy-
making is the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993). A belief system includes implicit theories about how to achieve
certain objectives as well as causal relationships. Political actors that share a set
of normative and causal beliefs are grouped into an advocacy coalition that act
together based on shared beliefs.
While frameworks based on social-inﬂuence theory explicitly incorporate how ac-
tors of a policy subsystem form beliefs, the ACF identiﬁes coalitions based on
observed beliefs derived from in-depth interviews and is thus able to reﬂect policy
issues arising in political practice. By combining both approaches in the context
of quantitative network analysis we are able to test the validity of our theoreti-
cal belief-formation module against the belief system located in political practice.
More precisely, we test the underlying theory that belief formation occurs in net-
works via communication. We examine the empirical communication network for
similarities with coalitions identiﬁed within an ACF context in Ghana, Uganda,
and Senegal.
Building on the discussion about the failure of foreign aid and the dominance of
aid agencies in the development discourse, we advance the understanding of the
donor-recipient relation by analyzing the role of stakeholders in the process of
knowledge interaction.
10.1. Introduction
In our assessment of participatory policies we particularly included the group
of donor organizations. We found that donors hold a signiﬁcant share of gov-
126
Chapter 10. Policy Beliefs and Networks - A Tale of Two Worlds?
ernmental accountability and are able to increase political ownership through
participation. While one might conclude that ownership of donor organizations
increases at the expense of the general public, one argument in favor of the explicit
participation of donors is the contribution to evidence-based policy-making. In
Sub-Sahara African countries, statistical data is often weak or absent. Thus, addi-
tional information available through the participation of donor organizations can
be of high value as long as it is not biased by particular interests (Zimmermann et
al., 2009). Especially the potential dominance of donors induced by development
funds makes the informational inﬂuence on national policies delicate when advice
and conditionality are diﬃcult to segregate.
The role of donors in developing countries remains a widely debated subject
in the development literature. Historically, development assistance has failed to
achieve its main objectives. A number of empirical studies show that foreign aid
has no eﬀect on economic growth or poverty reduction (see Boone, 1996; Svens-
son, 1999; Knack, 2001; Easterly et al., 2004). Many countries that received aid
conditional on policy change did not develop as expected. Corruption and poor
institutional development as well as bureaucratic failures and ineﬃciencies in the
recipient countries are often quoted as determinants of the poor macroeconomic
eﬀects of aid assistance (The World Bank, 1998). Even though it is well known
that foreign aid may be beneﬁcial if distributed to countries with sound macroeco-
nomic policies and democratic structures, there is no evidence that aid causes the
adoption of `good' policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Neither has aid allocation
by donor countries proved to be in favor of democratic levels or good institutions
in recipient countries. Strategic interest of donor countries were often the deter-
mining factor of aid distribution instead (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Furthermore,
foreign aid and political conditionalities have been associated with a decline in the
quality of governance. High levels of aid may reduce the need for taxes of govern-
ments (Rajan and Subramanian, 2007), increase aid-related corruption (Svensson,
2000), and lead to institutional destruction, perverse incentives, and collective ac-
tion problems (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). The expectation of aid itself may
suﬃce to increase rent dissipation and reduce public spending (Svensson, 2000).
While the scientiﬁc discourse is still dominated by questions concerning the ef-
fectiveness and determinants of foreign aid, the signiﬁcance of knowledge in devel-
opment and communication between donor organizations and recipient countries
have long been neglected.
According to Easterly (2007) the failure of development assistance originates from
insuﬃcient knowledge of how to achieve development, the persistence of aid and
advice despite this lack of knowledge, and the overrated role of development ex-
perts. Okolie (2003) criticizes the dominance of aid agencies in the policy process
and the supremacy of the `western' vision on development that leaves little space
for indigenous knowledge and practices and has led to a `Development Hegemony'
in Africa. Weiler (2009) argues that standardized eﬀorts at development have
established their own hierarchies of knowledge. Certain kinds of knowledge claim
a higher status and greater inﬂuence over other kinds regardless of relevance or
connection to the developmental problems. Both donors and recipients must ob-
tain the necessary information to actually target and achieve desired goals. Due
127
Chapter 10. Policy Beliefs and Networks - A Tale of Two Worlds?
to a lack of information and the inability to tap into local knowledge donors are
unable to coordinate foreign aid policy successfully (Williamson, 2010).
Policy conditionalities often imply that donor organizations force certain policies
onto unwilling governments - policies which may not be the only option or even
the most appropriate for the particular country (Dijkstra, 2002). Unsworth (2009)
points out that donors' approaches to development have remained largely techno-
cratic and stresses the importance of political economy approaches in development
policy.
However, aid agencies may have diﬃculties to apply political economy approaches
as they have a diﬀerent perception of proper development policy (Hout, 2012),
and `there is little evidence that it is prompting them to question their (mostly
implicit) assumptions about how development happens' (Unsworth, 2009, p. 884).
Lately, knowledge and learning have received increased attention in develop-
ment practice14. Though mainly focused on a conceptual, theoretical, and nar-
rative level, emphasis has been put on speciﬁc knowledge forms that inﬂuence
development policies and programs. Jones et al. (2013b) present a framework
to analyze the knowledge-policy interface which is inﬂuenced by four dimensions:
the political context, the relative strength of actors involved, the diﬀerent types of
knowledge, and the process of knowledge interaction. The role of political actors
in the knowledge-policy interface and the policy process more broadly is shaped
by actors' interests, beliefs and values, and the ability to make credible knowledge
claims. Jones et al. describe three diﬀerent types of knowledge, i.e. research-
based, practice-informed, and participatory, which have to be carefully balanced
as an over-reliance on technical knowledge can lead to technocratic policy-making
(see also Unsworth, 2009).
Recent theoretical developments on the role of knowledge in the policy process
focus on politics and legitimization and argue that power is infused throughout
the knowledge process and integrates three intertwined types of relations: actors
and networks, institutions, and discourse (Jones, 2009)15.
However, there is still a lack of empirical work on the role of diﬀerent types and
sources of knowledge and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent actors in development policy
making.
In a recent study, Mockshell and Birner (2015) identify policy beliefs of diﬀer-
ent stakeholders involved in the agricultural policy making process with regard to
diﬀerent policy instruments based on in-depth interviews in Ghana and Uganda.
Using the qualitative method of discourse analysis they ﬁrst identify metaphors
and story-lines which are aggregated into policy themes subsequently. Factor anal-
ysis and a following cluster analysis within the context of the Advocacy Coalition
Framework yield two discourse coalitions, i.e. the `donor' and the `domestic'
coalition, as well as the respective policy beliefs. Mockshell and Birner (2015)
ﬁnd that `domestic' stakeholders have substantially diﬀerent policy beliefs than
stakeholders in the `donor' coalition and conclude that it is essential to foster
14For an extensive review see e.g. Ferguson et al. (2010), Jones (2009); Jones et al. (2013b),
Valters (2014), and Akude (2014).
15In a similar way Sumner and Harpham (2008) describe the essence of frameworks to analyze
policy-making processes (see 2.2)
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policy dialogues between the `Donor World' and the `Domestic World' in order to
bridge the gap between the prevailing policy beliefs.
This analysis highlights the importance of the intrinsic policy position and the
individual comprehension of political coherence that each stakeholder involved
in the policy formulation process has in mind. The mental model of political
actors on the interrelation of policy instruments and policy goals are crucial -
next to strategic considerations and political interest - when it comes to adoption
of certain policy choices.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework explicitly identiﬁes policy beliefs as drivers
of policy-making among stakeholder coalitions, whereas it is unable to provide
a theoretical model of belief formation among actors involved in policy making.
According to social inﬂuence theory individuals form their beliefs through com-
munication (see section 3.2).
We extend the work by Mockshell and Birner (2015) by applying the network
approach described in chapter 3. Based on a quantitative network survey carried
out in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal, we analyze the exchange of expert infor-
mation between stakeholder organizations in political communication networks.
Under the assumption that policy beliefs are driven by communication between
political actors we test the communication structure of relevant stakeholder orga-
nizations for distinct patterns in accordance with the proposed donor and domestic
coalitions.
The main objective of this chapter is the identiﬁcation of the discourse coalitions
within the quantitative communication network data of political actors. Hence,
our research question is as follows: Are policy beliefs and communication patterns
between political actors in one-to-one correspondence with each other? If we are
able to detect signiﬁcant coalition-patterns within the communication networks,
this would further validate the theory-based module of informational inﬂuence
within our framework and indicate the existence of the `Two Worlds' identiﬁed by
Mockshell and Birner.
Furthermore, this chapter targets the lack of empirical work in the context of
knowledge in development. Combining quantitative network analysis with the
results of an ACF we identify the role of stakeholders in the policy process and
validate the inﬂuence of communication in the process of knowledge interaction,
i.e. belief formation. The next section presents the hypotheses in line with our
research question that guide the further procedure. In section 10.3 we describe
the data as well as the data transformation that was necessary for this analysis.
In Section 10.4 we present and discuss the results of our approach and conclude
in section 10.5.
10.2. Approach and Hypotheses
In modern democracies, policy-making is characterized by the interaction between
political actors as representatives of the general public, determined to create and
maintain welfare by setting a political agenda, targeting policy concerns and tak-
ing decisions on how to achieve the formulated policy goals. In this decision-
making process the political actors do not only comprise of governments oﬃcials
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but rather involve public and private stakeholders alike. Diﬀerent Stakeholders
have diﬀerent levels of power, diﬀerent interests, and diﬀerent resources. Deciding
on a set of policy choices in a certain policy domain can be diﬃcult to obtain
and requires a good amount of negotiations and concessions of all stakeholders
involved. Especially so when we consider policy-making in developing countries
where conﬂicts of interests, or beliefs for that matter, arise not only within na-
tional governments but rather between international donors and national policy
makers.
The network approach described in chapter 3 can help promote the understanding
of the policy process as we learn about the interaction of stakeholders in the policy
landscape, the structure of resource ﬂows such as expert knowledge between and
within important stakeholder groups, and the inﬂuence of diﬀerent stakeholders in
a certain policy domain that eventually determines the belief formation process.
Based on the exchange model of political inﬂuence resources by Pappi and Hen-
ning (1999) we apply the concept of a corporate actor for which a person is selected
as a representative to answer our interview question. The network survey carried
out in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal consists of many networks including expert
knowledge, political support and reputation networks as well as interest in certain
policy programs according to the CAADP pillars and the respective country pro-
grams. One of the key features in the exchange model by Pappi and Henning is
the interest of a stakeholder in the provision of expert knowledge. The inﬂow of
inﬂuence resources, e.g. expert knowledge, is then weighted by the relative inter-
est and enables us to calculate network multipliers from which we derive political
inﬂuence proﬁles.
This chapter lays the focus on the expert knowledge network only. The communi-
cation network consists of conﬁrmed transfers of expert knowledge via communi-
cation among stakeholder organizations who are regarded as the most important
or inﬂuential actors in the agricultural policy domain in the respective country.
Following the notation in section 3.2, we deﬁne the set of actors involved in the
communication network as the country's political elite E.
As our approach aims at the identiﬁcation of the discourse coalitions discovered
by Mockshell and Birner (2015) within our quantitative communication network
we further distinguish between the subset of the `donor' coalition, the subset of
the `domestic' coalition, and a subset `other'.
The subsets `donor' and `domestic' relate to the respective discourse coalitions
rather than the classiﬁcation of stakeholder groups, as the `donor' coalition is
comprised not only of donor organizations but iNGOs or think tanks alike (see
table 10.1). We include a third subgroup `other' for the matter of complete-
ness, as this subgroup refers to the stakeholders that have been interviewed by
University of Kiel, but not by University of Hohenheim during the data collection.
Hypothesis 1 Identiﬁed communication is concentrated among identiﬁed Belief
Clusters.
According to our research objective we assume that communication is more con-
centrated among identiﬁed clusters, i.e. `donor' communicate with `donor' more
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often than with the `domestic', and vice versa.
Without doubt, the simplest and most straightforward way to literally see diﬀer-
ences in the communication structure between the `donor' and `domestic' coali-
tions is by depicting network graphs. By marking predeﬁned subgroups with
diﬀerent symbols or colors it is easily possible to detect certain patterns within
the network structure. As these graphs tend to become blurry with increasing
network size it is recommended to relate to common network indicators in order
to get a clearer picture.
One of the basic measures to describe a network is its density. The network den-
sity is the amount of ties realized in a given network proportional to the amount
of all ties possible. It provides insights into the cohesion of an overall network
or the intensity of exchange within a subgroup in the respective network. Being
a relational measure the density of a network takes on values between 0 and 1,
with 1 indicating that every actor within the respective (sub-)group is connected
to each other.
As our interest lies in the density of the identiﬁed `donor' and `domestic' coali-
tions, we aggregate the stakeholders to subgroups accordingly and calculate coali-
tion densities. Concentrated communication patterns according to our hypothesis
would result either in identiﬁcation of distinct donor- and domestic cliques in the
network graphs and/or in higher network densities on the blockdiagonal.
Using a more sophisticated approach by applying blockmodel analysis, we trans-
form the `Belief Space' into a `Belief Network' and test both the belief network
and the communication network for structural equivalence which would result in
Hypothesis 2 Correspondence in `Belief Space' and `Communication Space'.
By examining the blockmembership of relevant stakeholders we are further able
to test for association between stakeholders with the same communication struc-
ture and similar beliefs. The Belief Space refers to the results by Mockshell and
Birner (2015), i.e. a matrix containing information on how often a certain stake-
holder (rows) mentioned a particular policy theme (columns), if at all. Based
on the idea of Discourse Network Analysis by Leifeld (2013), an approach that
combines qualitative content analysis with social network analysis, we transform
the Belief Space into the Belief Network. The Belief Space itself constitutes an
aﬃliation network as it consists of actors being related to certain policy beliefs. As
we are interested in the actor-actor relation rather than the actor-belief relation
it is straightforward to turn to an adjacency network. Actors receive a tie if they
have suﬃciently overlapping policy beliefs.
More formally, let Ai = a1, a2, ...an be the set of actors and let Pj = p1, p2, ...pm
be the set of policy themes in our Belief Space B(ij). A given actor i occupies a
position in the Belief Space B(ij) by holding a speciﬁc set of policy themes Pj.
How often a policy theme is mentioned is equally insigniﬁcant as not mentioning a
certain theme. To move from the aﬃliation network to the adjacency network we
proceed in three steps: First, we row-normalize the Belief Space to get the relative
weight an actor puts on each policy theme. Second, we multiply the relative pol-
icy theme overlap in each possible relation and create a square actor-actor matrix
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that contains the sum of weighted relations between actors. In the third step we
assign two actors a tie in the adjacency network if the weighted relation exceeds
a certain degree. The result is the undirected Belief Network in which actors are
connected by a conforming set of statements on policy themes, i.e. their policy
beliefs. With two networks at hand, the communication network and the artiﬁ-
cially constructed belief network, we are able to perform a blockmodel analysis
over both networks simultaneously.
Performing the blockmodel analysis for the communication network and the ar-
tiﬁcial belief network simultaneously yields data on blockmembership for each
stakeholder. Actors in the same block do not necessarily have a direct connection
to each other, they rather share the same structural relation, i.e. all in- and out-
going connections, to all other stakeholders in the respective network. We use the
sna-package developed by Butts (2008) for the statistical software `R.' to perform
our blockmodel analysis. The Hamming distances between all pairs of positions
in the adjacency matrices are computed and classes are formed through hierar-
chical cluster analysis. The input graphs are reordered by class and blockmodel
reduction is applied based on blockdensity.
Subsequently, we apply the chi square test for association across blockmembers of
the communication and belief network to test whether the underlying structure
of the networks correspond to each other, i.e. if there is a statistical relationship
between stakeholders with the same communication structure and similar beliefs.
Correspondence in the Belief Space and the Communication Space would yield un-
ambiguous Donor- and Domestic Blocks in the reduced graphs for both networks
as well as statistically signiﬁcant relationships of the corresponding blockmember-
ships.
Our third hypothesis is based on the seminal work by Friedkin and Johnsen
(1990) on Opinion and Social Inﬂuence and features sound theoretical foundation.
Following the approach described in chapter 3.2 we calculate network multipliers
from which we derive political inﬂuence proﬁles. Based on the discourse coalitions
identiﬁed by Mockshell and Birner we assume
Hypothesis 3 Correspondence in Belief Cluster and Political Inﬂuence Proﬁles,
which would result in distinct proﬁles of the Donor and Domestic Coalitions as
they are inﬂuenced by diﬀerent stakeholder groups.
We specify the rule how individuals combine their own positions with positions
communicated by others to form their ﬁnal policy position according to the belief
formation module in chapter 3.2 and suggest that individuals update their political
position by taking weighted averages of their neighbors' position.
As we are interested in whether the inﬂuence proﬁles of the respective discourse
coalitions show considerable diﬀerences we subtract actor i's weight on his own
position mii in the multiplier matrix M . Row normalizing the multiplier matrix
M yields the relative inﬂuence of actor j on actor i's ﬁnal position. Aggregation
of actors j in accordance to stakeholder groupings and subsequently taking means
of actors i in reference to the `Donor', `Domestic', and `Other' coalitions yields
the matrix of political inﬂuence proﬁles, i.e. the total inﬂuence of a certain stake-
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Ghana (N=54∗) Uganda (N=48∗) Senegal (N=49)∗
Domestic Donor Other Domestic Donor Other Domestic Donor Other
CSO 33.3 0 66.7 0 0 100 0 0 100
DONOR 0 57.1 42.9 0 71.4c 28.6 0 42.9 57.1
EXEC 58.3a 0 41.7 54.6d 0 45.5 50e 12.5 37.5
IG:AGIND 0 0 100 12.5 0 87.5 0 0 100
IG:NONAGRAR 0 0 100 0 0 100
IG:PROD 25 0 75 33.3 0 66.7 50 0 50
iNGO 20 40 40 0 0 100 100 0 0
LEG 100 0 0 100 0 0 100f 0 0
PUBAG 0 0 100 0 0 100 20 0 80
RESEARCH 0 44.4b 55.6 60 20 20 36.4g 18.2 45.5
SUPRA 0 50 50
aMinistry of Food and Agriculture [EXEC+6]
bUniversity of Ghana [RESEARCH+2]
cMinistry of Agriculture [EXEC+4]
dWorld Bank [DONOR+1]
eMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Equipment [EXEC+1]
fAssemblee [LEG+1]
gUniversité Cheikh Anta Diop [RESEARCH+1]
Table 10.1.: Stakeholder-Mapping (%)
holder group on an average actor in a given discourse coalition.
10.3. Data
The data for our analysis is based on the one hand on the results of in-depth inter-
views with political actors and subsequent analysis by University of Hohenheim
and on the other hand on quantitative network data collected by University of
Kiel in the context of the PEBAP-Project in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal in the
year 2012/2013.
The data on the communication networks has been collected in the framework of
the elite network study which involves questions about networks, policy positions,
and policy interests as decribed in chapter 5.
The data set provided by the University of Hohenheim comprises both a list of the
stakeholder organizations interviewed and the corresponding policy beliefs iden-
tiﬁed as well as the assignment of stakeholders to the discourse coalitions16. In
order to test our hypotheses we have to match the two data sets with regard to
the stakeholders interviewed and the respective coalition memberships.
Table 10.1 displays the relative composition of stakeholder groups according to
the identiﬁed coalitions. The group of `Other' is again included in the mapping of
stakeholders. However, we will ignore `Other' for now as we are interested in the
distribution of actors among the two coalitions only. The stakeholder mapping
displays a clear partition of stakeholder organizations in the elite network survey
across the two discourse coalitions. Organizations of DONOR classiﬁcation are
16We would like to express our gratitude to Jonathan Mockshell and Christina Birner who
kindly provided us with the data. For detailed information on data collection and analysis
see Mockshell and Birner (2015)
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exclusively in the Donor coalition in all three countries. Stakeholders with national
interests like Civil Society Organizations (CSO) or interest groups (IG: AGIND,
IG:PROD) as well as political actors (EXEC, LEG) are all located in the Domestic
coalition. Senegal inhibits a special role as one EXEC is associated with the
Donor coalition. It is not counter-intuitive that this particular governmental body
happens to be the Ministry of Economy and Finance due to its close relation to
donor agencies like World Bank or IMF. Internationally acting stakeholders such as
iNGOs (Ghana) or RESEARCH organizations (Uganda and Senegal) are attached
to both coalition clusters. RESEARCH is of particular interest as both National as
well as International Research Organizations are covered (see Table 5.1). However,
national research organizations such as AFRISA in Ghana or IPAR in Senegal
happen to be in the Donor cluster whereas IFPRI switches from the Donor (Ghana
and Senegal) to the Domestic coalition (Uganda).
The ﬁnal data set for our analysis had to be adjusted to take account of the
interview-pattern by University of Hohenheim. Within the framework of an elite
network survey we understand the interviewee as an oﬃcial representative of the
respective organization and therefore each organization has been interviewed once
following the concept of a corporate actor. In the data set subject to analysis
provided by University of Hohenheim there have been interviews with multiple
actors belonging to one organization. For example, University of Hohenheim
conducted interviews with oﬃcials of seven diﬀerent divisions within the Ministry
of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) in Ghana whereas University of Kiel interviewed
only one oﬃcial representing the Ministry as a whole. To take this into account, we
aligned the number of actors within the communication networks with the number
of stakeholders in the discourse coalitions by adding actors to the network. In the
case of Ghana for example, we adjusted the network by replicating the network ties
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) until the communication network
had six additional nodes, i.e. ending up with MOFA1 - MOFA7. Organizations
for which the data had to be adjusted and the extent of adjustments is noted in
Table 10.1. Our ﬁnal set of stakeholders comprises 54, 48 and 49 actors in Ghana,
Uganda, and Senegal, respectively.
10.4. Results
Network Structure
In our ﬁrst Hypothesis we assumed that communication is concentrated among
the identiﬁed Belief Clusters. Therefore we matched the stakeholder organizations
interviewed by both University of Kiel and University of Hohenheim and assigned
the identiﬁed discourse coalitions accordingly.
Even though network graphs are intuitive, they tend to fail at providing a
clear picture on the stakeholder relationships or any kind of coalition aﬃliation,
especially if we have large networks as these graphs tend to become very unclear.
That is the reason, why we only depicted the stakeholders that were interviewed
both by Hohenheim and Kiel which match the two coalitions of interest rather
than presenting the whole communication network that we collected. Figure 10.1
depicts the structure of the Ghanaian communication network. The nodes are
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Figure 10.1.: Communication Network (Ghana)
colored according to the two coalition clusters (Donor=white, Domestic=red).
We ﬁnd that the Domestic coalition is central in the communication structure,
whereas the Donor coalition is located in the periphery. This pattern points at
the direction of diﬀerent worlds according to Mockshell and Birner. However,
in order to conﬁrm our hypothesis of concentrated communication within the
coalition clusters we would have expected a clear-cut network graph in which the
Domestic coalition occupies for instance the left-hand side whereas the Donor
coalition would be located on the right-hand side. This is not the case for Ghana.
One interpretation of this pattern is, that stakeholders from both coalitions rely
on the Domestic actors the most when it comes to getting access to valuable
information.
The central role of the `Domestic' stakeholders in Ghana is also reﬂected by the
network density. The density of a network measures how many ties we observe in a
network or a given subgraph of a network in relation to all ties possible. Network
densities for all three countries are presented in Table 10.2. We calculated the
share of all connections across and within the coalitions. Since the communication
network is a directed network it follows naturally that the density matrix is non-
symmetric. For our ﬁrst hypothesis to hold we would have expected the highest
values on the blockdiagonal of the density table for each country. In Ghana, the
Domestic coalition exhibits an extraordinary high density (0.92), indicating that
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Ghana Uganda Senegal
Coalition Domestic Donor Other Domestic Donor Other Domestic Donor Other
Domestic 0.92 0.46 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.34
Donor 0.42 0.33 0.15 0.29 0.67 0.18 0.42 0.55 0.30
Other 0.59 0.16 0.19 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.36 0.20 0.20
Table 10.2.: Network Density
almost all actors within the Domestic coalition are connected with each other
in both directions. The density within the Donor coalition (0.33) is comparably
weak. In fact, actors in the Donor coalition tend to rather call on the expertise of
the Domestic coalition when they need expert information on agricultural policies
as indicated by the Donor-Domestic density in Ghana (0.42). This reﬂects the
pattern observed in the network graph for Ghana where the stakeholders belonging
to the Domestic coalition are located in the center.
Turning to Uganda and Senegal for comparison we ﬁnd a diﬀerent picture.
In the case of Uganda we do observe the highest values on the diagonal which
conﬁrms our hypothesis. Even though the density within the Domestic coalition
(0.46) is only slightly higher than across the Domestic-Donor clusters (0.45) this
ﬁnding is in line with our assumption. With a value of 0.67 the density within the
Donor coalition marks the highest value for Uganda. This result is also reﬂected
in the network graph for Uganda (see Figure A.5) in which we do identify diﬀerent
cliques for the Domestic and the Donor coalition. In terms of network densities,
Uganda exhibits an inversed pattern of Ghana as the role of the coalitions is just
the opposite, not only within but also across the coalitions. In Senegal, it appears
that stakeholders in the domestic coalition do not approach other organizations
as much as in Ghana or Uganda, neither within nor across coalitions. Like in
Uganda, the density within the Donor coalition yields the highest value (0.55) in
Senegal. Interestingly, members of the Donor coalition contact stakeholders of
the Domestic coalition even more often (0.42) than Domestic-actors themselves
(0.38). Nevertheless, as the diagonal exhibits the highest values we can conﬁrm
our hypothesis for the case of Senegal as well. This is also reﬂected in the network
graph for Senegal (Figure A.4) even though the clique structure is not as clear cut
as for Uganda.
Structural Equivalence
In our second hypothesis we assumed correspondence in the `Belief Space' and the
`Communication Space'. To test this hypothesis we transformed the Belief Space
into a Belief Network and analyzed both the Belief Network and the Commu-
nication Network for structural equivalence. Blockmodel analysis yields reduced
graphs for both networks and enables us to test the resulting blockmemberships
for statistical relationships between the belief and the communication network.
Figure 10.2 depicts the reduced graph of the communication and the artiﬁcially
constructed belief network in Ghana. In this 4-block solution we can identify
stakeholders that are structural equivalent through the corresponding blockmem-
bership. The reduced network graph presents the information in the network data
in simpliﬁed form. Actors who share the same block do not necessarily have a con-
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(a) Communication
(b) Belief
Figure 10.2.: Reduced Graphs: Communication and Belief (Ghana)
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nection to each other, but rather are connected to the same others, i.e. they have
the same social environment. The reduced graph of the communication network
reveals an interesting pattern. Both Donor and Domestic stakeholders scatter over
diﬀerent blocks. The Domestic coalition acts as a broker between the remaining
Donor-Blocks, a feature that we already identiﬁed in the coalition densities be-
fore. The reduced graph of the belief network reveals the same blockstructure
that we ﬁnd for the communication network. Apart from minor exceptions, the
blockmembership remains almost the same, i.e. we ﬁnd both coalitions in separate
Blocks.
We further used the results of the blockmodel analysis, i.e. the corresponding
blockmemberships of the communication network and the belief network, to de-
termine whether we identify a statistical relationship between both networks. We
applied the Pearson chi-square and the likelihood-ratio chi square test as measures
of association and ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant correspondence of blockmembership for
Ghana (Table 10.3). This is a positive signal as there appears to be a relationship
between stakeholders that have a similar communication pattern and stakeholders
that share similar beliefs.
Measure Ghana Uganda Senegal
Pearson chi2(9) 23.506 (0.005) 14.768 (0.098) 24.858 (0.003)
likelihood-ratio chi2(9) 24.433 (0.004) 14.107 (0.119) 18.475 (0.030)
Fishers exact 0 0.065 0.031
Table 10.3.: Measures of Association
As we can already see from Table 10.3, we further ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant values
for Senegal whereas the results for Uganda remain below the signiﬁcance level.
This is also evident from the reduced graphs for Uganda and Senegal. In Senegal
we identify a large Domestic block (Block 2) in the reduced graph of the commu-
nication network whereas the remaining actors distribute evenly over the spare
blocks. Interestingly, we ﬁnd the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to-
gether in the same block with the World Bank (Block 1), a pattern that we noted
earlier as the MEF has been assigned to the Donor coalition. The blockstructure
changes slightly as we proceed to the belief network where we ﬁnd both a large
Domestic (Block 1) and a large Donor block. The blockmembership remains al-
most the same as indicated in table 10.3 already. As in the case of Ghana, the
blockmodel analysis of Senegal's communication and belief network conﬁrms our
second hypothesis of correspondence in the `Belief Space' and the `Communica-
tion Space'.
In the case of Uganda we have to neglect our hypothesis as neither the reduced
graphs nor the blockmemberships yield signiﬁcant results.
Inﬂuence Proﬁle
In our third hypothesis we assumed correspondence in Belief Clusters and Political
Inﬂuence Proﬁles. Calculating network multipliers of the communication network
enables us to derive stakeholder inﬂuence proﬁles in order to analyze to what
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Figure 10.3.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle (Ghana)
extent the actors in the donor and domestic coalitions are inﬂuenced by diﬀerent
stakeholder groups.
Figure 10.3 shows the inﬂuence proﬁle in Ghana. The bars indicate the sum
of inﬂuence that a particular stakeholder group has on the opinion of an average
stakeholder in the Donor and Domestic Coalition. We identify a clear diﬀerence
between the two coalitions in terms of inﬂuence. The three stakeholder groups
with the biggest impact on both the Domestic and the Donor coalition are in
decreasing order research organizations, the executive, and donor organizations.
While RESEARCH has the biggest impact on the opinion of an average stake-
holder in the Domestic coalition, the Donor coalition is inﬂuenced the most by
EXEC. DONOR organizations have a bigger impact on the Donor coalition than
on the Domestic Coalition. We conﬁrm our hypothesis.
Research organizations are highly inﬂuential in Uganda (A.10). On both the
Domestic as well as the Donor coalition, RESEARCH yields by far the highest
inﬂuence. However, the Inﬂuence Proﬁles of both coalitions appear to be almost
the same. The only diﬀerence we can make out is the magnitude of inﬂuence, the
structure is more or less the same. We reject our hypothesis.
Compared to the Ghana and Uganda, RESEARCH is most inﬂuential in Sene-
gal (A.11). The inﬂuence on the Domestic ,cCoalition is determined by EXEC,
DONOR, CSO, and PUBAG, while the Donor Coalition is impacted most by
DONOR and EXEC. We conﬁrm our hypothesis.
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10.5. Outlook & Discussion
Building on the discussion about the failure of foreign aid and the dominance of
aid agencies in the development discourse, we advance the understanding of the
donor-recipient relation by analyzing the role of stakeholders in the process of
knowledge interaction.
Policy making is a dynamic process characterized by the interaction of many dif-
ferent stakeholders in the policy landscape. The decision-making is determined
by policy beliefs held by political actors.
Deﬁned as simple mental models applied by stakeholders to understand the com-
plex relation between policies and policy outcomes, Mockshell and Birner ﬁnd that
domestic policy actors have substantially diﬀerent policy beliefs than actors in the
donor coalition. We extended the work by Mockshell and Birner by applying a
widely acknowledged theoretical model of social inﬂuence.
Under the assumption that policy beliefs are determined by communication be-
tween political actors we applied a quantitative network approach to identify
the structural patterns in the exchange of expert knowledge between relevant
stakeholders in the agricultural policy domain of Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal.
We tested three hypotheses to examine whether policy beliefs and communica-
tion patterns between political actors are in a one-to-one correspondence to each
other. Using diﬀerent methods of quantitative network analysis we found that
the substantially diﬀerent policy beliefs of the identiﬁed `Donor' and `Domestic'
coalitions are subject to distinct communication patterns between political actors
in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal.
In line with our ﬁrst hypothesis we found evidence that communication is con-
centrated among identiﬁed belief clusters in Uganda and Senegal. In the case
of Ghana we had to reject our hypothesis as we observed a very dominant po-
sition of the `Domestic' coalition. Stakeholders in the `Donor' coalition relied
to a greater extend on information disseminated by members of the `Domestic'
coalition. Blockmodel analysis and subsequent tests for association of the block-
memberships conﬁrmed our second hypothesis in the case of Ghana and Senegal.
In the case of Uganda we had to reject our hypothesis as neither the reduced
graphs nor the blockmemberships yielded signiﬁcant results. In order to test our
third hypothesis we calculated network multipliers to derive political inﬂuence
proﬁles. While the inﬂuence proﬁles in Uganda revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
of the `Donor' and `Domestic' coalitions, we found clear evidence of distinct inﬂu-
ence on both coalitions in Ghana and Senegal. In Ghana, the `Donor' coalition is
highly inﬂuenced by the executive, a pattern that is also reﬂected in the network
densities where the `Domestic' coalition is of particular importance for `Donor'
what led to the rejection of our ﬁrst hypothesis.
All in all, we can conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Mockshell and Birner. However, the
structural properties of political communication in the agricultural policy domains
in Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal do not quite reﬂect the strict `black and white'
pattern of the suggested `Two Worlds' in agricultural policy making. Even though
our ﬁndings reﬂect the segmentation of the two coalitions there appear to be more
than two worlds.
140
Chapter 10. Policy Beliefs and Networks - A Tale of Two Worlds?
Our analysis attempts to provide the recent conceptual work on knowledge and
development with empirical evidence by investigating the relationship between po-
litical communication networks and policy beliefs. Our results underline the sig-
niﬁcance of political dialogue among stakeholders in the process of policy-making.
Especially in the context of the principles set out in the Paris Declaration (2005).
Communication is essential to bridge the gap between the distinct beliefs and
provides the foundation to align policy concerns and policy choices in particular
in order to create mutual accountability and ownership.
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11.1. Summary
The concept of stakeholder participation has become a critical approach in devel-
opment policy and is still at the center of contemporary development discourse.
Under the assumption that an active participation of stakeholders in the policy
process leads the way to more democratic and eﬀective governance, participation
has become one of the most widely used concepts in development politics (Reed,
2008; Young, 1980; Pretty, 1995). It promotes the realization of democratic val-
ues or the empowerment of marginalized groups which beneﬁts the democratic
society, citizenship, and equity, and leads to a higher quality of political decisions
and increased eﬃciency. In particular, central claims of stakeholder participation
in policy processes are:
• increasing governmental accountability, i.e. the incentives for governmental
agents to serve societal interest and needs (Keefer and Khemani, 2005)
• reducing government capture, i.e. government incentives to serve vested
interests at the expense of the general public (Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2002)
• increasing policy ownership, i.e. citizens/ civil society identify with and feel
committed to governmental policy which can signiﬁcantly reduce political
implementation costs (Adsera et al., 2003)
Additionally, the inclusion of relevant stakeholders provides access to grassroots
knowledge and may enhance the capacity to meet local needs and priorities, and
allows a comprehensive understanding of complex development processes if local
and scientiﬁc knowledge is combined. According to the relevant literature, the
beneﬁcial properties of political participation result in improved government ac-
tions and lead the way to sound economic and political performance. Approaches
to assess participation are based on qualitative methods or remain vague and
on a narrative level. Neither a clear concept nor a framework to quantitatively
measure participation have been developed yet. A theoretical framework helps
to understand how participation of non-governmental organizations in the policy
process impact on the policy decisions to yield the claimed beneﬁts. Moreover,
a quantitative measurement of stakeholder participation is crucial to understand
how participation translates into government performance, whose participation is
needed to what extent, and may provide information on how the desired level of
participation can be achieved.
We propose a theoretical framework based on micro-political theory that al-
lows us to capture participation of non-governmental organizations in the political
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decision-making process. Participation in the policy process implies that relevant
stakeholder organizations have political power, i.e. they are able to exert inﬂuence
on the ﬁnal policy decision. Following interest group theory, non-governmental
organizations obtain inﬂuence in the policy process via two channels: classical
lobbying and expert information. The fundamental condition of interest group
inﬂuence through the exchange of political support and expert information is ac-
cess to political decision-makers. This condition is taken into account by applied
policy network studies (Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi et
al., 1995). We incorporate a lobbying module and a belief formation module in
our framework that reﬂect the inﬂuence of policy networks on policy decisions. On
a theoretical level, we follow Pappi and Henning (1998) who suggest the organiza-
tion of political exchange in social networks, and Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) who
propose a model of belief updating and information exchange in social networks.
This enables us to illustrate the inﬂuence of non-governmental organizations on
the ﬁnal policy decisions and the derivation of network-based indicators to mea-
sure participation in policy processes. In particular, we present four indicators
in reference to the literature on participation that enable the assessment of gov-
ernmental accountability, government capture, political ownership, and political
knowledge as a result of stakeholder participation in the policy process.
Using Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda as case-studies, we apply our framework
based on empirical data collected within an elite network study conducted in
these three countries in 2012-2013. The CAADP-reform process provides a good
example to apply the network-based indicators of participation. The inclusion of
local stakeholder organizations in planning, formulation and evaluation of sector-
speciﬁc growth policies is a key principle of CAADP to enhance governmental
accountability and political ownership, which provides the background for our
quantitative assessment of stakeholder participation in agricultural policy pro-
cesses in Sub-Sahara Africa.
In order to assess stakeholder participation in the three case countries we follow
three steps:
First, we conduct a descriptive analysis of the network structures establishing
the CAADP policy domain in Ghana, Senegal, and Uganda. Using standard meth-
ods of social network analysis we perform a blockmodel analysis to examine the
policy networks for structural equivalence between the stakeholder organizations
and identiﬁed actors who hold central positions in the respective networks. To
evaluate the impact of political inﬂuence structures on diﬀerent aspects of politi-
cal performance we compute network multipliers derived from the communication
and support networks that constitute the centerpiece of the political inﬂuence
model. Subsequently, we derive inﬂuence proﬁles based on the network multipli-
ers to identify inﬂuential stakeholder groups in the respective country. Combining
the communication and support multiplier with legislative decision-making power
we derive the informational inﬂuence and lobbying power as well as the total inﬂu-
ence of individual stakeholders. Subsequently, we apply the theoretically founded
participation indicators of government accountability, government capture, and
political ownership empirically.
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Secondly, we perform a comparative analysis. We provide an extensive overview
of the level of political participation, the pattern of communication and lobbying
activities, and the inﬂuence structure in the CAADP policy domain. Moreover, we
combine government performance with the results of the participation indicators
in a cross country analysis and test the results for robustness.
Thirdly, we test the underlying assumption of our theoretical framework that be-
lief formation occurs through communication in networks. Therefore, we combine
our theoretical belief formation module with the beliefs observed in the context
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).
Overall, we ﬁnd that governmental organizations are the most inﬂuential ac-
tors in all three countries. Especially the Ministry of Agriculture is identiﬁed as
a key player in the agricultural policy process. However, its signiﬁcance varies
enormously over the three countries. MOFA is the central organization deter-
mining political communication in Ghana and establishes the political core in the
support network together with other central governmental organizations (e.g. the
Ministry of Finance). They are primarily engaged in the exchange of political
support with donor organizations and the national research institute ISSER. In
contrast to Ghana, the political communication process in Senegal and Uganda is
determined by stakeholder organizations that are also identiﬁed as extremely in-
ﬂuential in the lobbying network. Among these are the two research organizations
ISRA and ITA, the donor organization USAID, and the supranational CEDEAO
in Senegal. In Uganda, these include the public agency NARO and the Ministry
of Finance as well as the two interest groups UNFFE and PSFU.
These network structures are also reﬂected in the distribution of political inﬂuence.
We distinguish between informational inﬂuence (i.e. belief power) and inﬂuence
through political support (lobbying power). We ﬁnd that the distribution of be-
lief power and lobbying power depends on organizational aﬃliation, i.e. research
organizations are likely to be more inﬂuential through the provision of expert in-
formation whereas donor organizations tend to exert inﬂuence through lobbying
activities. This holds true especially for Ghana. In contrast, donor organizations
are comparatively more engaged in knowledge provision in Senegal whereas they
exhibit no signiﬁcant inﬂuence in Uganda. This is primarily the result of the
network structure in Uganda where the majority of donor organizations have no
direct link to the Ministry of Agriculture. In terms of total inﬂuence the executive
constitutes the most inﬂuential stakeholder group in all three countries. However,
in Uganda the level of total political inﬂuence is much more balanced compared
to Ghana and Senegal where the executive exhibits the highest inﬂuence share
by far. While donor and research organizations exhibit almost equal inﬂuence
shares in Ghana, research organizations are signiﬁcantly more inﬂuential than
donor organizations in Senegal. In contrast, the inﬂuence distribution in Uganda
is considerably less pronounced. The executive is only half as inﬂuential compared
to Ghana and Senegal and is at par with the agricultural sector (i.e. agribusiness
and producers).
The empirical application of the developed indicators on country level yields
mixed results and gains relevance when the results are compared in the cross
country analysis against the background of governmental performance in the re-
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spective country. As government performance is generally diﬃcult to measure
we used relevant economic and political indices to diﬀerentiate between the case
countries in order to approximate the performance of the respective government.
We included the gross national income as well as the poverty head count index as
measures for the economic development. The Freedom House indices of Political
Rights and Civil Liberties as well as the Polity IV index were used to measure
the political performance. Based on these indices we identiﬁed Ghana as the
comparatively most advanced economy. While Senegal exhibits similar results to
Ghana, Uganda is clearly the least developed economy both in political as well as
in economic terms. Based on these indices we evaluated the empirical results of
the participation indicators. Given these performance indices we expected con-
siderable diﬀerences in the results of the applied participation indicators in the
cross-country comparison, especially between Uganda on the one hand and Ghana
and Senegal on the other.
The indicator of government accountability does not yield the expected re-
sults. The distribution of political control in Ghana and Senegal turns out to
be primarily determined by inﬂuential stakeholders representing the society and
donor organizations whereas the industry is comparatively less signiﬁcant in both
countries. Uganda on the other hand is characterized by a weak position of donor
organizations while both the society and the industry appear to be able to hold the
government accountable for its actions. Under the assumption that stakeholder
participation in the policy process increases government accountability and hence
leads to improved government performance this ﬁnding contradicts the theory that
biased incentives are the main reason for poor governance. The second indicator
that was expected to reveal biased incentives in political decision-making is the
indicator of government capture. In general, the observed values of government
capture are only marginal in all three countries. However, we identify a bias in
favor of the rural poor in Uganda whereas the government of Ghana appears to
be biased in favor of the urban rich.
The indicators of political ownership turns out as expected. We ﬁnd that stake-
holder participation in the policy process signiﬁcantly reduces the political conﬂict
in Ghana and Senegal whereas the level of consensus in Uganda records only a
marginal increase. Furthermore, we use diﬀerent political power ratios to approx-
imate the distribution of political knowledge in the three countries and ﬁnd signs
for evidenced-based policies in Ghana and Senegal whereas the strong position of
the industry indicates a knowledge-bias in Uganda.
To account for the often voiced criticism that empirical network studies are plagued
by high measurement errors we test our empirical results for robustness by ap-
plying an ERGM-MCMC framework. We simulate network data and applied the
participation indicators to the estimated networks. Both, the indicator of govern-
ment accountability and of political ownership seem to be a robust measure and
exhibit only minor oscillations. Moreover, the majority of the empirical values lie
within the 95% conﬁdence interval which validates the ﬁnding in the case studies.
In contrast, the measure of government capture is unstable and exhibits signiﬁcant
oscillations around the mean. Additionally, the mean of the estimated networks
is contrary to our empirical results.
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To test the theory of belief formation we apply quantitative network analysis in
the context of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. We investigate the relationship
between political communication networks and observed policy beliefs and ﬁnd
evidence for distinct communication patterns between stakeholder groups that
have been identiﬁed in the ACF. This ﬁnding further validates the theoretical
framework of the network approach.
11.2. Discussion
We developed three network-based indicators derived from micro-political theory
of which two proved to be robust. The indicator `Government Capture' requires
further elaboration. The indicator `Political Ownership' is robust, but allows more
for an assessment of the growth rate rather than for a quantiﬁcation of the extent.
For example, if we only observe a minor increase in political ownership this may
be the result of primarily two processes. Either the stakeholder group is not an
active participant in the policy process and therefore does not gain much when we
assume a consensual policy process. In contrast, a neglectable shift in ownership
might also be the result of a stakeholder group that is already very close to the
ﬁnal policy position.
In general, we conclude that our framework provides a good starting point for
future research in participation in policy processes. In particular we consider the
following issues to be worth of further investigation.
First: considering the network as a snapshot of the communication and lobbying
structure in a particular country, how does this aﬀect our results? The network
estimation proves robustness of our derived indicators of political ownership and
government accountability. Thus, we conclude that the network structure is the
factor determining the extent of the empirical results. Relationships in the politi-
cal stock exchange of support and expertise are well established and do not change
quickly. Hence, we can assume even a snapshot to cover a certain time-frame.
We also survey the relative interest in particular policy issues, the favored policy
position of an actor, the relative trust in her own expertise, and the relative im-
portance she puts on the policy position supported by the majority of potential
voters, i.e. to what extent is the decided policy position of an actor generally
oriented towards the political support of stakeholder organizations. This is par-
ticular interesting when her position diﬀers from the position supported by the
majority of voters.
This implies, that the ﬁnal position of an actor is inﬂuenced beforehand and ob-
served in the empirical network. The actual ﬁnal policy position is subject to
uncertainty and merely the result of our model. Thus, if we evaluate the validity
of the empirical results with the estimated network data, it is still subject to un-
certainty. We include the interest in a policy issue as well as the policy position
of an actor. Furthermore, we survey the trust in expertise as well as the interest
in political support. However, the ﬁrst two are theoretically the endogenous vari-
ables.
In an optimal setting we observe the establishment of a policy network.
Therefore, one issue for future research is the inclusion of a time dimension, which
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enables a direct measurement of the initial policy position, the process of political
communication and support, and the ﬁnal policy position as a result thereof. The
application of dynamic network analysis in the context of participatory policy
processes provides a starting point for interesting research. Repeated surveys in
a country in phase of legislative decision-making implies extensive eﬀort. Experi-
ments within stakeholder workshops establish a sound environment to collect the
relevant empirical data. In a controlled setting it is possible to observe the process
of communication between political actors over a relatively short time-frame, in-
cluding representatives of governmental institutions, international organizations,
and other stakeholder organizations involved in the policy process. Triggered with
information and the incentive to communicate, the policy positions of stakehold-
ers is repeatedly surveyed during the workshop. Analyzing the resulting change
in the observed communication structure and the inclusion of lobbying activities
by a computer-based political exchange game would yield valuable insights in the
processes of participatory policy making.
Another interesting issue remaining for future research is the combination of
empirical policy network analysis and economic performance. The assessment of
the interdependency of political and economic performance with explicit consid-
eration of the quantiﬁed participation patterns would allow to conclude on the
implications of participation empirically, especially in a dynamic setting.
Analyzing the quality of participatory policy making in combination with quan-
tiﬁable measures of participation provides a broad ﬁeld for future research and
enables not only the evaluation of participatory policy processes, but also to com-
pare the level of participation of one country against the other. If we are able
to observe these interdependencies over a greater period of time, ideally during
the period of a particular policy reform, we can capture a dynamic participatory
policy process that reﬂects the interrelationship between diﬀerent levels of partic-
ipation and shifting power structures. This creates new opportunities to attribute
certain policy decisions to a shift in the policy structure as a result of the estab-
lished policy networks and therewith an enabling environment for improved policy
making.
Our work contributes to this by providing a framework to quantitatively assess
participation to be build on and may spark further research on participatory policy
processes, ideally in a dynamic setting.
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Zusammenfassung
Das Konzept der Stakeholder Partizipation ist ein entscheidender Ansatz in der
Entwicklungspolitik und steht nach wie vor im Zentrum des gegenwärtigen Ent-
wicklungsdiskurses.
Unter der Annahme, dass eine aktive Teilnahme der Stakeholder an politischen
Prozessen zu einer demokratischeren und eﬀektiveren Regierungsführung beiträgt,
ist Partizipation zu einem weitverbreiteten Konzept in der Entwicklungspolitik ge-
worden. Zentrale Vorteile, die partizipativen Politikprozessen zugesprochen wer-
den, beinhalten beispielsweise
• eine erhöhte Government Accountability, d.h. eine erhöhte Rechenschafts-
pﬂicht der Regierung steigert den Anreiz für Regierungsvertreter sich für
gesellschaftliche Interessen und Bedürfnisse einzusetzen,
• eine geringere Government Capture, d.h. Anreize eigennützigen Verhaltens
seitens der Regierungsvertreter auf Kosten der allgemeinen Bevölkerung wer-
den minimiert, sowie eine
• eine Steigerung der Political Ownership, d.h. die Zivilgesellschaft und Inter-
essengemeinschaften identiﬁzieren und engagieren sich mit und für die Regie-
rungspolitik, was erheblich die politischen Implementierungskosten senken
könnte.
Darüber hinaus bietet die Inklusion relevanter Stakeholder Zugang zu Basiswis-
sen, vermag die Fähigkeit lokalen Bedürfnissen und Prioritäten zu entsprechen zu
erhöhen und erlaubt ein umfassendes Verständnis komplexer Entwicklungsprozes-
se wenn lokales Wissen mit wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen kombiniert wird.
Der relevanten Literatur nach, liegen die Vorteile politischer Partizipation in ver-
besserten Regierungsprozessen, und sind maßgeblich entscheidend für eine ein-
wandfreie wirtschaftliche und politische Leistungsfähigkeit. Versuche, Partizipati-
on zu messen und zu bewerten bleiben jedoch vage und auf einem beschreibenden
Niveau. Sich hauptsächlich auf qualitative Methoden stützend, fehlt es hier an
klaren Messinstrumenten. Obwohl Stakeholder Partizipation in der Entwicklungs-
politik kein neues Konzept ist und hoch auf der politischen Agenda verbleibt,
wurde bislang weder ein klares Konzept noch ein geeigneter Rahmen geschaﬀen,
um Partizipation quantitativ zu messen. Ein theoretischer Rahmen ist wesentlich
für das Verständnis welchen Einﬂuss zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in poli-
tischen Prozessen und Politikentscheidungen haben, um den ihr zugesprochenen
Nutzen zu erzielen. Weiterhin ist eine quantitative Messung der Stakeholder Par-
tizipation unabdingbar um zu verstehen, wie sich die Partizipation in politische
Leistung umsetzt, wessen Partizipation zu welchem Ausmaß notwendig ist, und
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könnte außerdem Aussagen darüber treﬀen, wie ein angestrebtes Ausmaß an Par-
tizipation erzielt werden kann.
Wir schlagen einen theoretischen Rahmen basierend auf der mikro-polititischen
Theorie vor, der es erlaubt, die Partizipation von Stakeholdern in politischen Ent-
scheidungsﬁndungsprozessen zu erfassen. Partizipation an politischen Prozessen
impliziert eine gewisse Macht seitens der relevanten Stakeholder Organisationen,
d.h. Einﬂuss auf eine politische Entscheidung auszuüben. Nach der Interessengrup-
pentheorie üben die Stakeholder Organisationen auf zweierlei Art ihren Einﬂuss
aus: durch klassisches Lobbying und durch die Bereitstellung von Wissen. Vor-
aussetzung für den Einﬂuss, den Interessensgruppen durch den Austausch von
Unterstützung gegen Experteninformationen ausüben können, ist der Zugang zu
politischen Entscheidungsträgern. Diese Bedingung kommt bei angewandten Netz-
werkstudien zum Tragen(Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi
et al., 1995). Wir haben in unserem theoretischen Rahmen ein Lobbying Modul
und ein Belief Formation Modul integriert, welche den Einﬂuss von Netzwerken
auf politische Entscheidungen wiederspiegeln. Auf theoretischer Ebene folgen wir
Pappi and Henning (1998) die politischen Tausch in sozialen Netzwerken erklären,
sowie Friedkin and Johnsen (1990), die ein Belief-Updating Modell und Austausch
von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken vorschlagen. Dies ermöglicht die Dar-
stellung der Einﬂussnahme von Interessengemeinschaften auf die ﬁnale Politikent-
scheidung sowie die Ableitung netzwerkbasierter Indikatoren um Partizipation am
Politikprozess zu messen.
Wir stellen vier auf der Literatur basierende Indikatoren vor, die eine Bewertung
von Government Accountability, Government Capture, Political Ownership und
politischem Wissen als Ergebnis von Stakeholder Partizipation ermöglichen.
Anhand empirischer Netzwerkdaten wenden wir den entwickelten Ansatz an den
Fallbeispielen von Ghana, Senegal und Uganda an. Die empirischen Daten wurden
in den drei Ländern im Jahr 2012/2013 im Rahmen einer Elitebefragung erhoben.
Der CAADP Reformprozess stellt ein geeignetes Beispiel dar, um die entwickelten
netzwerkbasierten Partizipationsindikatoren anzuwenden. Die Einbindung lokaler
Stakeholder Organisationen in die Planung, Formulierung und Evaluierung sek-
torspeziﬁscher Wachstumspolitiken ist ein Kernziel von CAADP und bereitet den
Hintergrund der quantitativen Bewertung von Stakeholder Partizipation in Sub-
Sahara Afrika.
Um die Stakeholder Partizipation in diesen Ländern zu untersuchen sind wir in
drei Schritten vorgegangen: Zuerst führen wir eine deskriptiven Analyse der Netz-
werkstrukturen in Ghana, Senegal und Uganda durch. Anhand einer Blockmodel
Analyse werden die politischen Netzwerke auf strukturelle Äquivalenz zwischen
den verschieden Stakeholder Organisation untersucht und Akteure identiﬁziert,
die zentrale Positionen in den entsprechenden Netzwerken besetzen. Um die Aus-
wirkungen von politischen Einﬂussstrukturen auf politische Performanz zu be-
werten, werden Netzwerkindikatoren aus dem politischen Kommunikations- und
Lobbyingnetzwerk abgleitet, die das Kernstück des politischen Einﬂussmodells
darstellen. Die Verbindung von legislativer Entscheidungsgewalt mit den entspre-
chenden Multiplikatoren ermöglicht die Ableitung von Einﬂussmaßen individueller
Organisationen. Anschließend werden die darauf aufbauenden Partizipationsindi-
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katoren empirisch angewendet.
In dem zweiten Schritt wird in einer komparativen Analyse ein ausführlicher
Überblick über die politischen Kommunikations- und Lobbying-Strukturen, das
Ausmaß politischer Partizipation, sowie der politische Einﬂuss in dem CAADP
Reformprozess der einzelnen Länder gegeben. Die Ergebnisse der Partizipations-
indikatoren werden mit der entsprechenden Regierungsleistung in einer Cross-
Country Analyse verbunden, um eine Aussage über deren Zusammenhang treﬀen
zu können. Anschließend werden die Ergebnisse der Partizipationsindikatoren auf
Fehlerrobustheit getestet.
In dem dritten Schritt wird die dem Netzwerkansatz zugrundeliegende Theorie
von Belief Formation getestet. Die Verbindung des theoretischen Belief Formation
Moduls mit den im Kontext eines Advocacy Coalition Framework beobachteten
Beliefs ermöglicht eine Aussage über die Gültigkeit der Annahme, dass Belief
Formation in Kommunikationsnetzwerken stattﬁndet. Entsprechend unseren Er-
gebnissen stellen Regierungsinstitutionen die einﬂussreichsten Teilnehmer an dem
Politikprozessen in allen drei Ländern dar. Insbesondere die Landwirtschaftsminis-
terien werden als Hauptakteure identiﬁziert, wobei das Ausmaß ihrer Bedeutung
jedoch deutlich schwankt. MOFA ist der zentrale Akteur in dem politischen Kom-
munikationsprozess in Ghana und bildet zusammen mit anderen zentralen Regie-
rungsinstitutionen (darunter auch das Finanzministerium) den politischen Kern
des Lobbyingnetzwerkes. Dieser ist hauptsächlich in dem Austausch von politi-
scher Unterstützung mit Gebergesellschaften und dem nationalen Forschungsin-
stitut ISSER tätig. Im Gegensatz zu Ghana wird die politische Kommunikation in
dem Senegal und in Uganda von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen bestimmt,
die auch in dem Lobbyingnetzwerk von zentraler Bedeutung sind. Unter ihnen
beﬁnden sich sich die Forschungsinstitute ISRA und ITA, die Gebergesellschaft
USAID sowie die supranationale Organisation CEDEAO im Senegal. In Uganda
besetzen das NARO, das Finanzministerium, sowie die zwei Interessengruppen
UNFFE und PSFU die zentralen Positionen in dem Politiknetzwerk.
Diese Netzwerkstrukturen spiegeln sich auch in der Streuung des politischen Ein-
ﬂusses wieder. Wir unterscheiden zwischen politischem Einﬂuss durch Bereitstel-
lung von Expertenwissen (Informationseinﬂuss) und durch politische Unterstüt-
zung (Lobbyingeinﬂuss). Die Verteilung des Informations- und Lobbyingeinﬂusses
ist bedingt durch die institutionelle Zugehörigkeit der Organisationen. So sind bei-
spielsweise Forschungseinrichtungen eher durch die Bereitstellung von Expertenin-
formationen, d.h. durch Informationseinﬂuss, gekennzeichnet, wohingegen Geber-
gesellschaften tendenziell durch Lobbyingaktivitäten an Einﬂuss gewinnen. Dies
triﬀt insbesondere auf Ghana zu. Interessanterweise erringen Gebergesellschaften
im Senegal eher einen Einﬂuss durch Informationsbereitstellung wohingegen sie
in Uganda keinen signiﬁkanten Einﬂuss verzeichnen. Dies ist insbesondere auf
die Netzwerkstruktur in Uganda zurückzuführen, in dem die Mehrheit der Geber
keinen direkten Zugang zu dem Landwirtschaftsministerium aufweist. Die Kom-
bination aus Informations- und Lobbyingeinﬂuss ergibt den totalen Einﬂuss ei-
ner Organisation. Gemessen am totalen Einﬂuss ist die Exekutive in allen drei
Ländern am einﬂussreichsten. Jedoch ﬁnden wir in Uganda eine eher gemäßigte
Streuung des totalen politischen Einﬂusses, wohingegen Senegal und insbesondere
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Ghana von einer extrem einﬂussreichen Exekutive gekennzeichnet sind. Geberge-
sellschaften und Forschungseinrichtungen verzeichnen ein ähnliches Einﬂussniveau
in Ghana, wohingegen Forschungseinrichtungen in dem Senegal deutlich einﬂuss-
reicher sind. Die Streuung des politischen Einﬂusses ist in Uganda deutlich weniger
stark ausgeprägt. Die Exekutive hält lediglich halb so viel Einﬂuss verglichen mit
Ghana und Uganda und ist auf einem Level mit dem Agrarsektor.
Die empirische Anwendung der entwickelten Partizipationsindikatoren auf Län-
derebene ergibt gemischte Ergebnisse und gewinnt erst an Relevanz in der kom-
parativen Analyse vor dem Hintergrund der Regierungsleistung in den entspre-
chenden Ländern.
Regierungsleistung ist generell schwierig zu erfassen. Daher greifen wir auf rele-
vante ökonomische und politische Indizes zurück, um die Regierungsleistung zu
approximieren. Die verwendeten ökonomischen Indizes beinhalten das Bruttona-
tionaleinkommen sowie die Armutslinie. Die Freedomhouse Indizes für Politische
Rechte und Zivile Freiheit sowie der Polity IV Index repräsentieren die politische
Performanz. Auf Basis dieser Indizes identiﬁzieren wir Ghana als das fortschritt-
lichste und Uganda als das am schlechtesten entwickelte Land in unserer Analyse.
Anhand dieser Einschätzung ist eine vergleichende Bewertung der durch die In-
dikatoren identiﬁzierten Partizipation möglich. Aufgrund der Regierungsfürung
erwarten wir deutliche Unterschiede in der Cross-Country Analyse, insbesondere
zwischen Uganda und Ghana.
Die Accountability-Indikatoren erzielen nicht die erwarteten Resultate. Die Vertei-
lung der politischen Kontrolle in Ghana und Senegal ist primär von einﬂussreichen
Repräsentanten der Zivilgesellschaft und der Gebergesellschaften gekennzeichnet.
Die Industrie ist vergleichsweise von geringer Bedeutung. Uganda hingegen ist
durch eine schwache Position der Gebergesellschaften geprägt, wohingegen die Zi-
vilgesellschaft und die Industrie in der Lage sind die Regierung für ihr Handeln
zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Government Capture ist der zweite Indikator von
dem wir erwarten verzerrte Anreize in der politischen Entscheidungsﬁndung auf-
zudecken. Jedoch sind die beobachteten Werte nur marginal für alle Länder. Wir
ﬁnden eine Verzerrung zugunsten der armen ländlichen Bevölkerung in Uganda
wohingegen die Regierung in Ghana von der reichen urbanen Bevölkerung gecaptu-
red wird. Unter der Annahme, dass die politische Partizipation von Stakeholdern
Government Accountability zu erhöhen vermag und dadurch zu einer besseren
Regierungsführung führt, widersprechen die Ergebnisse der Theorie, dass die An-
reizproblematik der Hauptgrund für schlechte Regerungsführung ist.
Der Indikator für Political Ownership erzielt die erwarteten Resultate. Stakeholder
Partizipation führt zu einem beträchtlichen Rückgang des politischen Konﬂikts in
Ghana und Senegal, wohingegen die Teilnahme am politischen Prozess in Uganda
nur zu einem geringen Anstieg des politischen Konsensus führt.
Wir verwenden verschiedene politische Machtverhältnisse, um die Verteilung von
politischem Wissen in den drei Ländern zu approximieren und ﬁnden Hinweise
für eine evidenzbasierte Politik in Ghana und Senegal. Die starke Position der
Industrie in Uganda zeugt hingegen von einer Wissensverzerrung der Politik.
Um die oft geäußerte Kritik zu berücksichtigen, dass empirische Netzwerkstudien
häuﬁg von hohen Messfehlern betroﬀen sind, werden die Ergebnisse auf Fehler-
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robustheit getestet. Anhand eines ERGM-MCMC Ansatzes werden Netzwerke
simuliert und die Partizipationsindikatoren angewendet. Sowohl der Indikator für
Government Accountability sowie der Indikator für Political Ownership sind ro-
buste Kennzahlen und verzeichnen nur geringe Schwankungen. Zudem liegt die
Mehrheit der empirischen Werte in dem 95% Konﬁdenzintervall, was die Ergeb-
nisse aus den Fallstudien validiert. Der Indikator für Government Capture ist
instabil und weist starke Schwankungen um den Mittelwert auf und ist überdies
gegensätzlich zu den empirischen Ergebnissen.
Um die Theorie der Belief Formation zu testen, wird quantitative Netzwerkanalyse
im Kontext des Advocacy Coalition Framework angewendet. Die Resultate der Un-
tersuchung von politischen Kommunikationsnetzwerken und beobachteten Beliefs
weisen auf ausgeprägte Kommunikationsmuster unter den im ACF identiﬁzierten
Stakeholdergruppen hin. Dieses Ergebnis validiert zusätzlich den theoretischen
Rahmen des Netzwerkansatzes.
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Appendix A.
Graphs and Tables
A.1. Ghana
Table A.1.: Most inﬂuential Actors (Ghana)
ID Org Group IC
10103 MOFA EXEC 1
10405 USAID DONOR 0.96
10407 WB DONOR 0.88
10402 CIDA DONOR 0.84
10410 IFAD DONOR 0.84
10124 GIDA PUBAG 0.8
10131 NDPC EXEC 0.8
10123 COCOBOD PUBAG 0.76
10401 GiZ (GTZ) DONOR 0.76
10505 AGRA iNGO 0.76
Table A.2.: Indegree centrality: Reputation (Ghana)
Group IC Number
EXEC 0.71 6
PUBAG 0.69 5
LEG 0.50 2
DONOR 0.79 7
iNGO 0.58 5
RESEARCH 0.54 7
IG:AGIND 0.42 4
IG:PROD 0.62 4
IG:NONAGRAR 0.45 3
CSO 0.53 3
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Table A.3.: Overview: Actors (Ghana)
Acronym Orgname Orgtype
MOFA Ministry of Food & Agriculture EXEC
MLNR Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources EXEC
MEST Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology EXEC
MOTI Ministry of Trade and Industry EXEC
MOFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning EXEC
EPA Environmental Protection Agency PUB
COCOBOD Ghana Cocoa Board PUB
GIDA Ghana Irrigation Development Authority PUB
NDPC National Development Planning Commission EXEC
LCG Lands Commission Ghana PUB
FiCG Fisheries Commission Ghana PUB
NDC New Democratic Congress LEG
NPP New Patriotic Party LEG
GiZ (GTZ) Deutsche Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH DON
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency DON
AFD Agence Française de Développement DON
USAID U. S. Agency for International Development DON
WB The World Bank DON
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations DON
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development DON
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa iNGO
ACDI/VOCA ACDI/VOCA iNGO
TS TechnoServe iNGO
CRIG Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana RES
ISSER Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, RES
University of Ghana
STEPRI Science and Technology Policy Research Institute RES
UG College of Agriculture and Consumer Science University Ghana RES
FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa RES
IWMI International Water Managment Institute RES
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute RES
GAIDA Ghana Agriculture Input Dealers Association AG
GAABIC Ghana Agricultural Associations Business Information Centre AG
WGL Wienco Ghana Limited AG
FAGE Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters AG
FoodSPAN Food Security Policy Advocacy Network CSO
GNAFF Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen PROD
GNAPF Ghana National Association of Poultry Farmers PROD
PFAG Peasant Farmers Association of Ghana PROD
APFOG Apex Farmers Organization of Ghana PROD
EPAG Environmental Protection Association of Ghana CSO
AGI The Association of Ghana Industries NA
PEF The Private Enterprise Foundation NA
GEA Ghana Employers' Association NA
GAWU General Agricultural Workers' Union CSO
ADRA The Adventist Development and Relief Agency iNGO
CRS Catholic Relief Services iNGO
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Table A.4.: Degree Centrality: Actors (Ghana)
Acronym Orgtype Reputation Communication Support
IC ′D IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B
MOFA EXEC 1.00 0.82 0.84 0.02 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.75 0.50
MLNR EXEC 0.52 0.27 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.53 0.00
MEST EXEC 0.52 0.31 0.33 0.01 0.03 0.42 0.38 0.66 0.08
MOTI EXEC 0.72 0.22 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.29 0.27 0.60 0.04
MOFEP EXEC 0.72 0.38 0.29 0.01 0.09 0.31 0.29 0.61 0.09
EPA PUB 0.60 0.18 0.27 0.01 0.06 0.33 0.36 0.65 0.08
COCOBOD PUB 0.76 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.48 0.00
GIDA PUB 0.80 0.24 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.29 0.60 0.04
NDPC EXEC 0.80 0.20 0.36 0.01 0.03 0.40 0.4 0.66 0.09
LCG PUB 0.56 0.27 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.53 0.01
FiCG PUB 0.72 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.13 0.51 0.00
NDC LEG 0.48 0.40 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.43 0.00
NPP LEG 0.52 0.40 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.46 0.00
GiZ (GTZ) DON 0.76 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.38 0.66 0.07
CIDA DON 0.84 0.38 0.31 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.31 0.62 0.03
AFD DON 0.60 0.22 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.29 0.61 0.02
USAID DON 0.96 0.31 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.42 0.49 0.72 0.08
WB DON 0.88 0.42 0.38 0.01 0.07 0.40 0.44 0.69 0.08
FAO DON 0.68 0.33 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.49 0.71 0.07
IFAD DON 0.84 0.13 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.36 0.64 0.03
AGRA iNGO 0.76 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.02 0.42 0.00
ACDI/VOCA iNGO 0.44 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.58 0.01
TS iNGO 0.56 0.38 0.31 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.18 0.55 0.02
CRIG RES 0.68 0.18 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.24 0.57 0.02
ISSER RES 0.76 0.20 0.44 0.01 0.05 0.44 0.51 0.73 0.22
STEPRI RES 0.40 0.16 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.16 0.54 0.01
UG RES 0 0.07 0.02 0.01 0 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.00
FARA RES 0.56 0.11 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.51 0.01
IWMI RES 0.60 0.20 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.55 0.01
IFPRI RES 0.76 0.36 0.42 0.01 0.12 0.29 0.04 0.45 0.01
GAIDA AG 0.72 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.16 0.51 0.02
GAABIC AG 0.24 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.42 0.00
WGL AG 0.72 0.27 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.61 0.03
FAGE AG 0 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 0
FoodSPAN CSO 0.48 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.55 0.01
GNAFF PROD 0.72 0.24 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.42 0
GNAPF PROD 0.76 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.00 0 0.16 0.56 0
PFAG PROD 0.52 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.54 0.02
APFOG PROD 0.48 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.42 0.00
EPAG CSO 0.48 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.61 0.01
AGI NA 0.44 0.18 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.2 0.56 0.05
PEF NA 0.64 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.07 0.46 0.01
GEA NA 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.52 0.00
GAWU CSO 0.64 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.46 0.01
ADRA iNGO 0.52 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.29 0.61 0.07
CRS iNGO 0.64 0.02 0 0 0 0.22 0.04 0.43 0.00
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Table A.5.: Block- and Clustermembership (Ghana)
ID Acronym Orgtype Expert Support Cluster
10103 MOFA EXEC 1 1 1
10104 MLNR EXEC 2 2 1
10105 MEST EXEC 2 3 1
10108 MOTI EXEC 3 1 2
10109 MOFEP EXEC 2 1 2
10122 EPA PUBAG 2 4 3
10123 COCOBOD PUBAG 3 5 1
10124 GIDA PUBAG 4 1 1
10131 NDPC EXEC 2 1 2
10132 LCG PUBAG 2 2 1
10134 FiCG PUBAG 3 2 1
10202 NDC LEG 5 5 1
10203 NPP LEG 5 5 1
10401 GiZ (GTZ) DONOR 4 1 1
10402 CIDA DONOR 4 3 1
10404 AFD DONOR 4 4 1
10405 USAID DONOR 4 3 1
10407 WB DONOR 4 3 1
10408 FAO DONOR 4 3 1
10410 IFAD DONOR 3 3 1
10505 AGRA iNGO 3 5 1
10506 ACDI/VOCA iNGO 3 4 1
10509 TS iNGO 5 4 1
10601 CRIG RESEARCH 3 2 1
10604 ISSER RESEARCH 3 6 1
10607 STEPRI RESEARCH 5 5 1
10610 UG RESEARCH 3 5 4
10611 FARA RESEARCH 5 5 4
10612 IWMI RESEARCH 4 4 1
10613 IFPRI RESEARCH 5 5 1
10702 GAIDA IG:AGIND 3 5 5
10703 GAABIC IG:AGIND 3 5 5
10710 WGL IG:AGIND 3 2 1
10712 FAGE IG:AGIND 3 5 2
10802 FoodSPAN CSO 3 5 1
10804 GNAFF IG:PROD 3 5 1
10805 GNAPF IG:PROD 3 5 1
10807 PFAG IG:PROD 5 5 1
10809 APFOG IG:PROD 3 5 5
10901 EPAG CSO 3 2 3
11001 AGI IG:NONAGRAR 2 5 2
11003 PEF IG:NONAGRAR 2 5 2
11005 GEA IG:NONAGRAR 3 5 2
11102 GAWU CSO 6 5 1
11204 ADRA iNGO 3 4 1
11208 CRS iNGO 3 5 6
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Figure A.1.: Total Inﬂuence - Actor (Ghana)
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A.2. Senegal
Table A.7.: Most inﬂuential Actors (Senegal)
DI Org Group IC
10109 MEF EXEC 0.93
10103 MAER EXEC 0.91
10311 CEDEAO SUPRA 0.91
10507 ISRA RESEARCH 0.91
10313 UEMOA SUPRA 0.89
10413 UE DONOR 0.89
10129 SAED PUBAG 0.86
10704 CNCR IG:PROD 0.86
10101 Pres EXEC 0.84
10404 BAD DONOR 0.84
Table A.8.: Indegree centrality: Reputation (Senegal)
Group IC Number
EXEC 0.77 7
PUBAG 0.70 5
LEG 0.43 1
SUPRA 0.90 2
DONOR 0.81 7
iNGO 0.59 2
RESEARCH 0.67 10
IG:AGIND 0.67 6
IG:PROD 0.68 2
CSO 0.60 4
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Figure A.2.: Total Inﬂuence - Actor (Senegal)
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Table A.9.: Overview: Actors (Senegal)
Acronym Orgname Orgtype
Pres Président de la Republique EXEC
PM Premier Ministre EXEC
MAER Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'equipement rural EXEC
MINEL Ministère de l'élevage EXEC
MPEM Ministère de la pêche et des aﬀaires maritimes EXEC
MEF Ministère de l'economie et des ﬁnances EXEC
MTA Ministère du commerce, de l'industrie et du secteur informel EXEC
ANCAR Agence nationale de conseil agricole et rural PUB
ASEPEX Agence sénégalaise de promotion des exportations PUB
CSA Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire PUB
FNRAA Fonds national de recherches agricoles et agroalimentaires PUB
SAED Société d'aménagement et d'exploitation des terres du delta, PUB
de la moyenne vallée et de la falémé
Assemblee Nationale Commission du développement et de l'aménagement du territoire LEG
CEDEAO Communauté économique des états de l'afrique de l'ouest SUPR
UEMOA Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine SUPR
ACDI Agence canadienne pour le developpement international DON
AFD Agence Fran³aise de developpement DON
BAD Banque africaine de developpement DON
BM Banque Mondiale DON
FIDA Fonds international pour le developpement agricole DON
UE Union européenne DON
USAID United States agency for international development DON
ENDA Diapol Enda tiers monde iNGO
OXFAM GB Oxfam iNGO
CRES Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale RES
ENSA Ecole nationale supérieure d'agronomie RES
IPAR Initiative prospective agriculture rurale RES
ITA Institut de technologie alimentaire RES
INP Institut national de pédologie RES
ISRA Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles RES
UCAD Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar RES
UGB Université Gaston Berger RES
CORAF Conseil ouest et centre africain pour la recherche RES
et le développement agricoles
IFPRI International food policy research institute RES
CNIA Comité national interprofessionnel pour l'arachide AG
FENAFILS Fédération nationale des acteurs de la ﬁlère lait AG
ONAPES-SEPAS Organisation nationale des producteurs exportateurs AG
de fruits et légumes du Sénégal
UNIS Union nationale interprofessionnelle des semences AG
GDS Grands domaines du Sénégal AG
SODEFITEX Société de développement et des ﬁbres textiles AG
CNCR Conseil national de concertation et de coopération des ruraux PROD
RESOPP Réseau des organisations paysannes et pastorales du Sénégal PROD
CONGAD Conseil des organisations non gouvernementales CSO
d'appui au développement
FONGS Fédération des organisations non gouvernementales du Sénégal CSO
UNCS Union nationale des consommateurs du Sénégal CSO
CNTS/SNTPA Confédération nationale des travailleurs du Sénégal CSO
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Table A.10.: Degree Centrality: Actors (Senegal)
Acronym Orgtype Reputation Communication Support
IC ′D IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B
Pres EXEC 0.84 0.36 0.31 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.54 0.06
PM EXEC 0.68 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.36 0.65 0.12
MAER EXEC 0.91 0.58 0.56 0.02 0.23 0.07 0.4 0.67 0.04
MINEL EXEC 0.70 0.51 0.38 0.01 0.07 0.36 0.33 0.63 0.12
MPEM EXEC 0.68 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.39 0
MEF EXEC 0.93 0.36 0.38 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.41 0.00
MTA EXEC 0.68 0.31 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.2 0.13 0.51 0.03
ANCAR PUB 0.77 0.51 0.31 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.2 0.57 0.05
ASEPEX PUB 0.64 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.50 0.01
CSA PUB 0.55 0.04 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.46 0.00
FNRAA PUB 0.70 0.33 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.33 0.63 0.04
SAED PUB 0.86 0.40 0.33 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.45 0.01
Assemblee Nationale LEG 0.43 0.36 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.53 0.00
CEDEAO SUPR 0.91 0.29 0.33 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.2 0.54 0.10
UEMOA SUPR 0.89 0.24 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.46 0.01
ACDI DON 0.68 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.52 0.01
AFD DON 0.75 0.38 0.53 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.47 0.05
BAD DON 0.84 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.16 0.09 0.47 0.01
BM DON 0.84 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.27 0.60 0.05
FIDA DON 0.80 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.16 0.54 0.05
UE DON 0.89 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.16 0.50 0.04
USAID DON 0.84 0.49 0.44 0.01 0.06 0.49 0.51 0.73 0.37
ENDA Diapol iNGO 0.70 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.51 0.01
OXFAM GB iNGO 0.48 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.41 0.01
CRES RES 0.55 0.13 0.40 0.01 0.01 0 0.04 0.42 0
ENSA RES 0.66 0.22 0.33 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.57 0.01
IPAR RES 0.57 0.27 0.44 0.01 0.04 0.24 0.13 0.49 0.06
ITA RES 0.82 0.56 0.53 0.02 0.12 0.27 0.33 0.63 0.09
INP RES 0.57 0.20 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.44 0.00
ISRA RES 0.91 0.67 0.78 0.02 0.25 0.56 0.4 0.67 0.43
UCAD RES 0.59 0.20 0.53 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.44 0.01
UGB RES 0.64 0.33 0.51 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.35 0.00
CORAF RES 0.70 0.24 0.51 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.40 0
IFPRI RES 0.68 0.20 0.56 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.51 0.03
CNIA AG 0.75 0.29 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.07 0.42 0.01
FENAFILS AG 0.59 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.52 0.01
ONAPES-SEPAS AG 0.73 0.33 0.22 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.53 0.03
UNIS AG 0.70 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.24 0.59 0.05
GDS AG 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.32 0.00
SODEFITEX AG 0.84 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.16 0 0 0
CNCR PROD 0.86 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.50 0.03
RESOPP PROD 0.50 0.07 0.07 0.01 0 0.07 0.07 0.47 0.01
CONGAD CSO 0.75 0.44 0.40 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.31 0.63 0.10
FONGS CSO 0.77 0.47 0.49 0.01 0.08 0.29 0.24 0.59 0.10
UNCS CSO 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
CNTS/SNTPA CSO 0.55 0.29 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.44 0.02
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Table A.11.: Block- and Clustermembership (Ghana)
ID Acronym Orgtype Expert Support Cluster
10101 Pres EXEC 1 1 1
10102 PM EXEC 1 1 1
10103 MAER EXEC 2 2 2
10104 MINEL EXEC 3 1 2
10107 MPEM EXEC 1 3 3
10109 MEF EXEC 3 3 1
10111 MTA EXEC 1 3 2
10123 ANCAR PUBAG 4 3 2
10126 ASEPEX PUBAG 1 3 2
10127 CSA PUBAG 1 3 4
10128 FNRAA PUBAG 4 3 2
10129 SAED PUBAG 4 3 2
10212 Assemblee Nationale LEG 4 1 3
10311 CEDEAO SUPRA 3 1 1
10313 UEMOA SUPRA 1 1 1
10401 ACDI DONOR 1 3 4
10403 AFD DONOR 3 3 1
10404 BAD DONOR 1 3 1
10406 BM DONOR 1 3 2
10412 FIDA DONOR 1 1 1
10413 UE DONOR 1 1 2
10414 USAID DONOR 3 4 2
10423 ENDA Diapol iNGO 1 5 1
10424 OXFAM GB iNGO 1 5 1
10502 CRES RESEARCH 4 3 1
10503 ENSA RESEARCH 4 3 3
10504 IPAR RESEARCH 5 5 1
10505 ITA RESEARCH 6 2 2
10506 INP RESEARCH 4 3 3
10507 ISRA RESEARCH 6 6 2
10508 UCAD RESEARCH 4 3 3
10509 UGB RESEARCH 4 3 3
10512 CORAF RESEARCH 5 3 1
10515 IFPRI RESEARCH 4 3 2
10604 CNIA IG:AGIND 1 3 3
10605 FENAFILS IG:AGIND 1 3 3
10608 ONAPES-SEPAS IG:AGIND 4 3 3
10610 UNIS IG:AGIND 1 2 4
10622 GDS IG:AGIND 4 3 3
10624 SODEFITEX IG:AGIND 1 3 2
10704 CNCR IG:PROD 1 5 3
10709 RESOPP IG:PROD 1 3 5
10902 CONGAD CSO 5 5 2
10903 FONGS CSO 5 3 2
10913 UNCS CSO 1 3 6
10921 CNTS/SNTPA CSO 4 3 3
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A.3. Uganda
Table A.13.: Most inﬂuential Actors (Uganda)
ID Org Group IC
10104 MAAIF EXEC 0.97
10125 NARO PUBAG 0.93
10106 MFPED EXEC 0.9
10811 UNFFE IG:PROD 0.9
10406 FAO DONOR 0.87
10407 IFAD DONOR 0.87
10411 WB DONOR 0.87
10605 EPRC RESEARCH 0.87
11002 PSFU IG:NONAGRAR 0.83
10134 UCDA PUBAG 0.8
Table A.14.: Indegree centrality: Reputation (Uganda)
Group IC Number
EXEC 0.70 7
PUBAG 0.74 6
LEG 0.46 2
DONOR 0.82 6
iNGO 0.39 3
RESEARCH 0.62 5
IG:AGIND 0.55 8
IG:PROD 0.79 3
IG:NONAGRAR 0.75 2
CSO 0.43 1
175
Appendix A. Graphs and Tables
Figure A.3.: Total Inﬂuence - Actor (Uganda)
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Table A.15.: Overview: Actors (Uganda)
Acronym Orgname Orgtype
MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries EXEC
MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development EXEC
MoLG Ministry of Local Government EXEC
MTTI Ministry of Trade and Tourism Industry EXEC
MWE Ministry of Water and Environment EXEC
CDO Cotton Development Organisation PUB
DDA Dairy Development Authority PUB
NARO National Agricultural Research Organisation / System PUB
NEMA National Environment Management Authority PUB
NPA National Planning Authority PUB
OP Oﬃce of the President EXEC
OPM Oﬃce of the Prime Minister EXEC
UCDA Uganda Coﬀee Development Authority PUB
FDC Forum for Democratic Change LEG
NRM National Resistance Movement LEG
EU European Union DON
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization DON
IFAD International Fund for Agriculture DON
JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency DON
USAID United States Agency for International Development DON
WB World Bank DON
SG Sasakawa Global 2000 iNGO
SEATINI Strengthening Africa in World Trade iNGO
TS Techno Serve iNGO
ACODE Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment RES
AFRISA African Institute for Strategic Animal Resources Development RES
COAES College of Agriculture and Environmental Sciences, Makerere University RES
EPRC Economic Policy Research Center RES
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute RES
NUCAFE National Union of Coﬀee Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises AG
UCTF Uganda Coﬀee Trade Federation AG
UFPEA Uganda Fish processors and Exporters Association AG
UNADA Uganda National Agro-Input Dealers Association AG
UNDTA Uganda National Dairy Traders Association AG
UOSPPA Uganda Oil Seed Producers and Processors Association AG
USTA Uganda Seed Traders' Association AG
UTA Uganda Tea Association AG
NOGAMU National Organic Agricultural Movement of Uganda PROD
UCA Uganda Cooperative Alliance PROD
UNFFE Uganda National Farmers' Federation PROD
EAU Environmental Alert Uganda CSO
PSFU Private Sector Foundation Uganda NA
UMA Uganda Manufacturers Association NA
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Table A.16.: Degree Centrality: Actors (Uganda)
Acronym Orgtype Reputation Communication Support
IC ′D IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B IC
′
D OC
′
D C
′
C C
′
B
MAAIF EXEC 0.97 0.45 0.40 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.48 0.74 0.16
MFPED EXEC 0.90 0.60 0.69 0.02 0.38 0.86 0.52 0.75 0.51
MoLG EXEC 0.50 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.58 0.03
MTTI EXEC 0.63 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.00
MWE EXEC 0.77 0.21 0.45 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.31 0.63 0.03
CDO PUB 0.77 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.51 0.00
DDA PUB 0.77 0.26 0.19 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.52 0.05
NARO PUB 0.93 0.62 0.62 0.02 0.26 0.48 0.43 0.70 0.16
NEMA PUB 0.43 0.17 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.54 0.01
NPA PUB 0.77 0.33 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.31 0.65 0.00
OP EXEC 0.50 0.19 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.39 0.00
OPM EXEC 0.60 0.36 0.21 0.01 0.03 0.33 0.02 0.43 0.00
UCDA PUB 0.80 0.21 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.31 0.64 0.04
FDC LEG 0.43 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.56 0.00
NRM LEG 0.50 0.57 0.36 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.51 0.00
EU DON 0.80 0.48 0.33 0.01 0.05 0.55 0.31 0.65 0.07
FAO DON 0.87 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.62 0.03
IFAD DON 0.87 0.29 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.07 0.47 0.01
JICA DON 0.77 0.26 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.45 0.00
USAID DON 0.73 0.38 0.19 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.33 0.65 0.05
WB DON 0.87 0.29 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.43 0.00
SG iNGO 0.57 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.62 0.08
SEATINI iNGO 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.56 0.01
TS iNGO 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.19 0.58 0.06
ACODE RES 0.53 0.02 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.65 0.03
AFRISA RES 0.37 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.45 0.00
COAES RES 0.60 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.44 0.00
EPRC RES 0.87 0.05 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.43 0.00
IFPRI RES 0.73 0.05 0.52 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.33 0.66 0.08
NUCAFE AG 0.60 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.61 0.02
UCTF AG 0.63 0.21 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.61 0.01
UFPEA AG 0.63 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.33 0.66 0.06
UNADA AG 0.57 0.21 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.29 0.63 0.01
UNDTA AG 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.35 0.00
UOSPPA AG 0.57 0.26 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.31 0.65 0.01
USTA AG 0.50 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.26 0.62 0.02
UTA AG 0.50 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.54 0.00
NOGAMU PROD 0.73 0.31 0.29 0.01 0.05 0.33 0.48 0.73 0.08
UCA PROD 0.73 0.36 0.31 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.40 0.70 0.08
UNFFE PROD 0.90 0.50 0.52 0.02 0.18 0.48 0.48 0.73 0.17
EAU CSO 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.48 0.00
PSFU NA 0.83 0.40 0.48 0.02 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.14
UMA NA 0.67 0.36 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.29 0.31 0.65 0.04
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Table A.17.: Block- and Clustermembership (Uganda)
ID Acronym Orgtype Expert Support Cluster
10104 MAAIF EXEC 1 1 1
10106 MFPED EXEC 2 2 1
10108 MoLG EXEC 3 3 2
10110 MTTI EXEC 3 3 1
10111 MWE EXEC 1 3 2
10122 CDO PUBAG 3 3 2
10123 DDA PUBAG 3 3 1
10125 NARO PUBAG 2 2 1
10126 NEMA PUBAG 1 3 3
10128 NPA PUBAG 4 3 1
10129 OP EXEC 3 3 1
10130 OPM EXEC 1 3 1
10134 UCDA PUBAG 3 3 3
10203 FDC LEG 3 3 2
10205 NRM LEG 1 3 1
10405 EU DONOR 4 4 1
10406 FAO DONOR 3 5 3
10407 IFAD DONOR 4 3 1
10408 JICA DONOR 4 3 1
10410 USAID DONOR 4 4 1
10411 WB DONOR 4 3 1
10504 SG iNGO 5 5 4
10505 SEATINI iNGO 5 1 3
10506 TS iNGO 5 3 1
10601 ACODE RESEARCH 5 6 5
10602 AFRISA RESEARCH 5 3 4
10603 COAES RESEARCH 5 3 4
10605 EPRC RESEARCH 5 3 6
10621 IFPRI RESEARCH 5 4 6
10702 NUCAFE IG:AGIND 5 3 3
10705 UCTF IG:AGIND 5 4 3
10707 UFPEA IG:AGIND 3 1 1
10710 UNADA IG:AGIND 5 3 1
10711 UNDTA IG:AGIND 5 3 2
10712 UOSPPA IG:AGIND 5 5 1
10713 USTA IG:AGIND 5 5 3
10714 UTA IG:AGIND 3 3 3
10803 NOGAMU IG:PROD 5 1 1
10806 UCA IG:PROD 4 1 1
10811 UNFFE IG:PROD 6 6 5
10904 EAU CSO 3 3 1
11002 PSFU IG:NONAGRAR 6 6 1
11004 UMA IG:NONAGRAR 3 1 1
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Table A.19.: Model Terms
Ghana Senegal Uganda
Expert Support Expert Support Expert Support
EDGES
network densitya 0.2261 0.2145 0.2812 0.1585 0.2542 0.2259
POLSIM
mean simil.e 0.4329 0.3482 0.6126
(0.1161) (0.1109) (0.1422)
PREFSIM
mean simil.e 0.2362 0.2496 0.2591
(0.1152) (0.1105) (0.1409)
MEMBER
network densitya 0.0821 0.1623 0.0587
mean membere 0.93 2.54 1.05
(0.68) (2.54) (1.45)
MUTUAL
reciprocityb 0.3868 0.3604 0.3591 0.3171 0.3399 0.3137
GWESP & GWDSP
transitivityd 0.4391 0.3847 0.5064 0.3799 0.4796 0.4576
EXPERT & SUPPORT
mean degreec 20.35 19.30 25.30 14.26 21.35 18.98
(11.79) (12.02) (13.40) (9.95) (11.74) (12.24)
POWER
mean reputatione 0.3391 0.6899 0.4668
(0.1157) (0.1444) (0.1291)
EXEC
mean i.degreeg 17.33 16.33 13 7.711 13.57 11
(10.33) (6.74) (7.42) (5.77) (8.83) (11.82)
DONOR
mean o.degreef 13.29 17.71 11.43 9.14 12.50 7.33
(4.39) (3.68) (6.27) (6.62) (5.36) (5.96)
RESEARCH
mean o.degreef 8.14 8.86 13.60 6.60 2.80 6.60
(4.10) (7.01) (7.78) (5.89) (1.64) (6.35)
IG
share IG:IG h 0.2532 0.2033 0.1748 0.1754 0.2707 0.3277
Note:
a share of directed ties among all possible n2 − n ties
b share of reciprocal ties
c mean degree (standard deviation)
d clustering coeﬃcient, see Wasserman and Faust (1994)
e mean value (standard deviation)
f mean out degree (standard deviation)
g mean in degree (standard deviation)
h share of homophilic ties among all IG ties
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A.4. Policy Belies and Networks - A Tale of Two or Many
Worlds?
A.4.1. Network Structure
Figure A.4.: Communication Network (Senegal)
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Figure A.5.: Communication Network (Uganda)
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A.4.2. Structural Equivalence
Figure A.6.: Reduced Graph: Communication (Senegal)
Figure A.7.: Reduced Graph: Belief (Senegal)
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Figure A.8.: Reduced Graph: Communication (Uganda)
Figure A.9.: Reduced Graph: Belief (Uganda)
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A.4.3. Political Inﬂuence Proﬁles
Figure A.10.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle (Senegal)
Figure A.11.: Inﬂuence Proﬁle (Uganda)
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